


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Gorbachev's Party Loyalty Hinders Reform

91UN0940A Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 12, Dec 90 pp 20-23

[Article by Igor Klyamkin, doctor of philosophical sciences, under the rubric: "The Times and Debates": "Can Gorbachev Abandon Socialism?"]

[Text] The article is based on a text prepared by the author for the magazine KONTINENT, which is published (in German) in the FRG.

Let us remind the reader that articles under the rubric: "The Times and Debates" may not reflect the editors' views.

At first glance the question raised in the title looks strange, since the answer to it is seemingly obvious. It seems obvious because Gorbachev himself has repeatedly answered it, and answered it in the negative. He has repeatedly declared that for him the socialist choice and the communist future are not empty words but words that express his world view, his profound personal conviction, and the purpose and meaning of his life.

Nonetheless, lately we increasingly hear voices, including voices in the press, calling on Gorbachev to abandon his views with respect to both the socialist choice (since the country did not make that choice in 1917: the Bolsheviks represented the minority, not the majority of the population) and the communist future (since the whole world, it is noted, has long since recognized it to be a utopia). Liberal politicians and ideologists keep explaining to our president that by repeating old words that everyone is sick of he loses popularity, prestige and trust, and that society is ceasing to regard him as a leader capable of moving forward along the path of the perestroika that he has already begun. But Gorbachev will not listen to these friendly and not-so-friendly wishes, and he will not respond to critical reproaches, no matter how loud and harsh they might be. At the 28th CPSU Congress he once again stated publicly that he had no intention of changing his ideological colors. And so it seems that he would prefer to preserve his socialist faith while sacrificing his prestige, that is, sacrificing his entire political career as a reformer. But then there is just one question that remains to be answered: Is that really the case?

I think it is not the case, or at least not entirely the case. I think that the reason Gorbachev does not renounce socialism and communism is by no means that he does not want to, but primarily because he cannot, and could not even if he very much wanted to. Of course, it sometimes does happen, very infrequently, that people do not abandon their convictions, even when they can, because those convictions are too dear to them, because their conscience and intellectual dignity will not allow them to. I do not rule out the possibility that Gorbachev has some sort of inner ideological limit beyond which he will not permit himself to retreat. I would venture to claim, however, that today no one, including himself,

can see that limit or guess where it lies. Today we have the right to say only that Gorbachev is capable of changing his views and forgetting his former words when circumstances not only prompt him to but permit him to, and that he has demonstrated this ability to "restructure" himself more than once or twice. Was it all that long ago, for example, that he was declaring that only the foes of perestroika could strike blows against the party, and was making hostile remarks about those who "keep suggesting to us" the idea of a multiparty system? And probably not everyone remembers these former statements of his: that's how much everything has changed. But why did Gorbachev make up his mind to delete some sacred words (regarding, say, the "leading role of the party") from his political lexicon when they started to get in his way, while others (concerning, say, communism) that are no less a hindrance he hangs on to like Luther: "Here I stand, and I cannot do otherwise."

Let me repeat once more: if we try to guess which words are genuinely sacred for him, and which he pronounces merely out of necessity, we would probably have an entertaining game to play right up to the very end of Gorbachev's political career, but we would risk not solving a single of the puzzles we had posed. After all, in the course of perestroika Gorbachev has renounced many words that in the beginning he honored as sacred. That is why I would prefer to simplify the problem to the utmost, freeing it of any romantic mysteriousness and reducing it to a simple question: just what are the reasons and circumstances that compel the Soviet president in some cases to forgo his principles without any apparent effort, but in others compel him to declare, like Nina Andreyeva, that he cannot forgo them?

By putting the question this way, we can immediately see that there is nothing mysterious about his behavior. Gorbachev was put in the role of leader by the party apparatus. And as long as that apparatus retains power, until organized forces emerge in society that are capable of forcing it out and replacing it (and that, strictly speaking, has not yet happened), the leader is forced to continuously look to it and reckon with it. And no sort of advice or criticism from the liberal camp, and no sort of public irritation and anger can be heard, much less taken as signals for action, as long as the party apparatus feels itself capable of governing, as long as it is being called on to retreat and make concessions by the alien voice of public opinion, and not by the kindred voice of its own interests. The party apparatus (and Gorbachev) agreed to strike the sacred words concerning the CPSU's leading role from Article 6 of the Constitution not when the liberal public demanded that they be deleted, but when life had already deleted them. Last December the Lithuanian Communist Party split, and it immediately became clear that the party would no longer be able to play any sort of leading role in Lithuania, and that even if Article 6 of the Constitution were retained, it would not be followed there anyway. Early this year tragic events occurred in Baku that demonstrated that in difficult circumstances the party apparatus could not guide

anyone or anything, and that no one considered it to have authority. That was in January, and in early February the conservative CPSU Central Committee, which had remained practically unchanged since Brezhnev's times, voted unanimously to amend Article 6 of the Constitution, the very article that, prior to the events in Lithuania and Baku, it had been considered sacrilege and treason to attack. Could Gorbachev have achieved that result earlier by showing greater resolve, for the lack of which he has been so greatly and angrily criticized? I do not think he could have. In any event, if he had maintained the scrupulousness with regard to parliamentary procedures that the liberal public is demanding of him, before February he would not have obtained a majority either in the Politburo, the Central Committee, or the Congress of People's Deputies. To think otherwise is to preserve the old illusions we inherited from Stalinist times to the effect that everything in our society depends on the top person, who can do anything if he wants to, so if he does not do something, it means that he does not want to.

In saying that, I am by no means aiming to defend Gorbachev from criticism. I am simply interested in a different question—what is and is not within the ability of a reformer of the communist regime who has been brought up by the agencies of authority created by that regime and is dependent on them. I want the criticism of Gorbachev to be inseparable from criticism of a regime that has exhausted itself and is in need of reform, but that is less suited to be reformed than any other.

I understand that objections will be raised to what I have said. I may be told: Let's suppose you are right; let's suppose that until this February Gorbachev really had no possibility of changing Article 6 of the Constitution and thereby exploding the legal foundation that had once been laid to prevent the structure of the party's power monopoly from losing its stability in any sort of political winds. But why wasn't it then possible to also undertake the "great repudiation" of communist ideology that opposition representative Yuriy Afanasyev advised Gorbachev to make just this March at the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies? Why, indeed? After all, in exchange for that repudiation Gorbachev was promised a new jump in his popularity, which was already starting to run short. But he not only did not listen to the good advice, he hastened to distance himself politically from the unrequested advisers. And in response he received a new portion of criticism for indecisiveness, half-baked decisions, extreme cautiousness, and an inclination to compromise with the conservatives, that is, toward accord with the people whose proper place had long since been on the political ash heap of our country's history, and not in Kremlin and other high offices.

I think, however, that not just in March but even now Gorbachev cannot renounce socialism and communism, and that even today this is not for him just a question of personal belief and individual convictions, but first and foremost a question of political behavior in light of the existing balance of forces. Should he, trying to influence

that balance, strictly adhere to the proclaimed parliamentary rules of the game—or can those rules be forgone at any moment for the sake of progress? That, I think, is Gorbachev's "to be or not to be," his main question. And I believe that he has long since made his choice: slow progress supported by the majority in party and soviet parliaments is better and more dependable than resolute and bold actions that go against that majority, no matter how conservative it might be. I am not speaking right now about whether that is a correct choice, or whether it will bring success or failure. It is perfectly possible that Gorbachev's present liberal critics will prove right, and that slow progress that follows a slow movement to the left by the parliamentary majority will result in a situation in which life refuses to reconcile itself to a snail's pace and sweeps our present Kremlin leaders from the political scene. But I want to say that in that case it will not be political timidity, indecisiveness, and a tendency toward half-way decisions that will suffer historical defeat, but the consistent liberalism of Gorbachev the reformer and his adherence to a course of parliamentary accord.

So, given the observance of the parliamentary rules of the game in today's Soviet Union, there is not a person in Gorbachev's place who could discard the old ideological banner and publicly declare that there was no socialist choice, and that the communist future had turned out to be a utopia. It is very easy to explain this. The banner, which has faded, grown pale, and no longer inspires anyone, is the banner of the party apparatus, and the words that are written on that banner about fidelity to the past choice and the beckoning of future prospects serve the present group interests of that apparatus. As long as that apparatus exists and exerts influence on power, the words that it needs will also exist; they will have meaning even while they are meaningless. On the other hand, if society finds the strength within itself to say, "Enough!" and is able to sweep aside the partocracy and completely free itself of it, the ideological lexicon that the partocracy has created will also quickly disappear. Events in Eastern Europe leave no doubt on that account. They are more persuasive than the best arguments: in order to get rid of words, it is necessary to get rid of the regime that likes those words and will not repudiate them as long as it is in power.

Yes, but has not Article 6 of the Constitution been amended in the Soviet Union? Have not party committees been forbidden to interfere in state and economic affairs? Can it be that deputies to the soviets, enterprises directors, school teachers and higher-school instructors are required to obey those committees? And if they are not required to do so, doesn't that mean that the partocracy's power is something that no longer exists, while we simply cannot get used to its absence, and are continually citing it out of old habit, and seeking justification in it for our own ideological and political timidity, as well as the timidity of the present General Secretary, who lately has simultaneously been the president, and who therefore has sufficient powers to do everything that he deems necessary?

No, it does not mean that. Because our perestroyka has encountered a very interesting and unique phenomenon: as the most organized political force, the organization that is by its very nature the most undemocratic and totalitarian (the party apparatus), today controls practically our entire process of democratization, that is, the course and results of elections, which means that it ensures itself a majority in the representative bodies. It turns out that beyond the parliaments' walls a majority sympathizes with the opponents of the party apparatus, but within the parliaments those opponents are usually in the minority. Understandably, the parliamentary majority does everything in its power to block any decisions impinging on the interests of the party apparatus. And as long as the majority is such, and no different, neither Gorbachev nor anyone else will be able to change a single one of the sacred words that the apparatus requires. I have in mind more than just "socialist choice" and "communist future." In and of themselves, these ideological symbols are powerless. But they retain power as long as the words about the "vanguard party" have not been stricken from our political lexicon. That is because the "vanguard party" is the party that maintains a high-paid apparatus and workplace organizations through which the apparatus influences the makeup of elective bodies. That is why such passions have seethed lately over whether the Communist Party should be a vanguard party or a parliamentary party. The apparatchiks have utilized their majority in soviet and party elective bodies to preserve the vanguard party. They stand firm for such a party because they understand that turning it into a parliamentary party would deprive the conservatives of their chief political weapon—a powerful apparatus—which means that by becoming a parliamentary party, it would also be lose all chance of parliamentary success.

In this situation, Gorbachev also agreed to the preservation of "vanguard party." He continues to defend a consistently liberal position with regard to an organization that is further than any other from liberalism. And he thereby continues to subject himself to increasingly more frequent and powerful attacks from the liberal public, and that public, depressed by the failure of its criticism, is increasingly losing its liberal dignity and breaking out in the cry of "Down with him!" and appealing to the crowd, seeking its support and failing to notice that it is slipping onto a road that has been laid not by liberal but by totalitarian parties.

In order not to get angry and shout, the democrats need to quit giving Gorbachev advice that he cannot take. The democrats need to recognize that the main barrier on the path of perestroyka today is not Gorbachev but a party apparatus that retains its power, along with democrats' own relative weakness. I do not know the limit to which our president wants and is able to move to the left. But I know that for us and for him himself this limit will remain a deep mystery if democracy is unable to help not only itself but also Gorbachev by growing stronger independently of him. As long as he is weaker than the

party apparatus, Gorbachev will not help democracy. But if he becomes stronger, he will not, let us hope, hinder it, and maybe will even move in its direction. As long as he faces, on the left, flaming speeches at rallies, and on the right, powerful apparatuses, he will not move to the left, and if he does so he will not admit it, in order not to irritate the rightists, and if he does admit it, it will be only to placate the leftists without taking a single step in their direction. Incidentally, that is approximately the way Gorbachev has acted so far.

I see two means that democracy can use to strengthen its political positions. I did not think up these means; life has revealed them.

The first means is to counter the conservative party apparatus with a higher level of organization and, thereby, deprive it of its monopolistic influence on the makeup of elective bodies. The fact that this task is perfectly feasible was shown by recent elections in the Baltics, Moscow and Leningrad, where the makeup of those bodies now more or less accord with attitudes in the society. I think that such victories for democracy, which turn it from sentiments expressed at rallies into institutions of authority, may speed up the democratization of the initiator of perestroyka. He may react angrily to Lithuania's impudent challenge, and may erect thinkable and unthinkable barriers on Yeltsin's path to the leadership of Russia, but without the victories of Landsbergis and Yeltsin and without reconciliation with those victories, the present Gorbachev himself would not exist: the democrats' victories preserve him for his own perestroyka and nudge him forward. Granted, he continually lags behind; granted, he is moving very, very cautiously along a track that has been laid not by him but by the spontaneous development of life; but for me personally what is more important is not his cautiousness, but the fact that he is not hindering this development, realizing, it seems to me, that it is impossible to hinder it. And since that is the case, the democrats should first of all be concerned about themselves and think about what depends on them alone, and no one else. They should think how quickly they can win positions for themselves and how strong these positions are, and not seek the reasons for their weakness in the slowness and mistakes of others, or in the notion that someone has not given them something in time. They should say to themselves: if we want to be in the democratic opposition to the Kremlin, if we want to be reckoned with in this connection, let us be a strong opposition, and let us not complain about those in power and not take offense at them for their unwillingness to become what we want them to be, but let us utilize the entire arsenal of democracy in order to take power ourselves. Right now nothing more is needed. Therefore, I personally prefer the stand taken by the Baltic people's fronts, which have managed to remove the party apparatus from power, to that of democrats from other regions, who have been unable to do that and are angry at Gorbachev for not doing it for them.

The second means of strengthening democracy and weakening the party apparatus is being used (regardless of subjective goals and motives) by many communists. I have in mind quitting the party. Following the 28th Congress the liberal wing of the CPSU split into two groups: those quitting the party and those remaining in it. Those who have quit it have explained their positions many times in public statements, and everything here is clear. Those who have remained have expressed themselves less frequently and more cautiously, but as far as one can understand, they do not want to abandon the party to the conservative apparatchiks; or even more precisely, they do not want to leave Gorbachev and his group in a conservative encirclement. I understand those who have remained, and I believe the purity and nobility of their motives, but I am convinced that they are not right. Because the party in which they are remaining is a party in which the apparatus's positions, though shaken, are still very strong. And the principal interest of the party apparatus today consists primarily in not allowing the transition to the market. Here there can be no illusions. Where the market exists, the toilers of the party apparatus will find no work. And one need not deceive oneself with arguments to the effect that the apparatus also has diverse people, that it also has proponents of the market, as well as clever operators who have quickly "restructured" themselves, i.e., attached themselves to joint enterprises and other lucrative spots. I am speaking about a group, corporate interest, an interest with respect to which some people may be mistaken, but which does not therefore cease to exist. Let the final day of the 28th Congress warn us against naive illusions. Its results were already clear, the victory of Gorbachev and defeat of his conservative opponents were already a fact, and the party's policy of moving toward a market economy had already been adopted. Yet after all that a person came to the rostrum and read a minority resolution condemning that policy without reservation and demanding that it be put up for a vote, and he gained the support of more than 1,000 people, i.e., approximately one-fourth of the congress. The party apparatus cannot be a proponent of the market. In order for its position to change, it would have to cease to be the party apparatus, the power of which, incidentally, lies in the fact that nearly 20,000,000 Soviet people are still prepared to voluntarily maintain it with their donations, which are called membership dues. It seems to me that a person who favors the market and democracy, but at the same time stays in the party is simply deceiving himself and others. And that, incidentally, does not mean helping Gorbachev deepen perestroika if he really wants to.

I think that the distinctive feature of the present political situation in the Soviet Union consists in the fact that Gorbachev and his group have not yet exhausted their reforming resources, while the party of which they are members and to which they are fettered by virtue of their political origins has already exhausted them; unfortunately, it can now only retard the movement, not accelerate it. I think that the only way to help Gorbachev the reformer today is by leaving his party, as Yeltsin, Popov

and Sobchak have done, as several other members of the interregional group have done, and as 54 of Russia's people's deputies have done. Because, I repeat once again, the only thing that can detach Gorbachev from the party apparatus and speed up his (Gorbachev's) movement toward democracy is victories by democracy over the party apparatus, and victories by democracy mean, first and foremost, the establishment of bodies of power resisting the old apparatus; and in my opinion it is impossible to resist it while remaining a party member, because remaining a party member means continuing to be dependent on its apparatus and to support it financially.

I recognize that not everything in my position may seem clear. I foresee, in particular, a question: what sort of help for Gorbachev is it that is called on that leaves him without a party? It is an understandable and reasonable question, but at present it can be answered only in the most general sense. One might say that sooner or later the day will come when Gorbachev will need to make a choice whether to remain a reformer or a Communist. In this case, ceasing to be a Communist by no means indicates that the president should become a social democrat or Cadet, or apply to join Travkin's party. Let us not forget, after all, that Yeltsin, while leaving one party, has not joined another. And I think that will not hinder but help him remain a reformer who is supported by millions of people—both those who are members of various parties, and those who are not. It may be that Gorbachev will never make up his mind to embark on the path that Yeltsin and his followers have blazed, even when there is no party apparatus tying his hands. Well, in that case we will be able to say that his communist faith is so strong that renouncing it would be tantamount to renouncing himself. Then we will be able to say: there is the limit that it is not for Gorbachev to cross. And thereby to say: there is the profound personal drama of the initiator of perestroika, who reached the point that he could no longer keep up with it.

But it is too early to say that yet.

I wrote all this in July, immediately after the 28th CPSU Congress, and I am completing it at the end of October, almost immediately after the USSR Supreme Soviet voted for the Basic Guidelines of Economic Reform proposed by the president. Since that time a good many important events, some inspiring and some depressing, have occurred that merit special analysis, but I have no grounds for asserting that they have developed according to any sort of logic that is fundamentally different from that described above.

Soon after the congress M. S. Gorbachev, speaking in Odessa, came out officially for the first time for allowing private property, about which he was also speaking no so long ago only in the sense of an idea that "was being suggested to us." But in both that and subsequent speeches, the president not only did not renounce the

"socialist choice" but, to the contrary, started insisting on it even more definitely and firmly, as though he were trying to compensate for his concession regarding private property. The reason, I think, has not changed; although the "socialist choice" most likely is intended to serve as an ideological tranquilizer not only for party apparatchiks, but for all those who will not be able to or want to choose private property.

However, Gorbachev moved to the left even earlier, in late July and early August. Having freed himself at the 28th Congress from the patronage of conservatives in the top echelons of the central party leadership, he decided, as you will recall, on a political alliance with Yeltsin, who had just quit the party, and also on their joint creation of a group that would work out a program for the transition to the market as an alternative to the government program. After that program had been prepared, the president, after making a few amendments, presented it to the Supreme Soviet deputies in his name. But it very quickly turned out that the government, backed by the central departments and, especially, the military-industrial complex (after the partocracy, the second most powerful force in the old system), was in no hurry to give up and was prepared for stubborn and stiff resistance. It also turned out that a majority of the parliament was unprepared to vote for the presidential program. And then the president once again acted in full accord with the logic that has been discussed here. He gave in to the majority of the Supreme Soviet and transformed the concrete program into abstract "Basic Guidelines," which were adopted.

After that, M. S. Gorbachev was once again criticized for inconsistency and indecisiveness, and the criticism, of course, was fair, but in this case it is not that but something else that interests me. I am once again concerned not so much about what Gorbachev failed to do as about the fact that the people to his left lacked the power to influence the decisions of the union and republic parliaments (after all, no one but Russia ever did adopt the "500 days" program in the autumn, although practically all the republics responded to it approvingly beforehand.) In September and October everyone suddenly discovered a very simple and sad truth: the leftists, finding themselves in power, had not yet been able to create real economic and political power structures, and that means that they still had no levers for carrying out radical reforms in the economy. Granted, they had extensive popular sympathy on their side, but sympathy is still not power. Therefore Gorbachev—and one must recognize this fully and clearly—decided, it seems to me, to use the old institutions of power, especially the economic departments and executive agencies of the soviets, for the transition to the market. Naturally, he meant to do so by adapting them for the accomplishment of new tasks and taking into account the degree of adaptation they had already attained.

That, strictly speaking, is the essence of the option that was adopted for the transition to the market, an option,

of course, that you can in no way call radical: it is a moderate conservative option. But it won out—and that is the main conclusion that the democrats ought to draw—because democracy proved powerless to put up anything to counter it. I have in mind not programs, not slogans, not appeals to citizens, and not the presence or absence of elective bodies and governments, but institutions of power that are at least to some extent commensurate in political and economic weight with those that were established long before perestroika and that are prepared to change in order to adapt to the new currents, but that have no intention whatsoever of voluntarily departing the scene, yielding it to competitors that are incapable of giving them any competition.

If Russia's new leaders themselves admitted that they had no real authority, that authority is not just ministerial portfolios and parliamentary mandates, but first and foremost, money, including hard currency, and, finally, the army and the security and law-enforcement agencies, they thereby admitted that the radical reform option had no chance. And whether it will have any such chance in the future depends on the future successes or failures of the course that has been adopted and the future power (or powerlessness) of our democracy.

Law on Protecting Honor, Dignity of USSR President Published

91UN0954A Moscow *VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR* in Russian No 22, 30 May 90 p 487

[“USSR Law 391: On Protecting the Honor and Dignity of the USSR President”]

[Text] Recognizing that it is inadmissible to allow injury to the honor and dignity of the USSR president as the head of the Soviet State, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR resolves:

Article 1. Public insult of the USSR president or slander directed at him

—is punishable by fine up to 3,000 rubles or by corrective labor of up to two years, or by incarceration of up to three years.

The same actions but accomplished through the use of the press or other mass media

—are punishable by corrective labor for up to two years or incarceration of up to six years.

Article 2. The mass media organ that published the material insulting the USSR president or containing slander directed at him, is subject, by decision of the court, to a fine of up to 25,000 rubles.

Operations of a mass media organ that repeatedly disseminates materials insulting the USSR President or containing slander directed at him, may be ordered to cease by the court decision.

**M. GORBACHEV, president,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.**

Moscow, Kremlin, 14 May 1990

No. 1478-I.

**Decree Implements Law Protecting Honor,
Dignity of President**

*91UN0954B Moscow VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA
NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I
VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR in Russian No 22,
30 May 90 pp 487- 488*

[USSR Supreme Soviet decree "392: On Procedures To Apply and Implement the USSR Law: 'On Protecting the Honor and Dignity of the USSR President'"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To put into effect the USSR law: "On Protecting the Honor and Dignity of the USSR President" from the date it is published.
2. To clarify that public insulting of the USSR president is meant by a deliberate denigration of his honor and dignity, expressed in indecent form.

Slandering the USSR president means disseminating patently false statements disgracing him.

Public statements that contain critical remarks in regard to activities of the head of the Soviet State—the USSR president—as well as to the policy conducted by him, are not subject to application of the USSR law: "On Protecting the Honor and Dignity of the USSR President."

3. To resolve that the preliminary investigation of cases covered by the USSR law: "On Protecting the Honor and Dignity of the USSR President" is to be conducted by the procuracy organs' investigators in accordance with the criminal process legislation of the USSR and the Union republics.

4. Mass media organs or their subunits (radio and television programs and such) that published materials containing insults to the USSR president or slander directed at him, may be prosecuted after the court renders a verdict of "guilty" in regard to a specific person (persons) who committed the insult of the USSR president or slander directed at him.

5. To recommend to the supreme soviets of the Union republics to bring the Union republics' legislation into conformance with this Law.

**A. LUKYANOV, chairman,
USSR Supreme Soviet**

Moscow, Kremlin, 21 May 1990

No. 1490-I.

New USSR Law on Invalids' Rights

Law Enacted

*91US0264A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian First Edition
p 4*

[Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 11 Dec 90: "On the Implementation of the USSR Law: 'On the Fundamental Principles of the Social Protection of Invalids in the USSR'"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the USSR resolves:

1. To implement the USSR law: "On the Fundamental Principles of the Social Protection of Invalids," as of 1 January 1991, except for the provisions specified by Articles 9, 10, and 11 of the law.
2. To propose that the Supreme Soviets of union and autonomous republics bring union and autonomous republic legislation into conformity with the USSR law: "On the Fundamental Principles of the Social Protection of Invalids in the USSR."

To recommend that the Supreme Soviets of union and autonomous republics pass corresponding legislative acts drawing from the provisions of the USSR law: "On the Fundamental Principles of the Social Protection of Invalids in the USSR."

3. To set the following effective dates:

a) the provisions specified by Article 9 of the law that deal with the planning and development of population centers, the construction of residential areas, the development of plans for the construction and renovation of buildings, structures, complexes, and lines of communication, as well as for the production of means of transportation, and means of communication and information, shall go into effect as of 1 January 1992;

b) the provisions specified by Article 9 of the law that deal with the construction of objects of the social infrastructure, as well as the production and acquisition of means of transportation, and means of communication and information, shall go into effect as of 1 January 1995.

4. To establish that, with the exception of the re-equipping of buildings of railroad stations, sea and river ports, airports, and intercity bus stations, the adaptation for use by invalids of all objects of the social infrastructure [already] in operation (Article 10 of the law) must be completed by 1 January 2000. From such time on, the operation of these objects without adaptations for their use by invalids (including those using wheelchairs and seeing-eye dogs) is prohibited.

The re-equipping for access by invalids (including those using wheelchairs and seeing-eye dogs) of buildings of railroad stations, sea and river ports, airports, and intercity bus stations [already] in operation, must be begun in 1991 and completed no later than 1 January 1995.

The equipping of trains with at least one car accessible by invalids (including those using wheelchairs and seeing-eye dogs), as well as the adaptation of certain airplanes and sea and river vessels for access by invalids, must be completed by 1 January 1993.

5. That the provisions of Article 12 of this law that establish economic liability for nonfulfillment of the requirement for providing access by invalids to transportation and other objects of the social infrastructure, be implemented within the time frames established in accordance with points 3 and 4 of this Resolution.

6. To recommend that union and autonomous republic higher organs of state power and administration resolve the following questions:

On the time frames and procedures for organizing a network of rehabilitation centers as provided for by Article 20 of this law, as well as their finance, material and technical supply, and personnel acquisition;

On the creation of reserves of inexpensive consumer goods, and the procedure for their distribution to invalids as one of the important measures for their social protection under the conditions of the transition to a market [economy];

On the rendering of assistance by public invalid organizations, for the creation of specialized enterprises and the consolidation of their material foundations;

On the improvement of the supply of materials and equipment to enterprises of republic invalid communities, and the preservation and expansion of long-term economic ties with enterprises supplying them with goods and products.

7. To do the following for the USSR Council of Ministers by 1 July 1991:

Bring the decisions of the USSR government into conformity with the USSR law: "On the Fundamental Principles of the Social Protection of Invalids in the USSR;"

Ensure the revision or annulment by USSR ministries, state committees, and departments, of standard acts contradicting this law;

Ensure the drafting of the Statute on Individualized Rehabilitation Programs;

Ensure the preparation of a list of evidential items on the basis of which a person may be recognized as an invalid, with special attention to invalids since childhood who received wounds, contusions, or were maimed during the Great Fatherland War;

Prepare proposals on the formation of the Union Fund for the Social Protection of Invalids;

Stipulate concrete measures for the social protection of invalids during the transition to a market economy.

8. To approve the Concept of the Basic Directions of State Policy Regarding the Problems of Disability in the USSR presented by the USSR Council of Ministers.

By 1 July 1991—taking into account the provisions of the law, as well as the suggestions expressed by USSR people's deputies—to confirm for the USSR Council of Ministers measures for the realization of this concept by ensuring priority fulfillment of the following tasks within the next five years:

The organization of highly qualified medical and medicinal assistance for invalids;

The preparation of rehabilitation and social-security specialists, including abroad;

The creation of special work places for invalids at enterprises, and the development of a network of specialized enterprises that use invalid labor;

The development of scientifically based standards and forms of social assistance to persons in light of their disabilities;

The granting of supplemental discounts to invalids using rail and other forms of transportation on the Union scale.

Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet A. Lukyanov
Moscow, The Kremlin, 11 December 1990.

Text of Law

91US0264B Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian First Edition
p 4

[USSR Law signed by President M. Gorbachev on 11 Dec 90: "On the Fundamental Principles of the Social Protection of Invalids in the USSR"]

[Text] This law defines the fundamental principles of state policy on invalids, with a view to provide them opportunities equal to those of all other citizens of the USSR for realizing rights and freedoms; to remove impediments to their daily activities; and to create favorable conditions that allow invalids to lead their lives to the fullest and actively participate in the economic and political life of society, as well as fulfill their duties toward the state.

The state shall implement measures for the protection of the health of the populace, the prevention of disability, and the creation of conditions for the integration of invalids into society.

I. General Provisions

Article 1. Principles of the Legal Status of Invalids

Invalids in the USSR shall enjoy all the socioeconomic and individual rights and freedoms secured by the Constitution of the USSR, the constitutions of union and

autonomous republics, and other legislative acts of the Soviet Union and union and autonomous republics.

Discrimination against invalids is prohibited and punishable by law.

Article 2. Definition of the Concept of Invalid

An invalid is a person who requires social assistance and protection because of impediments to daily activities as a result of the presence of physical or mental handicaps.

Impediments to a person's daily activities are evinced by the complete or partial loss of the ability or potential of taking care of oneself, of mobility, orientation, social intercourse, control over one's behavior, or engaging in labor.

Recognition of a person as an invalid shall be done in the established manner by state organs so empowered.

Article 3. Social Protection of Invalids

In providing social protection to invalids, the state shall create for them the conditions necessary for individual development and for the realization of creative and productive potential and abilities by taking the needs of invalids into account in appropriate state programs, and by allocating social assistance in the forms provided for by legislation, with a view to remove obstacles in the realization by invalids of their rights to health care, work, education and professional training, and housing and other socioeconomic rights.

The state shall establish supplemental guarantees for invalids for the realization of their rights and legal interests, and shows special concern for invalid children.

Privileges for invalids and families that include invalids, in the allocation, acquisition, or construction of housing, and in their use of it, shall be established by housing legislation of the Soviet Union and union and autonomous republics.

Article 4. Protection of Rights, Freedoms, and Legal Interests of Invalids

The protection of rights, freedoms, and legal interests of invalids shall be provided by the state through judicial or other means established by law.

A citizen has the right to judicially challenge a decision by an authorized state organ on the recognition or non-recognition of him as an invalid.

Officials and other citizens guilty of infringing upon the rights, freedoms, or legal interests of invalids, shall bear material, disciplinary, administrative, and criminal liability, as established by law.

Article 5. Participation by Public Organizations and Citizens in the Development and Adoption of Solutions for the Problems of Invalids

In accordance with their charters, public organizations shall take part in the resolution of problems associated with the social protection of invalids, as well as in the financing of corresponding measures.

When resolving matters concerning the interests of invalids, state organs—as well as enterprises, institutions, and organizations, regardless of the forms of property, or economic management*—shall enlist representatives of public invalid organizations in the development and adoption of appropriate solutions.

*Hereafter, simply “enterprises, institutions, and organizations”.

Invalids and their legal representatives have the right to participate in taking decisions directly affecting their interests and to receive the necessary information.

Article 6. Legislation on the Social Protection of Invalids

Unless otherwise provided for by a Union treaty, the following shall be determined by legislation of the Soviet Union:

The principles of the social protection of invalids, irrespective of their place of residence within the territory of the USSR;

The procedure and conditions for the allocation to invalids of minimum social assistance from resources of the union budget, taking into account the price index level;

The procedure for establishing and financing all-union programs for the social protection of invalids;

The fundamental provisions on providing the teaching, general education, and professional training of invalids, their placement in jobs, and job protection.

With the exception of the points of this article enumerated above, all public relationships in the sphere of the social protection of invalids shall be regulated by legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Article 7. International Treaties With the USSR Pertaining to the Social Protection of Invalids

If rules and regulations other than those provided for in this law are established by an international treaty with the USSR, then the rules and regulations of the international treaty shall be applicable.

II. Creation of Conditions for Unimpeded Access by Invalids to the Social Infrastructure

Article 8. The Provision of Access by Invalids to Dwellings and Other Objects of the Social Infrastructure

State organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations shall create the conditions for access by invalids (including those who use wheelchairs and seeing-eye dogs) to domestic, public, and production buildings, structures,

and premises, for unimpeded use of public transportation and transportation nets, means of communication and information, and for unrestricted travel and movement.

Article 9. Consideration for the Needs of Invalids During Planning and Construction of Objects of the Social Infrastructure

The planning and development of population centers, the construction of residential areas, the development of plans, the construction and renovation of buildings and structures, including airports, railroad stations, sea and river ports, complexes and lines of communication, as well as the development and production of means of transportation, including private vehicles, and means of communication and information, without the adaptation of such objects and means for access and use by invalids, is not permitted.

Article 10. Adaptation for Use by Invalids of Objects of the Social Infrastructure [Already] in Operation

Means of transportation, communication and information, and other objects of the social infrastructure (Articles 8 and 9) that are [already] in operation must be adapted for access and use by invalids in the manner and under the conditions stipulated by union, republic, and local organs of state power and administration as appropriate, and with the participation of public invalid organizations.

In those instances when it is not possible to adapt such objects for access by invalids, measures necessary to ensure the satisfaction of the needs of invalids must be developed and carried out by appropriate enterprises, institutions, and organizations.

Article 11. Adaptation of Living Premises for Access and Use by Invalids

Living premises of invalids or families that include invalids must be equipped with special mechanisms and adaptations in accordance with individualized invalid rehabilitation programs.

The equipping of such living premises shall be carried out by local Soviets of People's Deputies, enterprises, institutions, and organizations at whose disposal are housing funds. The equipping of detached dwellings shall be carried out in the manner stipulated by appropriate Soviets of People's Deputies, and with the participation of public invalid organizations.

The procedure for financing such measures shall be stipulated by legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Article 12. Economic Liability for Nonfulfillment of the Obligation of Providing Invalids Access to Transportation and Other Objects of the Social Infrastructure

Enterprises and organizations that do not implement the measures provided for by this law for the adaptation of

means of transportation, communication and information, and other objects of the social infrastructure that are in operation, for access and use by invalids, shall deduct the resources necessary for the satisfaction of the needs of invalids from appropriate budgets in a manner establishable by legislation of the Soviet Union and union and autonomous republics.

Such resources may only be used for the implementation of measures for the adaptation of objects of the social infrastructure to the needs of invalids.

Article 13. Provision of Access by Invalids to Cultural and Entertainment Establishments and Sporting Facilities

Local organs of state power and administration are required to provide invalids with the conditions necessary for unrestricted access to and use of cultural and entertainment establishments and sporting facilities, and for the pursuit of physical fitness and sports, as well as to provide for the acquisition of special sporting equipment.

Invalids enjoy such services for free or under preferential terms in accordance with the legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Article 14. Participation of Enterprises, Institutions, and Organizations in the Financing of the Construction, Equipping, and Upkeep of Social and Cultural Objects and Sporting Facilities for Invalids

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations have the right to allocate resources for the financing of construction, the acquisition of equipment, and the upkeep of social and cultural objects and sporting facilities for invalids. Resources allocated for such ends are exempt from taxation.

Article 15. Social Services for Invalids

Social services for invalids, including the provision of foodstuffs and consumer goods, and the allocation of communal and other services, shall be carried out in the manner and under the conditions stipulated by local Soviets of People's Deputies, with the participation of public invalid organizations and of institutions of social assistance.

Article 16. Privileges for Enterprises and Organizations That Produce Goods and Technical Items for Invalids

Privileges for enterprises and organizations that produce industrial goods, special technical and other resources for invalids, and for those that specialize in providing services to invalids, shall be established in the manner and under the conditions stipulated by legislation of the Soviet Union and union and autonomous republics, as well as by resolutions of local Soviets of People's Deputies.

III. Medical, Professional, and Social Rehabilitation of Invalids**Article 17. Objectives of Medical, Professional, and Social Rehabilitation of Invalids**

The state shall organize and promote the formation and development of a system for the medical, professional, and social rehabilitation of invalids—a series of measures aimed at the restoration of, and compensation for, damaged or lost bodily functions, the ability to take care of oneself, the ability for various types of professional activity, as well as that allowing invalids to lead their lives to the fullest and ensuring the realization of their rights and potential.

The state shall finance and organize the conduct of scientific research and the training of specialists in the areas of medical, social, and professional rehabilitation of invalids, and the prevention of disabilities.

Article 18. Individualized Programs for the Rehabilitation of Invalids

The medical, professional, and social rehabilitation of invalids shall be carried out in accordance with individualized rehabilitation programs that are determined on the basis of medical and social examination by state organs so empowered by rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies, and with the participation of representatives of public invalid organizations.

The individualized rehabilitation program recommended to the invalid shall stipulate the concrete scope, forms, and duration of implementation of rehabilitative measures, as well as the forms of social assistance.

Article 19. Binding Nature of Individualized Rehabilitation Programs

The individualized rehabilitation program presented by an invalid is a binding document that appropriate state organs, as well as enterprises, institutions, and organizations, must carry out.

Article 20. Institutions That Carry Out the Rehabilitation of Invalids

Taking into account the needs of invalids for rehabilitative assistance, and local conditions, republic and local organs shall create a network of rehabilitation centers, including scientific production centers, departments for restorative treatment at outpatient and inpatient institutions for treatment and prevention, special training and educational institutions, specialized sanatoriums and health resorts, and specialized enterprises and institutions for the rendering of social services to invalids.

IV. Education and Professional Training of Invalids**Article 21. Provision of Conditions for the Acquisition by Invalids of Education and Professional Training**

The state shall guarantee the conditions necessary for invalids to receive education and professional training.

Organs of public education, together with health care and social security organs, are obliged to provide pre-school and extra-scholastic education to invalid children, and the attainment by invalids of a general secondary, specialized secondary, and higher education in accordance with individualized rehabilitation programs.

Article 22. Preschool Education of Invalid Children

In order to create the most favorable opportunities for the education of invalid children of preschool age, and to render necessary rehabilitative assistance, conditions shall be created in regular preschool institutions for attendance there by invalid children.

For invalid children whose health precludes the possibility of attending regular preschool institutions, special preschool institutions shall be created.

Article 23. General Secondary, Specialized Secondary, and Higher Education of Invalids

General secondary, specialized secondary, and higher education of invalids shall be conducted in regular educational institutions, or if necessary, at special educational institutions.

Educational activities shall also be organized for invalid children undergoing treatments at inpatient institutions of treatment and prevention, or rehabilitation institutions.

Article 24. Teaching and Instruction of Invalid Children in the Home

In the absence of the possibility of teaching and instructing invalid children at regular or special pre-school and educational institutions, and with consideration for the wishes of parents, teaching and instruction shall take place in the home. Moreover, one of the parents, or a guardian, shall receive material assistance and privileges in the manner and under the conditions stipulated by legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Appropriate teaching and educational institutions shall render parents assistance in the instruction of invalid children in the home.

Article 25. Extra-Scholastic Education of Invalid Children

In the interest of the all-round harmonious development of invalid children, and in order to engender in them social activeness, an interest in work, and involvement in science, technology, art, and sports, organs of public education and other state organs are required to provide access for invalid children to extra-scholastic education by creating the conditions necessary for this.

Article 26. Teaching and Instruction of Invalid Children in Inpatient Institutions

Invalid children confined to inpatient institutions shall be provided uninterrupted teaching and instruction by said institutions in close conjunction with social and work acclimatization.

Article 27. Professional Training and Skill Enhancement for Invalids

Professional training and skill enhancement for invalids shall be provided at educational institutions, enterprises, and organizations (either specialized or regular), together with institutions of social assistance in accordance with individualized rehabilitation programs.

Material assistance for invalids during the period of professional training and skill enhancement shall be implemented in the manner and under the conditions stipulated by the legislation of the Soviet Union and union and autonomous republics.

Article 28. Manner in Which Invalids Receive Education, Professional Training, and Skill Enhancement

Education, professional training, and skill enhancement of invalids shall be conducted in various manners, including on a full-time, part-time, or external basis, through instruction in special groups or classes, or by way of individualized lesson plans, including instruction in the home.

Article 29. Sign Language

The state recognizes sign language as a means of interpersonal communication.

The legal status and the sphere of application of sign language shall be stipulated by legislation of the Soviet Union and union and autonomous republics.

V. Invalid Labor

Article 30. Realization by Invalids of the Right to Labor

In order to realize the creative and productive abilities of invalids, and taking into account their individualized rehabilitation programs, invalids are guaranteed the right to work at enterprises, institutions, and organizations with normal work conditions, at specialized enterprises, and in *tsekhs* and *uchastoks* that use invalid labor, as well as to partake in self-employment or other labor activities not prohibited by law.

Except in instances when on the basis of the conclusions of medical and social examination, the state of an invalid's health interferes with the fulfillment of his professional duties or endangers the health and work safety of others, refusal to conclude a labor contract or to promote, dismiss, or transfer of an invalid to a different job without his consent, on the grounds of disability, is not permitted.

Article 31. Provision of Employment for Invalids

In order to provide employment for invalids, state organs, along with the participation of public invalid organizations, shall establish quotas at enterprises, institutions, and organizations, in the amount of not less than five percent of the work force ([if] not less than 20 persons) in the manner stipulated by legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations that do not provide work billets reserved for invalids, or that avoid placing them in jobs, shall pay compensation to local organs of state power for expenditures associated with job placement and material assistance rendered to invalids, in a manner establishable by legislation of union and autonomous republics.

Taking into account the needs of invalids and local peculiarities, specialized enterprises, *tsekhs*, and *uchastoks* shall be created for the utilization of invalid labor.

Local organs of state power and administration shall render the assistance necessary to invalids who work in the home, and to those who are self-employed, in the allocation of non-dwelling premises for such activities, and in the acquisition of raw materials and the sale of products.

Article 32. Work Conditions for Invalids

Such work conditions as are necessary shall be created for invalids employed at enterprises, institutions, and organizations in accordance with their individualized rehabilitation programs.

Work conditions, including compensation for labor, the schedule for work and breaks, and the length of annual and supplementary vacations established in the collective or individualized work contract, may not worsen the situation or restrict the rights of invalids as compared to other workers.

Article 33. Advantages and Privileges for Enterprises Utilizing Invalid Labor

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations in which not less than 30 percent of the total work force employed are invalids, enjoy the right to preferential taxation, financing, and material and technical assistance.

In instances where invalids constitute more than 50 percent of the total work force, enterprises, institutions, and organizations are exempt from paying taxes and other dues.

The procedure and conditions for providing preferential taxation, financing, and material and technical assistance to enterprises, institutions, and organizations utilizing and providing invalid labor, shall be established by legislation of the Soviet Union and union and autonomous republics.

VI. Social Assistance for Invalids**Article 34. Forms of Social Assistance**

Social assistance for invalids shall be rendered in the form of monetary disbursements (pensions, grants, one-time payments), the provision of technical and other resources, including automobiles, wheelchairs, prosthetic and orthopedic devices, publications with special print, hearing aids and beepers, as well as through services for medical, social, and professional rehabilitation, and for the handling of everyday chores.

The procedure for providing invalids with pensions and grants shall be stipulated by legislation on pensions and social security.

The procedure for rendering free professional medical assistance to invalids shall be stipulated by health care legislation of the Soviet Union and union republics.

The provision of medicines and drugs for invalids, the allocation to them of technical and other resources, as well as the rendering of services for the handling of everyday chores, shall be carried out for free or on preferential terms in a manner establishable by legislation of the Soviet Union and union and autonomous republics.

Article 35. Allocation of a Technical or Other Resource to an Invalid

A technical or other resource shall be allocated to the invalid for free or on preferential terms in accordance with his individualized rehabilitation program.

If the technical or other resource envisaged by the individualized rehabilitation program can not be made available to an invalid by a governmental organ, or if an invalid has acquired an appropriate resource at personal cost, he shall be paid compensation in the manner established by legislation of the Soviet Union and union and autonomous republics.

Article 36. Treatment at Home. Inpatient Institutions for Social Assistance to Invalids

Invalids who require care and assistance from others shall be provided medical and everyday services in the home or in inpatient institutions by organs of social assistance.

The state shall promote the development of a network of inpatient institutions of social assistance to invalids requiring the care of others.

Article 37. Rights of Invalids in Boarding Houses and Other Inpatient Institutions of Social Assistance

The living conditions of invalids in boarding houses and other inpatient institutions of social assistance must ensure invalids the opportunity for realizing their rights and legal interests, and for facilitating the maximum satisfaction of one's personal needs.

If as the result of rehabilitative measures it is no longer necessary for an invalid to continue living at a boarding house or other inpatient institution of social assistance, he must be provided with decent housing by local organs of state power in accordance with the requirements of Article 11 of this law.

Upon reaching adulthood, invalid children confined to inpatient institutions who are orphans or are deprived of the guardianship of parents, have the right to receive living quarters through exceptional procedures in accordance with their individualized rehabilitation program, should it envisage the possibility of taking care of oneself and leading life independently.

Article 38. State Organs Rendering Social Assistance to Invalids

Social assistance shall be rendered to invalids by local Soviets of People's Deputies and their executive and administrative organs, by organs of social security, health care, public education, culture, physical education and sports, and other state organs on the basis of the conclusions of medical and social examination (by committees of medical and labor experts, specialized expert services, and medical consultative committees) in accordance with legislation of the Soviet Union and union and autonomous republics.

Article 39. Sources for Financing Social Assistance

Social assistance shall be granted at the expense of the resources of union, republic, and local budgets, as well as voluntary contributions from organizations and citizens.

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations that finance measures connected with the rendering of social assistance to invalids, shall be granted taxation privileges in the manner and under the conditions stipulated by legislation of the Soviet Union and union and autonomous republics.

VII. Public Invalid Organizations**Article 40. Right of Invalids To Create Public Organizations**

In order to defend their rights and interests and render mutual support and services, invalids and persons representing them have the right to create public organizations, including various funds, in the manner established by legislation of the Soviet Union and union and autonomous republics.

Unless otherwise provided for by law, a quota shall be established for public invalid organizations during elections to organs of state power and local self-government.

State organs shall render all manner of support and assistance to public invalid organizations and organizations representing the interests of invalids.

Article 41. Privileges and Advantages Grantable to Public Invalid Organizations

Public invalid organizations and their enterprises, institutions, and organizations enjoy taxation privileges and

advantages in a manner stipulatable by legislation of the Soviet Union and union and autonomous republics.

The President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
M. Gorbachev

Moscow, The Kremlin, 11 December 1990.

Deputies Demand Zaslavskiy's Resignation

91UN0937A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 20 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by N. Garifullina: "An Ultimatum Through the Curtain"]

[Text] Most likely, an emergency of rayon significance that occurred last week at a session of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet of Moscow will go unnoticed against the background of current cataclysms. This is what happened there. Seventy-eight out of the 122 deputies present at the meeting (the entire body of deputies numbers 148 elected representatives) voted in favor of placing on the agenda the issue of giving a vote of no confidence to Chairman of the Rayon Soviet I.I. Zaslavskiy and relieving him of his responsibilities.

Our readers will exclaim: It cannot be! The press and television have created an image of Ilya Iosifovich as the most democratic of all our democrats, a refined intellectual, a resourceful orator and politician advocating the most radical reforms. To be sure, he also gained notoriety for his openly advertised hatred for the CPSU, October, and our entire post-October history. However, as they say, such is the spirit of the time.

"A town meeting" got noisy last Wednesday in the lobby of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet on 8 Shabolovka Street. Voters split into two opposing groups. Some carried placards such as "Hands off Zaslavskiy!" (I was told that many of them came from Zelenograd for some reason); on the contrary, the placards of others demanded "Zaslavskiy, resign!" Instead of a placard, one woman held a clipped article from a city newspaper: "Deputy Zaslavskiy Asks To Communicate." The article tells the story of a family of disabled Muscovites (the father is a disabled veteran of the Great Patriotic War) unable to move into an apartment allocated by the rayon executive committee because an Altshuller has occupied it illegally. USSR People's Deputy and Chairman of the Rayon Soviet Zaslavskiy is taking part in her case personally.

A sharp character from the detachment of Zaslavskiy's fans advanced resolutely on the quiet woman with the newspaper clipping: "How much did the Communists pay you?"

She responded with dignity (I found out her name—G.V. Poddubskaya): "I am a nonparty member; I protect the disabled free of charge." The "fan" would not quit: Crude curses were hurled. In general, the show that occurred that evening in the building of the rayon soviet resembled a drama fading into a farce.

...The meeting did not begin at the appointed time, 1600 hours, because there was no quorum. There was talk of "democrats" deciding to boycott the discussion of the chairman. By 1700 hours, 90 deputies were registered, the quorum being 100. On a suggestion from the floor, a roll call was taken, and two more deputies were added.

They asked from the presidium: "What are we to do?"

The answer from the floor was: "Stick it out to the end, and wait for a quorum."

We waited. A detailed conversation started all by itself. How do the deputies view the situation in the soviet? What do they find unsatisfactory about the chairman? It turned out that matters were complicated well beyond these curious questions.

Chairman of the Rayon Soviet Permanent Commission for Health Care G.V. Markov said: "I will begin with the time they suggested that I become a people's deputy. I became a supporter of Zaslavskiy after he spoke at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies. It appeared that this man was really working to further democracy. In general, I was tired of what had been happening. My grandfather was a ChK [Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution, Speculation, and Sabotage] general, and was subjected to reprisals in 1939. My life was harsh. In a word, I was motivated to help Zaslavskiy in his struggle. I joined the ROI (Rayon Associations of Voters—note by N. Garifullina), and my preelection struggle began. When I take a detached look at these events now, I see what they were really about. An undisguised struggle for power was under way in which all moves were thought through and calculated. After all, Zaslavskiy's emissaries were trained in America; he had a fine-tuned team. We went in teams to preelection meetings and made them fail to our benefit. We took specified seats and, if there was a candidate other than 'ours' we just 'smothered' him any which way—by intellect, shouting, or boorishness. Zaslavskiy won elections to the post of rayon soviet chairman in a landslide; he was supported by about 80 deputies.

"However, everything that came later... I admit I am on the verge of a breakdown. I rebelled when I saw that my sector, health care, was being driven into a condition of hopeless deficit. He responded: This has to be done. Handing over a building to the medical guild was the first thing Zaslavskiy undertook. In this guild was Valeriy Semenovich Kozak and the doctor who treats Zaslavskiy personally. Nobody knows what the guild does, not even our health care commission. Nothing is being done for the rayon. Demands of our commission to allocate buildings for medical centers, for example, an internal medicine center, got bogged down. However, the centers that Zaslavskiy needs are being commissioned. Zaslavskiy appointed V.S. Kozak chief of the rayon health care department by an arbitrary decision, contrary to the opinion of our commission (eight people against one). He could not care less about the opinion of deputies.

“...This is not the first time the issue of Zaslavskiy’s resignation has come up. Personally, I have said at every meeting during the three months of this session: ‘Zaslavskiy, resign, the people do not support you.’ Recently, a paper signed by 500 disabled people came demanding his resignation. There are districts in which 80 percent of the voters are against him by now. He has lost trust and popularity because he has not done anything for the rayon. He has not acted on a single resolution that the deputies demanded; more often than not he has given the resolutions a hostile reception. Therefore, a decline of Zaslavskiy’s authority is not unexpected...”

The auditorium began to fill up as we talked, and the fan-voters began to move from the lobby to the balconies. Another roll-call brought out 94 deputies. Several minutes later, the presidium announced that two more deputies had been “scraped up,” but there was still no quorum. Deputy A.Kh. Vlasova came to the microphone:

“Comrades! We would have a quorum if Deputies Gulyayev, Gennadiy Melnikov, Ginzburg, Zhegallo, and Chegodayev moved from the hallway to the auditorium.” Addressing the invisible chairman, she said: “Incidentally, Ilya Iosifovich Zaslavskiy is now in the presidium room. I would ask you, Ilya Iosifovich, to come and get registered.”

The appeal went unanswered. It was strange; after all, quite recently Ilya Iosifovich in his appeal to the residents of Oktyabrskiy Rayon admonished and complained about “the absence of a quorum at the meetings of the session due to the lack of discipline on the part of a number of people’s deputies and deliberate sabotage of the operation of the session by another segment of the body of deputies”: “After all, every day of its work costs more than 2,000 rubles from the budget of the rayon, which could be put to a better use.” It appeared that this time around he decided “to deliberately sabotage” himself.

One of the deputies approached us:

“Could the press take an interest in why our chairman refuses to grace the meeting with his presence?”

The situation was fantastic indeed. Taking an interest was worthwhile. We went backstage. There were some people sitting in the room of the presidium. I recognized a lady—Zaslavskiy’s wife—from numerous TV shows. She nodded towards the door: “Ilya Iosifovich just left this way.” We roamed the corridors and found Ilya Iosifovich in his own office. I introduced myself: a SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent. A silent scene followed.

“Ilya Iosifovich, I would like to know why you are not going to the session? The deputies are waiting for you!”

His shock wore off.

Enraged Ilya Iosifovich jumped up: “Who allowed you to enter? I did not give you permission to turn on your cassette recorder!”

I did not even manage to object: A recorder is as much a working instrument for journalists as, say, shovels are for diggers...

Ilya Iosifovich opened the door wide in front of me and said caustically: “This is my attitude towards your newspaper!”

“Thank you kindly! However, I would still like to ask whether you are coming to the session?”

Instead of an answer, Ilya Iosifovich noisily slammed the door—quite democratically, as, apparently, becomes an intellectual with aristocratic upbringing. Yet, several minutes later Zaslavskiy did manifest himself to the people. They calculated in the presidium that they finally had a quorum, 100 deputies were present, and they could start a meeting. However, at this point Ilya Iosifovich took the microphone and delivered an unexpected spiel:

“Esteemed colleagues, they say that man is born once and dies once... It is the first time I am being removed from the post of chairman. First, I would like to approach you with a request to at least make the setting for this procedure more or less solemn rather than the way it is being done now. Second, I would like to explain that I categorically refuse to report for this highly solemn procedure under these circumstances, and I will be forced to abandon the session. I would ask that you strike me off the quorum. Goodbye!”

He merely asked to be “struck off the quorum.” How sophisticated his knowledge of democratic arrangements is!.. He proudly retired backstage, and... there was no quorum once again to the distress of the audience. The spectacle directed by the chairman went on. Suddenly, an excited lady jumped up on the left balcony for guests:

“I represent the Democratic Party of Russia. I state my support for Chairman of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet Zaslavskiy. All democratic transformations in the rayon are associated with him. The personality of people’s deputy Zaslavskiy is inviolable!..”

She hurled angry tirades at the audience for a long time, and they had difficulty pacifying her. They announced soon that 104 deputies had signed the registration book. The farce did not work out. The meeting began after all with a delay of almost three hours. There were 27 people on the list of speakers. Debate continued for more than two hours, and all of those who went up to the podium sought tormentingly an answer to the following question: Why has Zaslavskiy, who won elections brilliantly only 10 months ago and became an idol for the deputies, not come into his own as soviet chairman? There was disappointment, pain, and bitterness over dashed hopes in the sincere, agonizing monologues of speakers. As the deputies surmised, at this time “the idol” was backstage, and for this reason the deputies addressed their speeches

to "the esteemed curtain": We know that you are there, Ilya Iosifovich... It turns out that one needs courage, a lot of it, in order to hear the truth about himself looking his colleagues straight in the eye, and not the kind that is required for public utterances in front of TV cameras. Perhaps, Ilya Iosifovich did not make out everything from behind the curtain. Therefore, let us enlist the help of our editorial cassette recorder.

Deputy A.S. German: First of all, we need to control our emotions. There is no war going on in this hall, there is no putsch by blind deputies... Everything is much more complicated. A great tragedy is taking place in our soviet and our rayon; it is your tragedy and mine regardless of the bloc to which we belong, a tragedy for voters. Ilya Iosifovich Zaslavskiy is definitely a brilliant and outstanding person. He came here through the fire of a political struggle, the struggle for power, and brought here the entire arsenal of means that were necessary for the struggle. This is the art of political intrigue. This is a search for the enemy and subsequently the destruction of the enemy. This is also a search for various groupings and the splitting of them in order to win some over to your cause and destroy others... There are also many other things. These traits, with which Ilya Iosifovich is abundantly endowed, should have been abandoned before crossing the threshold of this building, and he should have entered it with a quite different experience—the skill of rallying the people, getting them together, finding a niche for everyone, and making everyone's efforts useful and necessary. The ability to unify and inspire trust is not a quality that Ilya Iosifovich possesses.

Our tragedy—the tragedy of both those who rallied around Zaslavskiy and those who did not—is known: Our rayon is sick and tired of waiting for action while we here play these childish games—you are a democrat, a partocrat, and you are an advocate of mob rule...

We say that we are split. This is not true! We have been split on an old blueprint. They keep showing us the enemy all the time. Sometimes there are many enemies—all of the CPSU—or there is one particular person... We are called irresponsible, people who have come here out of ambition, or people who cover up their own mediocrity with the credentials of deputies. The chairman does not understand what goes on here... Indeed, we are in a blind alley. However, comrades, I swear that there is a little street at the end of this blind alley. This is the one and only street: We should replace the chairman. I hope that we will still be able to look our voters straight in the eye if this happens...

Deputy V.A. Bolshakov: A majority of our soviet consists of research associates who have never done any apparatus work. They should have been organized for such work, which Zaslavskiy failed to do. However, we are not without fault either. In principle, the presidium should leave also, together with Zaslavskiy. We have handled for the most part petty matters. Our economic policy has not been reviewed by experts once...

[Deputy A.Yu. Zhokina] I would like to say why I have come to the conclusion that Zaslavskiy should no longer be soviet chairman. In the summer, Zaslavskiy was away on business trips abroad all the time. I asked why he was not at work; after all, he wanted to become soviet chairman so much. I heard the following: The main point for him is not to return to the past... He is destroying our political, economic, and ideological system... I do not belong to any party. I am a nonparty member. However, if someone is elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet peacefully and quietly, without telling anyone that he is an anticomunist, I believe that he misleads many voters. He blocks the work of all committees and deputies. I may show this using our housing commission as a case in point. Specific issues are of no concern to him. To be sure, he receives a lot of people, but their petitions are referred to the deputies and the executive committee. He does not even monitor except for some specific cases that are of concern to him. He resolved the case of a specific person contrary to the decision of the commission and executive committee, based on a personal phone call from the RSFSR minister of education...

[Deputy G.V. Markov] Our soviet is a microcosm that reflects processes under way in our country. Our country is our Motherland, and it is very good that the number of people for whom this sacred word stands for something increases, incidentally, irrespective of ethnic background. This is what I would like to tell Zaslavskiy, but he is not in attendance; nonetheless, I would still address him because I am sure that he is listening—the people see that you, Ilya Iosifovich, and your team work in order to promote their personal welfare... Yesterday, Deputy Sergeyeva stated that we were elected "on Zaslavskiy's coattails." What she failed to do is to lay proper emphasis. It was not the people who elected us "on the coattails," but rather the ROI's organized and financed by Zaslavskiy. Being naive, I supported them initially in the belief that the well-being of the people was the goal of this organization. Where are the ROI leaders now? All of them have gotten themselves cushy jobs. As far as the people are concerned, they did not elect us "on the coattails" but in order to defend their interests.

[Deputy A.A. Nikolenko] I state my lack of confidence in Zaslavskiy. Having assessed the operation of the soviet, I will share my pain with you. The principles of economic policy were manifested in the emergence of private, monopolistic commercial structures that leave no room for competition. Our voters have experienced firsthand the "favorable effect" of inviting and registering at common legal addresses a tremendous number of commercial structures that we have so far been physically unable to find in the entire territory of our huge country...

[Deputy A.Kh. Vlasova] Zaslavskiy has created in the press the image of a democrat, an adversary of the CPSU, the administrative command system, and President Gorbachev personally. In reality, the style and method of his work are the style and method of a

rayon-caliber dictator. Of course, this is very distressing... However, since we elected him ourselves, we should also untie this knot ourselves. The main fault of Zaslavskiy is that he did not allow the body of deputies to work. Many honest, socially conscious, and politically knowledgeable people have become members of this body, but we cannot do the things we have come here to do. I can demonstrate this in my district. We have not been able to resolve a single one of the five major issues of our district. We found nine apartments suitable for residential occupancy on the ground floor of our building; according to the design they are residential space. I raised the issue of returning them to the housing stock before the executive committee. The executive committee turned us down: They said they would rent the apartments for hard currency. The formation of a self-government committee began in our district but we still cannot acquire a legal status. Ilya Iosifovich took personal charge of the court, the militia, and the procuracy, and, before going abroad, forbade submitting the candidacy of the chief of militia administration to the session for confirmation...

[Deputy Yu.I. Marenich] Market structures are effective only when there is competition; monopolies bring about very high prices otherwise. As early as May and June, I knew that Ilya Iosifovich wanted to wind down the soviet and replace it with an economic committee. However, there was no opposition because the creation of a large number of cooperatives and parties was under way. A critical situation developed on 19 August when an entire string of decisions was made on creating structures that began to smother cooperatives and small enterprises inconspicuously, little by little, and began to dictate their terms... At this point, I appealed to the chairman of the soviet and those who espoused these ideas: "Come out into the open and tell the deputies so that they will be able to make an assessment: Is this a market or a countermarket, or is it the replacement of one authoritarian system with another, even harsher one?" However, I got a categorical answer: No, no, no! Ilya Iosifovich began to take the position of monopolistic dictatorship. His personal traits shone through in the course of this struggle: Destroying any person who came out against him by whatever means, whether moral or immoral...

[Deputy B.I. Chizhikov] Initially, 99 percent of the deputies supported the Zaslavskiy program and hoped that there would be substantial changes in the operation of the soviet. However, we came to see with every passing day that I.I. Zaslavskiy was driving at usurping power...

About 20 deputies spoke in the debate. Their assessment of the personality and activities of the rayon soviet chairman were generally unambiguous. Other views were also aired. For example, they gave credit to Zaslavskiy for the fact that various parties and movements have been specifically registered in Oktyabrskiy Rayon as "the most democratic rayon." Two or three deputies shared his views of soviets as "obsolete power

structures." Having agreed that the chairman has made "a great deal of mistakes," Deputy Smotranko nonetheless cautioned that the Zaslavskiy case is "the acid test that will have nationwide repercussions and far-reaching consequences." Yet another speaker observed that a campaign against democracy is under way now, and the most democratic soviets—the Moscow Soviet, the Leningrad Soviet, and the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet are drawing criticism.

This is the same motif: "Democracy is in danger!" After a speech by E. Shevardnadze at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the "democrats" and their press have been deliberately scaring our society with the ghost of a forthcoming iron-fisted dictatorship.

Indeed, democracy is in danger, and it needs to be protected by all of us, but not against the CPSU and the president who (let us not forget it!) initiated perestroika and paved a way to democracy, but against pseudodemocrats of every description. As it is becoming increasingly clear, they are very guilty before the people and the country.

The incident at the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet is not at all an emergency of rayon significance. It reflected, as a mirror, processes under way in the democratic movement, which is not homogeneous itself. At present, this movement is not perceived by the mass consciousness in any manner except with a negative sign, having been compromised by many of its leaders who have taken a position of frantic antisovietism, anticommunism, and the disintegration of the USSR. There is a reason why the word "democrats" is no longer used without quotation marks. Meanwhile, there are many honest people in this movement who are concerned about the future of the Motherland. They sincerely believed those who called on them to rally under the slogans of democracy, and fervently desired to participate in the democratic transformation of our society. Take Yuriy Iosifovich Marenich with whom I talked. He is a section chief in the Central Institute of Economics and Mathematics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, a candidate of economic sciences, and a CPSU member since 1962. He joined the bloc Democratic Russia with hope and belief. As a deputy, he intended to develop forms of public self-government.

He admitted bitterly: "We believed sincerely that those who screamed the most about democracy lived by its laws themselves, but we were mistaken. After all, Zaslavskiy was elected soviet chairman by an absolute majority. However, the people began to see the light when they saw that in reality democratic slogans camouflaged an attempt to establish a totalitarian regime based on usurping the property of the rayon. After all, if we extend this situation to the entire country it will bring about splitting it into small independent principalities. When the deputies understood what this was about, they

demanded that the holding of posts of soviet and executive committee leaders while managing commercial enterprises be disallowed. However, our demand was not met..."

Still, it appears to me personally that even if the events at the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet are a tragedy, they are an optimistic tragedy. Something that Zaslavskiy did not even dream of happened. People's deputies understood what path their "leader" had taken, and rose to the defense of democracy, a truly popular people's power, and their own future. An effective fighting union of like-minded people, which is what a soviet should be, is finally being born in the course of this righteous struggle.

...The results of secret balloting concerning a vote of no confidence in Zaslavskiy and relieving him from the post of chairman were announced after 2300 hours. Ninety-five ballots were handed out, and 94 were found in the ballot box; 78 deputies favored his resignation, eight were against, six abstained, and two ballots were found invalid. Seventy-eight constitutes an absolute majority of the soviet, and yet it was resolved to consider the vote null: Once again, there was no quorum. A repeat vote was scheduled for the next meeting of the session....

BBC Cites Yeltsin on Kaliningrad, Kuriles

91UN0915D Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 13 Feb 91 p 3

[Unattributed comment: "The Kurile Islands... There's the Rub"]

[Text] There really is no secret that eventually does not come out. Why would such an educated and smart cooperator as Artem Tarasov suddenly accuse the USSR president of suffering from an irrepressible desire to sell the four Kurile Islands to Japan for \$200 billion? Everybody shrugged their shoulders, fully aware that Tarasov, to say it in street language, had been "substituted." Some others, including some people on television, feeling sorry

for him, explained: This was "planted" on him. Well, let us then listen to what BBC says about B.N. Yeltsin's visit to Kaliningrad Oblast.

BBC

"The timing of the visit was hardly well selected. Many Russians among those living in this area and in the neighboring Baltic republics, have accused Yeltsin of ignoring the situation with Russian national minorities, which allegedly (let us leave this "allegedly" on the conscience of the BBC commentator—RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA) are being persecuted. And since Yeltsin's political future depends on the support of the Russian people (this is truly hitting a bull's eye!—RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA), such accusations are potentially dangerous for him.

"Trying to guess the region's future gave rise to rumors that Kaliningrad will be returned to its old name of Koenigsberg and sold to Germany. This sort of wild rumor gave Yeltsin an opportunity to present himself as a protector of Russian interests. "Russia will never surrender Kaliningrad," he told local shipbuilders (we should note here that he chose not to mention that this "idea" is not being put forward by anybody in Moscow for reason of its complete historic absurdity—RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA).

"Using this opportunity (keep listening, keep listening!—RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA), Yeltsin mentioned the Kurile Islands, which, in his words, Russia will never give up either."

And then BBC touches on an explosive topic:

"The recent visit to Moscow of the Japanese foreign minister, and Gorbachev's upcoming visit to Tokyo gave rise to the rumors (but somebody does spread them!—RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA), that the Soviet Government is possibly thinking of a deal involving the Kurile Islands. Whether these rumors contain a grain of truth or not, Gorbachev was put on the defensive, and Yeltsin received one more opportunity to play his "Russian card."

Baltics**Latvian Minister Interviewed on Militia**

91UN0959A Riga BALTYSKOYE VREMYA in No 8, 4 Feb 91 p 1

[Interview with Aloiz Vaznis, minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Latvia, by Yana Rubinchik; place and date not given: "The Minister Does Not Intend To Leave"]

[Text] [Rubinchik] Mr. Vaznis, today the militia is formally under the jurisdiction of the Latvian Republic. But from conversations with rank-and-file militiamen I have come to understand that in terms of their convictions many of them are more supportive of the OMON [Special Missions Militia Detachment].

[Vaznis] The problem is that the information in the Russian language is not truthful enough. After all, only 13 percent of our workers are Latvians. Those who have not mastered the Latvian language read mainly the newspapers of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Latvia.

[Rubinchik] You have received 600 applications from people wishing to work in the militia and 250 of them are now being processed by the medical commission. How well have they been prepared? In this respect will it be possible to compare the militiaman with the "Black Berets"?

[Vaznis] No, they cannot compare with the OMON men. They will take three-month courses which include elementary legal, physical, drill, and fire arms training. It would take much more time to bring them close to the level of the OMON.

As for OMON, it all began after eight hours of patrolling when they were given three days off and were allowed to keep their automatic weapons, pistols, and nightsticks with them and to use Ministry of Internal Affairs transportation. During their days off they earned five times more than they did in a month at their main jobs.

They signed contracts with casinos and restaurants in Yurmala and with rich cooperatives. A lack of supervision led to a situation in which they decided that nobody could give them orders.

[Rubinchik] Is it possible that the OMON began to serve the Latvian Republic?

[Vaznis] I think that among the "Black Berets" there are many people who could work in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But first it would be necessary to conduct an investigation of all the events in which the OMON participated.

[Rubinchik] How do you feel about voluntary guardians of law and order?

[Vaznis] Fighting crime and maintaining order are work for professionals. It would make more sense if the funds spent on all kinds of social formations were turned over to the militia.

[Rubinchik] Do your friends and loved ones have any advice for you concerning your present situation?

[Vaznis] People I know and do not know call me up and I receive letters from entire collectives asking me to leave the post of minister. I do not have the right to leave now, although that would be both morally and materially advantageous for me. If the Supreme Soviet ever thinks I should abandon my post I will do so.

[Rubinchik] Thank you for the conversation.

Deputy Chairman Trubins on Latvian KGB

91UN0958A Riga BALTYSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian No 6, 28 Jan 91 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Janis Trubins, deputy chairman of the Latvian KGB, by Jan Rubinchik; place and date not given: "The KGB Does Not Want To Be Involved"]

[Text] [Rubinchik] Mr. Trubins, what is the KGB position on the recent events in the republic?

[Trubins] We do not know that ourselves because our status has not been determined, although in the autumn the republic government and the center were conducting negotiations about this.

[Rubinchik] Your people swore an oath of allegiance to the USSR, so they cannot serve the Latvian Republic.

[Trubins] It is possible to renounce an oath; the problem lies elsewhere: Drawing everyone into political games has already led to bloodshed. Now the OMON [Special Missions Militia Detachments] is the enemy but on 15 May it was the good guy when it prevented mass disturbances in front of the Supreme Soviet building. Everything depends on the republic government and its negotiations with the center. Of course, it is possible to create a new security service, but how much time would it take to have professionals working there? It would take a minimum of three years to train the specialists. The intellectual level of our workers is very high.

[Rubinchik] Do you have a lot of work?

[Trubins] During the past few days I have been doing nothing but meeting with journalists. It is sad but it is much easier to hold a conversation with correspondents from the West: They are more knowledgeable in questions of law.

[Rubinchik] There have been splits in many organizations recently. How monolithic is the KGB?

[Trubins] Every one of our workers may have his own opinion but at work they must adhere to the canons we have adopted. Free thinking is impermissible among people who are bearing weapons. In the event of a split in

the KGB I would immediately turn in my resignation even though my job supports my family.

Truth cannot be on the left or the right. Have many deputies visited the KGB? Very few. Our prime minister, I. Godmanis, met with a small group of us, and the rest... They have been reading too much Kalugin... We used to have a nondemocratic parliament but the apparatus was professional. Now the parliament has become democratic but it is poorly trained and the result is that a number of the most recent laws are based solely on emotion.

[Rubinchik] How do you feel about the signing of the agreement with Yeltsin?

[Trubins] If the agreement was signed for the sake of appearances before the world it is unrealistic... For we have destroyed the vertical and are placing our hopes on the horizontal, but it is so fragile...

[Rubinchik] What qualities do you value most in people?

[Trubins] Sincerity, constancy. I like it when people are able to control themselves in difficult situations and when they look for their own mistakes. Among politicians I like the ones who are able to speak the truth. How difficult it is now for Gorbunovs, who is being pressured from both sides! I am impressed by how realistic Godmanis is. Nonprofessionals irritate me.

[Rubinchik] In social situations do you never feel a lack of confidence?

[Trubins] I am a conservative in a certain sense: I am afraid of taking big steps, I love to think things out five steps in advance, as in chess. My language is too "rough" and I have suffered for that both during the years of stagnation and now. Sometimes I want to say: "That is it, I am going into a monastery!" and then I add: "Make it a convent."

[Rubinchik] Are there times when you do not think about work?

[Trubins] I used to play the saxophone and I loved to fish, but recently I have not had the time to think about anything but work.

[Rubinchik] The last question: Juris Podnieks made a suggestion at a press conference that a third, unknown force participated in the events of that bloody night in Riga...

[Trubins] There must be strict control over weapons! There are so many provocations here, but we KGB workers try not to let them draw us in. You know that we arrested five people but that was done for their own safety. I would advise you to study the condition of the isolation facility for political investigations: It is literally like a hotel!

[Rubinchik] Thank you for the conversation.

Cultural Autonomy for Latvia's Minorities

91UN0959B Riga *BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA*
in Russian No 8, 4 Feb 91 p 2

[Comments by Andrey Panteleyev, chairman of the Standing Commission of the republic Supreme Soviet for Human Rights and Nationalities Questions, recorded by T. Andrianova: "The New Law Is a Model of National-Cultural Autonomy"]

[Text] The republic parliament adopted in its first reading the law of the Latvian Republic "On the Right of National and Ethnic Groups of Latvia to Cultural Autonomy." Andrey Panteleyev, chairman of the Standing Commission of the republic Supreme Soviet for Human Rights and Nationalities Questions, comments:

This law is a constituent part of the nationalities policy of the Latvian state. It does not contain discriminatory points and it does guarantee people, according to their wishes, the possibility of conducting themselves as individuals of one nationality or another. That is, with this law the parliament is preventing the homogenization of the Latvian population.

"Every resident of the Latvian Republic who has reached 16 years of age is authorized, according to his national consciousness, to freely select, indicate, and restore his national affiliation in information for civilian registration," it says in Point 2 of the law. This is a model of national cultural autonomy. The new law, and hence the state, guarantees everyone the right to use and develop his native language, national culture, and traditions. National schools and publishing activity in the languages of the national minorities and economic activity of national societies are given the "green light" and are under the protection of the state. On the financial plane this is expressed in the fact that national schools which provide a general education will receive material aid from the state, and the property of national cultural societies will not be taxed, nor will the profit from these societies' economic activity be taxed either.

Lithuania Awaiting Clarification of Soviet Intentions

PM2702134791 Vilnius *ECHO LITVY* in Russian
12 Feb 91 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Questions Without Answer"]

[Text] The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium sent a letter to Georgiy Stanislavovich Tarazevich, representative of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 24 January. "While expressing its gratitude to you," the letter says, "the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium asks you to officially clarify the intentions of the USSR president and government regarding the elimination of the consequences of unlawful actions by the USSR Armed Forces in the Lithuanian Republic, especially during the period since 11 January 1991."

"The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium and all Lithuanian citizens would like to know whether the Soviet leadership intends:

"—to institute judicial proceedings, with regard to the outrages committed by Soviet troops, against the officials who ordered such actions;

"—to immediately release all seized installations and return them to the Lithuanian government's jurisdiction;

"—to immediately withdraw the USSR Assault Troops and Internal Troops from the Lithuanian Republic's territory;

"—to issue the necessary orders ensuring that Soviet Army troops subunits stationed on the Lithuanian Republic's territory are transferred to the regime of military bases."

No reply has been received yet.

Interior Officer on Pskov, Vitebsk Units in Attack
LD1602205391 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 26 Jan 91
p 2

[Article by Arnoldas Caikovskis: "Oppressive Uncertainty"—under the rubric "Reviewer's Comments"]

[Excerpt] MVD unit officer asserts: it was desired to topple Lithuania's government.

[passage omitted, citing instances of individuals renouncing their orders and medals, in protest of tragic events in Vilnius]

We hear radio broadcasts citing WWII participants, who in protest against paratrooper atrocities, are also relinquishing their battle merit citations. In solidarity with those seeking Lithuania's independence, certain special services staff members and soldiers are also refusing to serve any further and are issuing statements to the people, over the Lithuanian radio.

An interview, recently heard over the radio, with former MVD unit's senior lieutenant, Oleg Kryuchok, was especially interesting. He had withdrawn from CPSU membership in December and somewhat later—on the eve of the paratrooper attack on the Lithuanian radio and television building—he had warned radio listeners of a possible military overthrow. The military overthrow did not succeed, the soldiers had expectations of frightening peaceful residents with their equipment, however their hopes were dashed. They did not expect a fearless reaction, from the population, toward their bloody acts. Similar moods have also prevailed during the paratroop seizure of the press building.

The senior lieutenant recalled, what had taken place, somewhat earlier, at the MVD division headquarters. When the Vilnius city party committee announced that a meeting would take place, division officers were called to the headquarters. "I wonder, if that could be termed as a

service-related consultation," observed Oleg. It was announced to the officers, that a meeting was being prepared—"a last drop," after that, there would follow a change of government in Lithuania, upon the introduction of presidential rule, or other forces and means... "The officers were thoroughly instructed, almost to the point of orders, that they were obliged to take part in the meeting. Nearly everyone was provided with a banner, with poles that were fashioned in a way to make it possible to use them in battle. The state upheaval was planned for the ninth. It was also stated, that the date of the meeting may be changed, in order to confuse members of the population, who had assembled to protect the parliament. It was intended to reach the inside of the supreme council building and to seize the parliament, without any obstacles...thus, according to the MVD unit officer, at least the military, were aware of the planned overthrow.

It is now coming to light, that on that day, which could have been fateful for the Lithuanian parliament, the crowd at the meeting, included some members of the military, dressed in plain clothes.

According to Oleg, soldiers from Vilnius northern townlet did not take part in the press building seizure—no one had instructed them in how to fight against peaceful and unarmed people. The Pskov paratrooper division took part in the action to occupy the press building.

Prior to this, a unit of the Pskov division arrived in Lithuania, per order of USSR Defense Minister Yazov; having established itself in the northern townlet, it was housed there, unfortunately, under unbearable [living] conditions, apparently in order to make them angrier, prior to the storming attack. They have also actively participated in the storming of the radio and television building, it is thought, that the principal shock group belongs to the Vitebsk paratroop division, the tactic of the special designation group—to appear suddenly and unexpectedly, to complete their objective, to occupy (take over) and to vanish into nothingness. It seems, even the U.S. "berets of berets" pale before it. No one can state, with any certainty, where those shock troops are, who had crushed the peaceful civilians and had shot at them with "dum-dum" bullets, since that is considered an special secret. It is thought, they have been transferred from Lithuania to another republic.

Those Pskov unit paratroops, who had remained in Vilnius, were in charge of the occupied buildings. The press building currently contains mvd sub-machine gunners, who have arrived from Moscow. Whether the paratroops were also assisted by a subunit of the Dzerzhinskiy division, located outside of Moscow, is not known. by the way, not one single Lithuanian, Latvian or Estonian soldier, is included in the Dzerzhinskiy division.

Currently, mvd unit soldiers are wearing helmets and bullet-proof vests and think that they could be—

attacked. Military propagandists have contaminated their brains, considerably, in trying to convince them that armed-to-the-teeth nationalists are rampaging through Vilnius. However, the soldiers encounter—only peaceful people and are somewhat disoriented. Especially, in view of the fact, they have inherited from the paratroops the Vilnius city pavement, sprinkled with the blood of innocent people. [passage omitted on Tarazevich's role in maintaining relations with the military, General Varenikov's radio comments regarding "threat of new painful events," disavowal by General Naudziunas of his association past, present or future with the national salvation committee.]

Vilnius Decrees Aid for January Victims' Families
PM2702123991 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
9 Feb 91 p 3

[Item from roundup of Government Information Service and ELTA reports under general heading: "In the Republic Government"]

[Text] Under an instruction dated 6 February this year the Lithuanian Republic Government has instructed the Vilnius, Kaunas, and Marijampole city administrations and the Kedainiskiy and Rokishkiskiy rayon administrations to display concern for the living conditions of the families of the people who died 11-13 January 1991 as a result of USSR military aggression and to allocate these families cars in case of need. The government has also allocated out of the Lithuanian state budget a free grant of 5,000 rubles to every child of those who died who is still a minor or does not yet have an independent source of earnings.

Lithuanian CP's Burokevicius Interviewed
LD2302204191 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 26 Jan 91
p4

[Interview with M. [Mykolas] Burokevicius [1st Secretary Central Committee [CC], Lithuanian Communist Party/CPSU Platform], member Politburo CC CPSU, entitled: "Thus Spoke M. Burokevicius," by unidentified TIESA correspondent; date and location unspecified]

[Text] CPSU CC Politburo Member Discusses Party Affairs, the National Salvation Committee and the Journalists Ejected From the Press Building.

[TIESA Correspondent] First, in brief—how are things going for the LCP, what is it engaged in?

[M. Burokevicius] The Lithuanian Communist Party is functioning under difficult circumstances, currently. Today, (24 Jan-ed) we had assembled city and rayon LCP Committee secretaries. They have stated: there is no panic and also, party ranks are not dispersing. During the course of those stormy events, 17 individuals from one rayon, even expressed their desire to ask for the return of the LCP ID Cards, they had relinquished.

[Correspondent] If it is not a secret, in which one [rayon]?

[Burokevicius] The matter rests in the fact, they are persecuting intensely...

[Correspondent] Has the LCP leadership met to discuss the events of 11-18 Jan? In your estimation, to what extent have the organizers been successful or unsuccessful, in implementing their intentions?

[Burokevicius] The Bureau of the LCP CC has met on two occasions. Its adopted documents have been published in the 23 Jan issue of the TARYBU LIETUVA newspaper.

[Correspondent] It is asserted there that "provocative actions by the republic's leaders, thus led to a physical confrontation, resulting in people's deaths!" So, are the LCP and the military not at all, to blame?

[Burokevicius] The events commenced spontaneously. The fact that the people had taken to the streets, was an indication certain very serious events were developing. In my estimation, they were encouraged by Landsbergis' anti-Soviet propaganda over the radio and television. Moreover, it would have been possible for those cruel events not to have taken place, had the Soviet officer not been shot dead.

[Correspondent] Here, in that issue of your party newspaper TARYBU LIETUVA, next to the LCP Statement, appears a statement by the Lithuanian National Salvation Committee. It is asserted there, that from January 11, 1991, it "has assumed responsibility for the fate of the Lithuanian people." Are you satisfied with the results of this committee's activity?

[Burokevicius] What results?

[Correspondent] The fact that the television tower, the Television and Radio Building and the Press Building have been seized...

[Burokevicius] It would appear, that we had seized them?

[Correspondent] If this was the activity, solely, by the National Salvation Committee, how do you assess the results of its activity?

[Burokevicius] I have already provided a characterization....

[Correspondent] It is stated in the January 17, 1991 resolution by the LCP CC, "Concerning The Present Situation and the Tasks of the LCP CC: "To Approve the actions of the Lithuanian National Salvation Committee, which support USSR President M. Gorbachev's appeal to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet." Moreover, there was not one word of criticism directed against it!

[Text] [Burokevicius] You know, I have not read and analyzed all of the committee's statements, there simply

is not sufficient time [for that]. I first must examine everything in depth and only then will I be able to provide my assessment.

[Correspondent] Did the idea enter your mind, following the thoughts set fourth in M. Gorbachev's 22 Jan declaration, that various committees or front, regardless of what programs they might proclaim, may arrive at leadership only through constitutional means, that it should be better for the Lithuanian National Salvation Committee to cease its activity?

[Burokevicius] If I had direct ties with them, now, following the president's speech, I would certainly recommend that they do that. It is difficult for me to say, how they will act.

[Correspondent] And now, several questions, perhaps of more interest to journalists. The first—who appointed the chairman of the non-existent Soviet Lithuanian television committee? Was it the LCP leadership?

[Burokevicius] It is not up to the Central Committee of the LCP to decide who should be appointed chairman. That is—a state matter. It must be decided by the Union leadership. Until such time this is accomplished, people are already at work.

[Correspondent] I was astounded, by the complaints on the Soviet Lithuanian Television that the newspapers, TARYBU LIETUVA and LITVA SOVETSKAYA do not possess "Free Building and the paper warehouses, are currently in the LCP's hands...

[Budrokevicius] Noting the LCP's hands!

[Correspondent] Well then in the Military's...

[Budsrokevicius] Not in the military's either. The affairs of the Press Building are being administered by all the democratic forces of Lithuania. While, members of the LCP can only act as intermediaries. Newspaper distribution is—another matter. Since the beginning of the year, our subscribers do not receive TARYBU LIETUVA and LITVA SOVETSKAYA.

[Correspondent] Only the press circulation agency currently remains free of seizure... let us return, however, to the paratrooper-occupied Press Building. In your words, under the protection of the democratic forces, this building is terribly devastated and plundered.

[Burokevicius] After I was informed of this, I made a recommendation to the Soviet Lithuanian Procuracy to clarify this. That can also be stated with reference to all the other buildings. I could inquire, whether the procuracy has already addressed this matter.

[Correspondent] On 23 Jan the "Spaudos" [Press] central paper warehouse was occupied, which contained paper purchased not only with CPSU funds.

[Burokevicius] I received a phone call yesterday evening (23d- ed) and only then did I learn of this event. This is

a simple matter. Since the Central Committee's Press facility was placed under guard, the warehouse had to be taken over, as well. We will sort out whose property it is.

[Correspondent] When will the Editorial Staff of the Press Building, of TIESA, to be exact, be able to claim its dictionaries, mailing-label machines and other inventory, required in daily journalistic tasks?

[Burokevicius] I was informed yesterday, that an inventory is currently underway there and valuables are being sealed.

[Correspondent] However, the daily necessities are being snatched up, everyday! We have seen this with our own eyes!

[Burokevicius] Wait now, who is doing that...I shall make some inquiries...I simply do not understand this...Noting should disappear there.

[Correspondent] Allow me to pose one other, almost a personal question—are you perhaps preparing to occupy the press facility on Maironis Street, soon?

[Burokevicius] This morning I was even asked that question by Brazauskas [Chairman of the Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania]. It seems to me, you will soon be transferring to work on the Press Building premises.

[Correspondent] How is that to be interpreted?.. Will the building be returned to Lithuania?

[Burokevicius] But even currently it belongs to Lithuania, Soviet Lithuania.

[Correspondent] We were expelled at the point of automatic weapons!

[Burokevicius] That, of course, was not the best way to resolve the question.

[Correspondent] What would you yet like to add, at the end of the interview?

[Burokevicius] I find it strange, that TIESA, everywhere refers to the Lithuanian Communist Party as the Soviet Union Communist Party organization in Lithuania.

[Correspondent] I fail to understand why you find this insulting?

[Burokevicius] This is—a juridical matter. LCP is independent, it only is included within the CPSU structure. This is how you should write about it. Whereas now, in saying, CPSU organization in Lithuania, you turn the people against us.

RSFSR

Tula Workers Ready To Barter Arms for Food

91US0301A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 25 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by S. Bobrovskiy: "Delayed-Action Billions"]

[Text] "...peoples amuse themselves playing with governments until one day a taciturn battleship arrives in their waters and tells them: Don't you break your toys!" (O. Henry)

Political scientists pay so much attention in their predictions to the development of relations along the Gorbachev-Yeltsin axis that at times it appears that conflicts would die down, strikes would come to an end, and the country would fall silent in anticipation of forthcoming prosperity and welfare if these individuals embraced each other on TV. To be sure, it is disturbing that the contemporary history of our great country so interpreted bears a suspect resemblance to "The Tale of How Ivan Ivanovich and Ivan Nikiforovich Quarreled."

In general, nobody has yet refuted Lenin's concept that **politics is a concentrated expression of economics**. However, if this is the case, why is emotional politics, politics of sympathies and antipathies, so ubiquitous, and, finally, where is interest-driven politics? He who pays the piper calls the tune. Could it be that at present our economy is so sick that it has nothing to pay for the choices with?

We have stooped to barter. These words of the previous prime minister describe the attained level of collapse in the national economy quite accurately. Indeed, we have stooped, and indeed, we have stooped to barter. Of course, a natural economy does not look very decent at a time when the curtain is about to fall on the 20th century. However, economists have talked for so long about market mechanisms being natural, self-generating, and ineradicable that it makes sense to consider barter from this point of view as well.

Indeed, is not direct bartering of goods a real mode of self-defense by enterprises against two woes at once—the administrative command system and the cheap ruble? Labor collectives which have goods in demand (color TV sets, meat, cars, and cold-rolled steel) may procure everything they and their production facilities need (cars, TV sets, meat, and cold-rolled steel) without outside help.

Barter has already spawned commodity exchanges. This is like an announcement in the GUM department store: "Citizens who have lost each other should meet in front of the enquiry office." Very soon the exchanges will discover goods which are fit not only for immediate consumption but also as a means of payment in mutual settlements between sellers and buyers. We will be but a step away from exchange obligations and exchange money. This will almost amount to a market.

Of course, the spontaneous development of events is not the fastest way to overcome chaos. After all, it is easier for an individual to be born by his own mother than "evolve" from an ape again. However, let us recall that it took humanity millennia to progress from a natural economy to an exchange; meanwhile, we "replicated" this path in half a year.

The main point is that the market has become a quite realistic and virtually palpable prospect due to highly undesirable barter. It is no longer some kind of a theoretical fact, it "really exists."

Is it advantageous for everyone? Obviously, it is not. Otherwise, we would not practice politics but would rather proceed confidently toward our common goal.

The administrative command system (AKS) stands to lose, but not all of it. There will be business left for ministry officials to attend to. Even the core of the administrative command system, the party apparatus, is slowly adjusting to new conditions: It is opening hard-currency hotels, investing money in small enterprises, and letting cooperative members use its printing plants. The party apparatus even has a good chance to control production through its participation in the banking system with a greater effect than before (almost everything necessary to this end is available—funds, structures, information, connections, and their own people in industry).

The military-industrial complex remains. It also stands to lose.

We assail the administrative command system a lot, and foolishly at times, for being an administrative system, for being a command-driven system, for failing to ensure the affluent life for us. Was it really designed to do this? No. The military-industrial complex was its alpha and omega. Having answered in the affirmative the question of whether it was possible to build socialism in one separate country, we made ours the situation of a fortress under siege from the very beginning. This preordained everything else inexorably.

A fortress is forced to rely only on its own resources; it cannot do without Uzbek cotton, Baku oil, Ukrainian ore, and so on. It is doomed to be an empire.

A fortress means readiness condition No. 1, orders are not subject to discussion, and a loud mouth is a godsend for a spy.

A fortress means that the main point is to endure; anything is better than nothing. It is not "more cotton prints for our female Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] members" but rather more rail sidings and armored trains on them, and only later more cotton prints in order to boost the productivity of female labor. The administrative command system has accomplished its task well for decades: Everything for victory, everything for the military-industrial complex. The best tank, the best plane, the best hydrogen bomb,

the first cosmonaut in orbit... No other system would have been able to evacuate its industry beyond the Urals within months. Our system was able to; it was designed to. It was not designed "to provide for every family its own apartment."

Our military industrial complex is by its very nature an industry financed from the state budget and, for now, an anti-market industry. What is a cannon producer to do when a butter producer seeks refuge from the cheap ruble by means of barter?

Conversion is the only measure which may reconcile the military-industrial complex and the market, that is, broadly interpreted conversion: Not just shrinking "the defense industry" and changing its production lines to "civilian" ones, but a realistic, socially guaranteed program of implanting military production facilities in a competitive economy whereby a tank will have a normal price based on supply and demand rather than a list price set by a government official. However, for now conversion has bogged down. This is why the military-industrial complex is still armed and very dangerous.

The fondly remembered "500 days" program faded away without drawing serious criticism. Why? I quote: "...reductions will be implemented from the first day of the reform... and will primarily affect the following spheres of the national economy: 1. Military-industrial complex." End of quote; there is no need to continue it; this was the death warrant for the program.

Participants in the meeting of top producers of the military-industrial complex (the December meeting of managers of state enterprises) were the first to respond in winter to the reign of barter. The press interpreted many of their speeches as an ultimatum to the president.

...Colonel Alksnis from the Soyuz group of deputies was the first to frankly threaten Gorbachev with creating the Committee of Public Salvation.

...On 12 January of this year, several hours before the Vilnius events, a telegram was sent to the president from Tula:

"Moscow, the Kremlin. To President Gorbachev.

"The foodstuffs problem in Tula borders on a crisis which is due to the peculiarities of its industry. Dissatisfaction of workers at the enterprises of the military-industrial complex mounts. In addition, the once high wages at defense-industry plants are becoming some of the lowest in the city. The situation compels us to put forth an INITIATIVE TO SELL TULA ARMS TO OTHER REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY IN EXCHANGE FOR FOOD-STUFFS AND OTHER GOODS. The workers hold the USSR Government and you personally solely responsible for the situation. Nikolay Matveyev, brigade leader of metal workers of the Arms Plant, deputy of the oblast soviet. Tula, Mira Street, 15."

...On 11 January, the USSR Supreme Soviet session confirmed defense expenditures amounting to 96 billion

rubles—7 billion less than the Ministry of Defense had requested, 7,000,000,000 less...

...On 12 January, a self-appointed committee embarked on saving Lithuania.

If there is a gun hanging on the wall in the first act, it will be fired in the third act. In our country, in view of the size of the military-industrial complex, guns hang all over the stage. It is no wonder that they are fired non-stop.

They say that tanks fired blanks in Vilnius. However, in the course of it they laid direct fire on the president. Let us count "hits" in order to make sure that it was so: A threat of political strikes, demands to resign, and a Western semi-boycott. Whose position took more fire?

The widespread version is that the president has accumulated so much power that he may even have the tanks roll. What if he is not strong enough to stop the tanks?

Democracy or a Gorbachev dictatorship? This is how the issue is raised at present. A different scenario, a dictatorship instead of Gorbachev, and certainly instead of democracy, appears to be more realistic to me personally.

Ambartsumov on RSFSR Draft Constitution

91UN0870A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 50, 23-30 Dec 90 p 6

[Article by Yevgeny Ambartsumov, people's deputy of the Russian Federation, member of the Constitution Commission: "Attacked From the Very Start"]

[Text] *The Draft Russian Federation's Constitution had sooner been published [as published] than a massive attack was launched against it, as if on command. A series of preemptive attacks were undertaken even before the Draft was in print. What was the matter? Who feels uneasy about the Draft and why?*

Perestroyka paved the way for the country's transformation into a civilized democracy, and the Constitution of the Russian Federation must legitimize this transformation. For the first time in Russia's history, the Fundamental Law will proceed from the interests of man, from human rights and liberties, rather than the interest of the state, as used to be the case with all the previous Constitutions. This puts the social groups and structures formerly exercising control over society under the control of society. Perhaps the salvo of accusations was triggered by this circumstance.

Accusation One: Restoration of Capitalism

Along with the traditional rights and liberties (which used to be only a sham) the Draft mentions the right to own property, to sell your own labour, to exercise your own business initiativeness and enterprising spirit.

This important point was immediately called an attempt to restore capitalism. But can we speak here about a restoration? Rather, it is an attempt to break the deadlock we are in, thanks to the state monopolization of the economic and social spheres. The constitutional protection of private property liberates the economy from state control and uproots the ruling bureaucracy. Hence, the cry about the rejection of the "choice of socialism" which has in fact resulted in people's slavery to the state.

The Draft imposes restrictions on the right to property. It states that property owning mustn't infringe on individual rights and liberties, injure personal dignity or be detrimental to the public weal. The same article outlaws unfair commercial competition and anti-consumer activity, particularly monopolies.

Consequently, we are dealing here not with switching over to capitalism. On the contrary, the **idea of social welfare is basic to the Draft Constitution**. It is concerned with social protection and checking unbridled forms of capitalism: speculators—domestic and foreign, or Party bosses managing the economy who wish to make the expropriated public property their own private possession.

Accusation Two: Another Totalitarianism

The latest plenary meeting of the Communist Party of Russia hurled a grave accusation against the Draft Constitution: it allegedly "reflects an open desire to constitutionalize a coup d'etat capable of changing the existing social structure and creating a totalitarian state with a mock democratic facade." The thought about the threat of totalitarianism setting in was reiterated by several speakers at the plenary meeting, including the Party's General Secretary Polozkov.

Let's see what the Draft actually says. Its Article 2 declares that: "No one part of the nation, no one organization or an individual can be allowed to usurp power. Usurpation of power is a grave crime." Thus, **in its founding principles, the future Constitution institutionalizes a barrier insurmountable to totalitarianism**, the threat of which the constitution's critics are harping so much about. In fact, those critics are secretly longing for totalitarianism, but their own kind.

This is an old trick, reversing the responsibility (for totalitarianism) to the opponents, at the cost of openly distorting facts. For example, Yu. Slobodkin, MP and member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia, speaking at the Constitution Commission session discussing the Draft, accused its sponsors that their draft declares the future president to be the main source of power. The ploy was designed to make the general accusation of totalitarianism look well grounded. But Article 2 of the Draft declares the entire multiethnic population of the Russian Federation to be sovereign and the only source of state power in the Russian Federation.

Accusation Three: Authoritarianism

It looks like the opponents of the Draft Constitution concentrate upon criticizing the presidency of Russia as an institution. Speaking recently at a certain meeting at the top, Boris Oleinik who gets angry when a non-Ukrainian says anything about the future of the Ukraine, accused the authors of Russia's Draft Constitution of trying to turn the future president into a virtual monarch. True, the Draft Constitution envisages vast powers for the president. But then the overwhelming majority of Russia's citizens are in favour of this, according to public opinion surveys. However, the Draft Constitution stipulates the president may be impeached in case he consciously violates the Constitution and other laws. The Draft Constitution allows only one re-election of the same person to the presidency, which limits presidential term of office to eight years. Since the president is to be elected through a popular and direct vote among a choice of candidates, there are no grounds to speak about a threat to democracy. Besides, why is it only the USSR president we're concerned about getting broad power, and not the president of Russia?

Of course, the Draft Constitution never mentions "Soviet" as an attribute. But does this mean that the authors of the Draft were out to liquidate the Soviets as bodies of power? **The Draft Constitution drops only part of the combined functions of the Soviets, namely, the fusion, within the Soviets, of the legislative, executive and judiciary powers.** This fusion allowed the Soviets to be hijacked by the Party, repressive and other extraordinary bodies.

The designers of Russia's Constitution are also being accused of undermining the Soviet Union. But this is an absurd accusation, even because the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, who is simultaneously chairman of the Constitution Commission, has been constantly stressing his preference for preserving the Union, while the Centre's procrastinations in developing a new Union Treaty have been the greatest contribution to the destruction of that Union.

The Constitution Commission also received (and eventually rejected) an alternative draft authored by a group headed by MP Slobodkin. This draft is, in contrast to the official one, full of ideology. In fact, it represents an attempt to legitimatize the old system which formed in this country in the '30s-'60s. I think that it was a good idea to publish that draft as well and let citizens of Russia decide for themselves as to their preferences.

RSFSR Supsov Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Interviewed

91UF0522A Moscow NOVOYE VREM'YA in Russian
No 2, Jan 91 pp 24-26

[Interview with Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee, by NOVOYE VREM'YA observer Vladimir Razubayev; place and date not given; "Russian Axioms"]

[Text] What kind of foreign policy should Russia have? Should it be implemented under parliamentary supervision. How are the civil rights of the Russian-speaking population in the Union republics to be secured? Our observer Vladimir Razubayev interviews Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee.

[Razubayev] Soviet foreign policy has traditionally managed without parliamentary supervision. It might have seemed from the outside that it has, nonetheless, been quite effective.

[Lukin] Yes, for it was determined by the views and wishes of four or five members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. The influence of the foreign minister has always been of a purely personal nature. If this minister was close, conditionally speaking, on an informal level to the general secretary, his influence on strategy was relatively great. If not, he would simply carry out the wishes of the general secretary or the person who was close to him. And this led to the apparent effectiveness of the pursuit of foreign policy.

But the above "effectiveness" was gauged primarily by the subjective qualities of those who made the decisions. As a result it was too often "protocol-psychological" effectiveness. When the mastodon foreign policy machinery is largely engaged in collecting information on how the general secretary is respected, an illusion of foreign policy efficacy may easily be created even given its complete absence. Of course, Soviet diplomacy has had real achievements also—intelligent people capable of proposing and carrying through a sound idea also worked in the Foreign Ministry of that time—but they were few in number. It was not they who made the decisions. In an enlightened monarchy there is a tendency with the years to become increasingly less enlightened and more and more monarchical.... The true effectiveness of our foreign policy, on the other hand, is determined by whether the country has become better off as a result of this diplomatic action or other. But can it be said that the USSR was the winner as the result of the interference in Hungarian affairs in 1956, Czechoslovak affairs in 1968, and Afghan affairs in 1979?

One further aspect of the problem is the fact that the omnipotence of the totalitarian system was merely apparent. Omnipotence was combined with anarchy. There was a kind of "multiple-doorway system" of coordination. There was the powerful "doorway" of the military—a very influential force in foreign policy—and there was the Foreign Ministry "doorway," and they both combined all-state interests with their own. And to what did "doorway interest" amount under these conditions? An indicator of effectiveness, say, was considered the number of treaties with foreign countries....

Or take another example. Pray tell me, does our country need to have an embassy in each country of Tropical Africa? Or could it confine itself to one embassy for five

countries? But the number of embassies is a direct characterization, seemingly, of Foreign Ministry activity.... And there was further the "doorway" of esteemed Chekists, who also really influenced foreign policy. Therefore, despite the seeming facility of decisionmaking, the system suffered from obvious feebleness and lack of control. And the coordination of the "doorway" type, through which every foreign policy decision passed, was ultimately a considerably lengthier procedure than parliamentary supervision. And far more arduous than direct negotiations with other countries. Many Soviet diplomats have confessed to me that dealing with the "other side" was far less complicated than making their way through the thickets of the "multiple-doorway" system.

[Razubayev] Obviously, the length of negotiations was affected not only by the coordination procedure....

[Lukin] Of course. It is no secret that the Foreign Ministry people loved to conduct lengthy negotiations. This is understandable—this is what they were paid for. And if the negotiations were conducted overseas, they were paid in hard currency. Therefore the participants in important negotiations in Geneva, say, or Vienna might not have been unhappy that no progress was being made.

So the system was in fact cumbersome and inefficient and at the same time fraught with the danger of surprise subjectivist outbursts, if the cards of two or three "doorways" were suddenly dealt in a single "suit" and the general secretary approved this line. But much has changed in the time of perestroika. The overall processes in the country and the style that became established in the Foreign Ministry with the arrival of Eduard Shevardnadze have been reflected.

[Razubayev] Shevardnadze was at the sources of the new relations of the Union Foreign Ministry and the Union parliament....

[Lukin] He readily agreed to cooperate with the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee. I believe, incidentally, that this Union parliamentary committee has acted and continues to act with inexplicable timidity. The techniques of hearings have not been assimilated. Departmental experts have acquired precedence at them. Independent analysts have been called on to speak last. And time has frequently been short for them also. But the precedent has been set, and parliamentary supervision has begun to operate.

[Razubayev] And how are the RSFSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee's relations with the Russian Foreign Ministry shaping up?

[Lukin] In order for the Russian Foreign Ministry's policy to be monitored there has to be such a policy. It does not yet exist in pure form. We have to establish our concept in the Supreme Soviet. And await the signing of the Union treaty in order to determine our authority. Until then we cannot, figuratively speaking, acquire our

own character. So a certain amount, a significant amount even, of foreign policy is made at the Union level. But the Union is a vast territorial formation. It is ridiculous to say that, for instance, Kirghizia and Estonia do not have specific foreign policy interests. Immense Russia has such all the more. It must express them via two balanced paths: via the Union, and directly. We are currently endeavoring to create this balance. We must defend our interests via the Union by participating in the formulation and implementation of the overall line.

I, for example, still cannot understand the Union Foreign Ministry position (although it was most likely not acting on its own initiative) in connection with Russian representatives' participation in the Union delegation at the Paris meeting within the CSCE framework. It cannot be denied that Russia is a most important European country. It cannot be denied that Russia is a sovereign republic within the USSR and should for this reason be represented in the Union delegation. But this axiom completely surprisingly seemed to some people merely a hypothesis and was studied for a very long time. Only the day before the start of the Paris meeting did we receive a reply. It was positive, but need a decision on this elementary matter have been dragged out that long? The Ukraine received an answer to a similar demand on the last day. Even if it was once again positive, this is not the way to deal with sovereign countries. From such petty problems big conflicts arise. They must be prevented. We need to sit down at the negotiating table and divide up functions and authority. The Union should have the right to make decisions in some sphere, and the republics should be subordinate, otherwise disorder will reign. But in everything else they should act themselves. It is the RSFSR Foreign Ministry that should regulate the republic's relations with neighboring countries. Vladivostok should not be applying to the Union Foreign Ministry on matters concerning Russian-Japanese relations. This is the prerogative of the Russian Foreign Ministry. When all functions have been divided up, a Russian foreign policy will emerge, and we will be able to speak of the Russian parliament's supervision of its implementation.

Meanwhile our relations with the republic Foreign Ministry are in the process of formation. We should now be helping it more than supervising it. In addition, the stage of elaboration of the concept of Russia's foreign policy activity continues. We will in January be submitting it for examination by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

Good relations have taken shape between our committee and the Foreign Ministry. We played an active part in the search for and discussion of candidates for the office of minister. The International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee made a considerable contribution to Andrey Kozyrev becoming minister, incidentally, because it was we who proposed this candidate. In respect of the prospects of future Russian foreign policy our views and the minister's views are very close. We believe that we can neither adopt a servile position in

respect of the Union nor endeavor to demolish that which is good that there is in our country at the Union level.

[Razubayev] In what capacity will Russia participate in the all-European process?

[Lukin] If the Union treaty, which we wish to sign, records that participation in the all-European process is predominantly a matter for the Union, the Union will involve itself with this. But Russia will participate in the all-European process via Union diplomacy. If, however, it is unsuccessful here, we will raise the question of Russia's participation in the European process as a subject of it, for it would be ridiculous if a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals were to be created without Europe from Smolensk to the Urals.

[Razubayev] What do you think, should Russia become a member of the United Nations?

[Lukin] A parliamentary delegation of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet visited the United Nations recently. During talks with its representatives we declared that we understood full well the problems ensuing from the UN Charter, but would like the Russian factor to be represented in some way, for all that. In specialized agencies as an observer, possibly, but represented. We already have certain arrangements with the USSR Foreign Ministry in this connection.

[Razubayev] What is your attitude toward the proposition that Russia and the USSR as a whole should switch to an isolationist policy for the next several years, decades, perhaps?

[Lukin] This is inevitable to some extent. The country is bankrupt, to call things by their name. Everything has been invested in the military complex. Elementary human needs figured in the budget according to the "residual" principle. The result is well known. There is a tenfold "Vietnam syndrome" in the country. I would recall that the United States was for a decade virtually oriented toward isolationism following the Vietnam failures. So it is not a problem here of the choice of whether to consent to isolationism or not but of recognition of the ancient piece of wisdom coded in the saying: "cut your coat according to your cloth." I believe that the country is condemned for a lengthy period of history to a very modest foreign policy. The reference points, evidently, will be geopolitical interests and economic activity. In this respect I would prefer the "policy within one's means" concept to the term "isolationism." This presupposes rationalism and minimal expenditure and at the same time a responsible presence in the world community. A responsible presence, precisely, what is more. The RSFSR Supreme Soviet, for example, recently adopted a decree criticizing Soviet policy in the Persian Gulf. I do not consider this decision correct. I do not at all believe that the USSR should immediately dispatch its forces to the Persian Gulf. By no means, we should not send them.

But, for all that, not sending forces is one thing, emphasizing that Russia is knowingly not supporting the international community in its attempt to eliminate the consequences of the aggression is another. This is an insufficiently responsible approach. The country should be a civilized member of the international community and participate in its affairs, but this participation should conform to the possibilities and interests of the state.

[Razubayev] Your committee further studies Russia's relations with the Union republics....

[Lukin] Among other committees and commissions of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Now, when the quality of leadership on the part of the "center" is quite dubious, the maintenance of interrepublic and interregional ties is extraordinarily pertinent. In our country there are republics that are intent on seceding from the Union, and there are republics that are intent on remaining but are putting forward the most varied conditions. In this situation we are trying to conclude specific agreements between republics, that is, to establish horizontal relations that create a guarantee that all the positive features which united the Union operate throughout the transitional period. Our committee took part in the elaboration of the agreements with the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belorussia. I do not rule out something multilateral gradually being formed from this also. We would then be commencing from below a process which spins its wheels when it proceeds in accordance with an initiative "from above." It is a question of the re-creation of a political, economic, legal, cultural, and ecological space and Union structures devoid of imperial, dictatorial properties, which have exasperated everyone. And this would not be talk about the benefits of the Union but a real contribution to the prevention of its collapse.

[Razubayev] I have the impression that at least part of the Russian leadership is proceeding in its relations with other republics from the concept according to which the formation of national states is now under way in the USSR. Whence the specifics of the response to the problem of refugees from other republics....

[Lukin] I do not believe this to be the case. Although I admit that there could in the Russian parliament be people with a medieval feudal thinking complex. They truly agree that all need to separate into national states with mythical "absolute sovereignty." In my opinion, this is a reactionary utopian position, with which I categorically disagree. A philosopher said: Truth is dearer than home. If this is not so, you really do not love your homeland for, given the reverse reading—home is dearer than the truth—views would be as close as could be to fascist. Such was Hitler's logic. Alas, many people have inherited from the past feudal logic. The "nationalism" concept is triumphing in place of the "internationalism" slogan. But the behavior has remained the same as before—totalitarian-commissar behavior. I was told recently about quite a prominent figure of the present regime in a Transcaucasus republic. His father

and mother were people of different nationalities. They are buried together. This man is now building a wall between their graves....

I am opposed to the collapse of the Union. Such a collapse would bury beneath the rubble many totally innocent people. I am for the conversion of imperial forms of relations between republics into civilized forms. The treaties between Russia and other republics, incidentally, provide for tremendous attention to be paid to the problem of citizenship. People must have the right to voluntarily choose this citizenship or the other. Russian citizens in the Ukraine, say, or Ukrainian citizens in Russia should here enjoy equal rights with the local citizens. In addition, the treaties contain the proposition that Russia will display particular concern for its citizens in other republics, permitting other republics to display particular concern for their citizens living in Russia. I believe that we must do this and that we do not always concern ourselves with this sufficiently. I am convinced that we should protect the rights of Russians and the representatives of other nationalities traditionally connected with Russia—Tatars, say—by the most effective methods when these rights are violated in other republics. This is one further axiom of Russian foreign policy.

Kuptsov Views Siberian RSFSR CP Conference

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[Interview with CPSU Central Committee Secretary Valentin Kuptsov by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA staff correspondent Vitaliy Pyrkh; place and date not given: "Valentin Kuptsov: 'It Is a Thorny Path to Accord'"]

[Text] *As has already been reported in the press, a seminar-conference of the secretaries of gorkoms and raykoms of the RSFSR Communist Party from West Siberia was held in Krasnoyarsk. Issues concerning socio-economic development of the country, and problems of perestroika and the renewal of the party were the focus of its attention. Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Valentin Kuptsov participated in the proceedings of the seminar and took the floor.*

Our staff correspondent Vitaliy Pyrkh interviewed him.

[Correspondent] Valentin Aleksandrovich, as they put it, it is visible to the naked eye that in Siberia, and in particular in Krasnoyarsk Kray, the political situation has been quite calm so far. It even came to this thought being voiced at a recent plenum of the CPSU kray committee: Siberia has saved the country many times before, and apparently its time has come again...

[Kuptsov] Our life has become politicized everywhere; this is an obvious fact. Some people are "running" ahead.... However, we should ponder what we have achieved. To my mind, the most significant conclusion drawn at the recent joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Control Commission was that politics in our country has become disconnected

from economics, and the latter is not keeping up with changes. It is good that Siberia holds its position. Perhaps, this has to do with the steady character of the Siberians and peculiarities of the sectors of the national economy that require the people to be highly professional and responsible.

[Correspondent] This is why the rallies of opposition parties do not attract as many people as they do, for example, in Moscow...

[Kuptsov] Indeed, despite the fact that hardly a week goes by without one of the "democrats" visiting here. However, this is what happens: Our country watches TV, follows events in Moscow, Leningrad, and other "charged" localities, and it is puzzled: What is going on? Apparently, we also have problems, but life goes on here, whereas over there they have a total collapse! Is the fact that Kravchenko does not let them rouse the entire country from the "bell tower" of Moscow the reason for attacks on him at present?

[Correspondent] You said that representatives of the opposition frequent Siberia, for example, Travkin. What is the Central Committee waiting for?

[Kuptsov] I absolutely disagree with you on this point! True, Sulakshin, Travkin, and Shostakovskiy have "worked" this area many times, but how does the press cover their trips? As sensations of the first order, as events of tremendous political significance. It looks like many newspapers try to outdo each other. However, not a single newspaper reports that, for example, Lysenko did not draw audiences to these meetings—if they did gather, there were not more than 100 people.

As far as our Central Committee is concerned, a complete lack of information explains everything. Immediately after the 28th CPSU Congress, 118 Central Committee members traveled throughout the country in order to inform as many labor collectives as possible about its decisions and promulgate its program documents vigorously. They subsequently reported the following to the Central Committee: In 28 regions of our country, people were having difficulty perceiving what had happened at the party congress. Once again, a group of the best-trained party functionaries, about 70 people, was dispatched there.

However, some time later this question came up again: Why are you "sitting it out in the trenches," why are you not taking your message to the people? We leafed through newspaper files for the past three months, and... we did not find a single line there about a single CPSU Central Committee secretary traveling in our country!

[Correspondent] Do these trips accomplish a lot for you?

[Kuptsov] Our political course cannot be verified in the absence of such trips and live communication with the people. (Incidentally, this is my second visit to Krasnoyarsk).

All of us are concerned about the outflow of people from the party. How do some secretaries justify it? Social problems are not being solved, there are difficulties with housing and provisioning... They say that this is why the people have lost faith. I visited a metallurgical plant in Krasnoyarsk and I will admit frankly: I yet have to see another enterprise in our country where social issues have been resolved to this degree! When you talk to workers in the plant canteens, you hear nothing but favorable responses: A comparable assortment of food-stuffs is not available in the city, and prices are moderate... Look at their medical facilities! State-of-the-art medical equipment worth \$1.5 million has been purchased for them! They have tennis courts, a swimming pool, a riding house... and a considerable number of people quitting the party. How does one relate to the other? It turns out that social facilities are not the main factor.

[Correspondent] What is?

[Kuptsov] Working with the people is the key to success. There is simply no other way to win their minds over. Let us look at contacts with economic managers: In this matter, we trail behind our political opponents. For example, Sajudis acts differently. I visited Lithuania together with "the Gorbachev group." We were told the same thing at all enterprises: Appeals to quit the party were not made in squares. It turns out that Sajudis activists went to industrial enterprises, construction organizations, institutes, and worked on managers there. They persuaded them to break with us persistently and stubbornly.

Some time later, a director would leave the party, and a month or two after that, his deputies would file petitions following him. Not a single communist shop chief would be left at this plant in half a year at the most!

We have a duty to resume work with the economic managers because cadres have been and will be the main asset of the party.

[Correspondent] Apparently, it is no accident that the opposition has targeted the party committees of enterprises for this reason.

[Kuptsov] How else? In places where directors are Communists, party committees will never "withdraw" from enterprises. It is just that nobody will vote in favor of such a decision. After all, the work of the party committees has never run counter to the tasks of the collectives. It is simply advantageous for the directors to have secretaries at their enterprises who may hold, for example, a careless shop chief accountable to the party if something happens.

[Correspondent] As is known, Valentin Aleksandrovich, you are responsible for interparty contacts and relations in the central Committee. Tell us about this.

[Kuptsov] Only two political parties, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Islamic Party, have filed the necessary registration documents with the USSR Ministry of Justice. A party must have no fewer than 5,000 members in order to secure official status. However, some cannot "overcome" even this low "threshold." Some vociferous leaders receive no broad-based support from the people. However, the political situation in our country changes literally before our eyes. Seventy diverse political entities claiming the status of parties have already made their presence known. Besides, their potential is determined by their aggressiveness and offensiveness, and at times the use of means that we consider unacceptable, rather than their numerical strength.

The opposition forces are regrouping quickly and establishing various blocs organizationally. Democratic Russia and the Democratic Congress are the most serious opponents of the CPSU. The first bloc came together in November of last year, and the second, as is known, did so quite recently—in Kharkov in January. This is a major organizational setup of the opposition at an all-Union level.

[Correspondent] Our newspaper has already written about it. However, it is worthwhile to repeat what the "congressmen" advocate.

[Kuptsov] They demand the resignation of the USSR president by all methods and in every manner, including actions of civil disobedience, strikes, and demonstrations. They favor the dissolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet before the expiration of the term. They also have other tasks: splitting a unified USSR, frustrating the referendum, forming republic armies, de-party-izing the armed forces, the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and so on. The CPSU Central Committee Political Declaration evaluated all of this and outlined our position clearly.

Changes in the tactics of the opposition forces do not involve only the very admission of a struggle for power, which has not been concealed for a long time now. Calls to change the existing system and renounce socialism are the main danger. This is being done against the background of the forthcoming referendum on the issue of preserving the USSR.

[Correspondent] To my mind, the issue of whether the Union is to be or not to be will eclipse everything else soon.

[Kuptsov] The array of forces in the country was projected to be approximately as follows in December, when the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies made its decision on the referendum: 75 percent in favor of signing the Union treaty, and approximately 25 percent against. By now, the situation has clearly deteriorated, primarily because of the position of individual republic. The Supreme Soviets of the Baltic republics, Georgia, and Armenia have officially proclaimed their reluctance to hold the referendum and sign the Union treaty. The USSR president has been forced to issue the well-known

Decree on Lithuania because "their own" referenda were scheduled in a number of republics in contravention of the USSR Constitution.

[Correspondent] What do assessments by experts indicate?

[Kuptsov] A wide range of opinions. For example, in Azerbaijan the concept of a confederation dominates, and about one-third of the adult population support the Union. In Armenia, this statistic is around 50 percent, and the picture is the same in the Baltic area and in Moldova...

Various groups of the populace take various views of the Union treaty. For example, cooperative members and nascent entrepreneurs come out against it most vigorously.

[Correspondent] The opposition also noticed this...

[Kuptsov] And long ago, too. For example, Democratic Russia circulated to its primary organizations a document signed by Murashov, one of its organizers, that contains the following instruction: "Solve the problem of financing primary organizations locally, set up foundations for the transfer of funds, establish contacts with private businesses, cooperative members, lessees, and small enterprises—we express their interests." Here it is!

[Correspondent] How high is the rating of the CPSU?

[Kuptsov] Sociological surveys indicate that our party continues to be trusted the most. Thirty-eight percent of those polled consider it to be the main force capable of consolidating our society based on its authority.

Materials of a survey taken by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism indicate that only 30.4 percent of those polled in the Soviet Union unequivocally reject the idea of socialism; 64 percent consider it the most acceptable and progressive. Only 14 percent came out in favor of capitalism.

As far as the current political situation is concerned, we should go to the people and work with the masses, as Lenin taught us. The year of confusion is over; the party, if I may say so, has regained consciousness. It has entered the political arena renewed. We should act everywhere, certainly, within the framework of the law.

For example, we are getting ready to rebuff Sulakshin and Balashov who demand that the party be put on trial. By what right, we ask? Why did they not hold the Communists accountable when they were the first to lead attacks, when they were taken out to be shot "in bundles," when they abandoned convenient cities and left for the virgin lands and great construction projects? How can we now look indifferently at the people being pushed toward a new fratricidal war?

Western Republics

Activities of Belorussian Soviet Discussed

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[Interview with Belorussian SSR People's Deputy V.G. Tikhinya, doctor of jurisprudence, by SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA parliamentary correspondent P. Berezovskaya; place and date not given: "The Power and the Law: On the Results of the First Part of the Scheduled Session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet and on Its Prospects"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Valeriy Guryevich, the winter break for parliament is over. The third session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet is resuming its work. What were the hallmarks of its first half; what points would you, a jurist, emphasize?

[Tikhinya] There are many reasons to consider the first part of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet third session a success. Judge for yourself: During 15 work days seven laws were passed. The Republic Supreme Soviet has never known such productivity. In addition to that, the State Plan and the State Budget for 1991 were adopted. A very important resolution for the development of science—on the status of the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences—was passed; also adopted was the procedure for reinstating the rights of citizens who suffered from repression during the years of the personality cult. Among other things discussed at the sessions were first drafts of the laws on local self-rule and local economy and on the status of a Belorussian SSR people's deputy. In my opinion, the discussion of the draft law on culture has been an accomplishment and is proof of the professional growth of the parliament. There are no analogies to it in parliamentary activities on either the all-Union or the republic level.

[Correspondent] However, when the session agenda was discussed, when it was being decided what to include and what to exclude, there were differences in the attitudes towards this draft law...

[Tikhinya] I was among those who said that the agenda was overloaded, and proposed to cut the number of issues up for discussion, but not at the expense of the draft law on culture: The topical coefficient of this draft is too high. The spiritual rebirth of the Belorussian people is impossible without giving national culture a priority. All of us have to understand today that, considering the problems that have accumulated in the cultural sphere, it is impossible to affect the situation substantially by some individually taken measures. We need cardinal measures that would allow us to decisively change the status of culture in our state, to break the existing vicious circle of low cultural esteem in society. The draft law takes as its foundation the notion of culture's determinant role in the entire system of social relations; it also takes into account its sad state, especially in rural areas. As a jurist, I can state that the very

idea of culture represents a very delicate and specific matter for legal regulation. The crux of the matter is that law does not regulate the process of cultural activity itself. The law must be a guarantor of the creation of necessary socioeconomic and legal conditions that stimulate cultural development in all its manifestations; it should be a guarantor of the creative freedom of artists; and, finally, it should ensure the protection of spiritual values.

[Correspondent] This is the year of the republic's move towards a market. How well is it backed by the legal framework?

[Tikhinya] The movement towards a market should be accompanied by a cardinal renewal of the existing system of economic laws that is now outdated. I think that within the next two or three years the republic will have to pass a total of about 40 laws to regulate market relations. Out of this huge package, the third session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet has already passed the Land Code and laws on property, leases, enterprises, and banks and banking activities, and on indexing population income according to inflation rate. These laws are the foundation for developing a market economy. They are in full compliance with the declaration of Belorussian SSR state sovereignty, and they correspond to today's realities. With the passage of these laws, the republic gets the legal base for a market economy.

[Correspondent] The discussion on the private property issue at the session was quite dramatic. What can you say about the final decision?

[Tikhinya] It is true that two laws—the Law on Property and the Land Code—caused heated arguments: Should there or should there not be private ownership of land? I would like to use this opportunity to answer the opponents who accused me—through the mass media, in particular, in the newspaper ZNAMYA YUNOSTI, and the weekly PRATSA—of being motivated by political considerations related to my election as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia in my opposition to private ownership of land, which I stated at the republic Supreme Soviet session. I categorically reject such accusation.

At the third session of the Supreme Soviet, I, a peasant's son, enumerated all the merits and advantages of private ownership of land, without holding anything back. Nevertheless, I opposed it. And I did so quite consciously. I believe that the form of land ownership that we offer and that is now fixed in the Land Code—a lifetime inheritable possession of land—combines in itself, first, all the merits of private ownership of land, while, second (for some reason the opponents had not paid attention to this thesis of mine although it had been presented at the session), it neutralizes the negative factors that are related to the introduction of private property on land, namely, the appearance in rural areas of new antagonistic classes and the opportunity for private owners to

keep in merciless economic dependence those who do not have such property. As is known, the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies decided to conduct a referendum (an all-people vote) on the issue of whether there should be private ownership of land. I think that after it is completed numerous political games around this topic will stop.

I would also like to use this opportunity to present the Communist Party of Belorussia's position on private property. We, the Communists, are unjustly accused of speaking against private property. Look through the materials and decisions of the 31st Congress of the Communist Party of Belorussia. They show clearly that the Communist Party of Belorussia is against **private property on land, not against private property in general**. Why, for instance, should a bakery or a barbershop not be in private hands? Who would object to that? Therefore, one should not present the position of the Communist Party of Belorussia in a simplistic way.

[Correspondent] Which draft laws will the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet discuss in the nearest future?

[Tikhinya] In my opinion, priority should be given to the concept of the new Union treaty. Until the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet formulates its stand on this issue, it can hardly proceed with a number of draft laws that are on the agenda of the current session, such as the law on citizenship, the law on primary principles of sovereignty of the people in Belorussia, and some others.

Draft laws related to the Chernobyl situation should get extra priority: on the rights of Belorussia citizens who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl nuclear power station catastrophe; on the status of the territories that were subjected to radioactive contamination. Here, again, there are no analogies in the legislative activities of other republics. Ours is the first Supreme Soviet that discusses and has an opportunity to adopt such draft laws; the same goes for the law on culture.

Rural workers are waiting impatiently for the draft laws that would give priority treatment to socioeconomic development of rural areas and of the agroindustrial complex, and also on the peasant-farmer homesteads. There will be several other proposed market-related laws, first drafts of which will be presented for discussion: on measures aimed at strengthening discipline during the transition period; on individual income tax; on freedom of economic activities and development of entrepreneurship; and several others.

[Correspondent] Valeriy Guryevich, what is frustrating is that laws are being passed but they are not being complied with...

[Tikhinya] In this respect, I recall the words of a famous Russian democrat of the past, Vissarion Grigoryevich Belinskiy; these words, although he said them about 150 years ago, remain pertinent today: "The tragedy of Russia is not in the lack of good laws, but in the fact that even those that we do have are not obeyed." I share my

constituents' concern in this respect; just yesterday, at the meeting with my voters, I was asked why the laws are not obeyed. I can name at least two reasons. First: By destroying the command administrative system we, as they say, threw out the baby with the bath water—we have undermined the authority and prestige of executive power. To a certain degree this explains why many laws are not observed today. Second: Laws that are being passed by the Supreme Soviet, unfortunately, do not contain a built-in mechanism for implementation. Laws that have been passed contain an element of haste.

[Correspondent] You are a specialist in judicial matters. Of what would you advise your colleagues and compatriots to beware?

[Tikhinya] We are a society of extremes. During the years of personality cult and the years of stagnation, the law had played a diminished role in the life of the society and the state; now, in my opinion, we are observing another extreme. Some people in the economic and soviet leadership, as well as ordinary citizens, now believe that all problems can be solved by passing laws. There are, however, limits to how much you can regulate social relations by law. It is equally wrong both to underestimate and to overestimate the significance of law. I am watching, for instance, how a draft law on youth is being worked on: Everything relating to youth is being removed from the norms of labor, housing, and family law, and put together in one separate code. Is it going to solve the youth problems? I am afraid not. In my opinion, it would be more sensible to develop and perfect the norms that already exist in appropriate branches of law.

I also think we should treat more strictly the definition of an "alternative draft." For instance, the draft law on local self-rule and local economy, presented by the parliamentary opposition, truly is a creative contribution. But when we speak about unsubstantial differences—as we have, for instance, in the draft law on militia that is in the works now—and the authors insist that this is, indeed, an alternative draft, I cannot agree with that.

Of course, this and other shortcomings are partially just growing pains. The important thing is that the parliament is establishing itself. I hope that the second part of the session, as well as this entire year, will be marked by common sense, businesslike attitude, and accord, all of which we need in order to get out of the crisis.

[Correspondent] Last question, Valeriy Guryevich, and it is related to you personally. As was justly remarked at the session, you participated in it in your two personae—as a minister of justice and simultaneously as a Belorussian SSR people's deputy. This is contrary to the legal principle of separation of powers...

[Tikhinya] This is true; the law says I should choose one or the other. It does not give, however, any indication as to the time frame within which the position should be resigned. Quite possibly, this is an oversight in the

existing election law that needs some correction. In timely fashion, I did submit my request to be relieved of my ministerial duties due to my election as a Belorussian SSR people's deputy. The current session agenda contains an item on the changes in the government. I assume that this problem, which concerns me and raises questions on the part of others, will be finally resolved.

Comparison of Belorussian Front, Sajudis

91UN0833B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 16 Jan 91 p 3

[Article by Professor I. Kucherov, doctor of jurisprudence, chairman of the Advisory Commission to the Socialist Federation of Lithuanian Working People: "Go and Drink the Sea"]

[Text] Among the regularities of the historical process of our times, one may detect this one: When history goes into a steep curve, public organizations and movements emerge, ripen, and then vanish into the netherworld. The life cycle of some of them is rather short. A seemingly immortal Lithuanian Sajudis collapsed after barely making it to its second congress. Having lost the respect of the people, it collapsed under the burden of lies, the militant nationalism and anticommunism, and the bankrupt economic policy. Various political parties have been formed from its debris, the latest of which is the Independence Party, headed by Sajudis' former executive secretary, V. Petkyavicius.

I am saying all this, first of all, because I have seen the following bragging in Zenon Poznyak's interview with NARODNAYA GAZETA of 23-30 October: "The future of the BNF [Belorussian People's Front] is still to come." Directly related to this is also a publication in the weekly SOYUZ, No 43, October 1990, entitled "A Horseman With a Sword Over the City." Its interlocutors are a journalist and one of the BNF leaders Mikhail Tkachev. The interlocutors cum authors are beaming over the BNF "victory"—the official recognition by the Minsk City Soviet of the logo "The Chase," which had become a symbol of the anti-Soviet, nationalistic coup d'état in Lithuania on 11 March, 1990. I would like to dispel the faked optimism of the interviewees right away: A social movement that advocates enmity and destruction has no future! Do we need the proof?

BNF, much like other analogous movements in other republics, is Sajudis' offspring, a flesh of its flesh that carries defective heredity in its genetic code. First and foremost, it is anti-Sovietism and anticommunism. BNF displays them in an even more aggressive form than the former Sajudis did: They resemble the actions of openly pro-Fascist organizations such as the Lithuanian Freedom League, the Shaulis (Riflemen) Union, the Young Lithuanians—who at the 9 November rally announced a holy war (!) against the Russians, Communists, and the "occupational army." For comparison, I will quote Z. Poznyak. "Now," he told the correspondent, "it is not enough to demand the dissolution of

party committees and party organizations in the workplace. In reality, the CPSU—the Communist Party of Belorussia—should be disbanded as an anti-Belorussian, antihumane organization."

So what are all the lofty phrases that follow—about the "independent, free, democratic state"—worth? It is well known that when anticommunist ideology is implanted into political practice it means the suppression of democracy. Examples of this are in nearby Lithuania, where a group from the Sajudis right wing grabbed power and set course for the establishment of a totalitarian nationalistic regime. Criminal policy becomes harsher; activities of political parties are being put under state control; nonconformist representatives of science, literature, and art are being persecuted; monuments are defiled, and the graves of warriors and partisans—who perished liberating Lithuania from German fascists and local nationalists—are being desecrated. One of the "pearls of democracy" emerged out of the Sajudis parliament on 18 December, when the procurator's office was instructed to start criminal proceedings on charges of antistate activities against a group of activists who had been collecting signatures in support of signing the new Union treaty. Only the powerful voice of the left-wing forces that have closed ranks around the Communist Party of Lithuania and the resistance of the working masses to the implementation of antidemocratic laws—including the dissolution of collective farms—stand in the way of Sajudis' stride towards a totalitarian dictatorship.

Another sign of the BNF's defective heredity is nationalism and Russophobia.

The idea of national renewal produces strong organizing impulses only until it transforms itself into nationalism, while the latter becomes a political practice. In order to exist, nationalism needs an image of the enemy of the nation—which is usually some other nation. Remember, the Hitlerites first targeted Jews and Gypsies; then the Slavs' turn came. At the BNF rally in Minsk I had heard hoarse shouts: "Jews! Get out of Belorussia!", and "Russians! Get out of Belorussia!" Together with Communists, of course. One can hear this in Vilnius quite often, too: "Van'ka, go home!"—from the nationalists marching under "The Chase" logo. By the way, by "Van'ka" they also mean Belorussians who have been living in Vilenskiy Kray since times immemorial. The paper of the Socialist Federation of Lithuanian Working People VMESTE I NARAVNE recently published an appeal to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR president, signed by 150 Belorussians from Vilenskiy Kray who asked for protection from Lithuanian authorities violating their human dignity. Minsk residents told me that this appeal has been distributed in Minsk and posted in the Supreme Soviet building, but that BNF deputies take it down, to try conceal it from their compatriots.

Z. Poznyak explains his Russophobia by the fact that he finds "as a man of a different culture, many strange,

unpleasant, and unacceptable things in the works of Russian poets and writers..." Of course, every person is free to associate himself with any culture. But nobody has the right to attach to that other culture the entire nation, especially by using ignorant judgments. Z. Poznyak, however, maintains categorically that Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Russians are three nations that are "closely related in language, but are of a different race, different culture, different value systems, and different historical destinies."

Such a psychological goal—to separate and put in contrast to each other three nations stemming from a single Slavic root—is clearly borrowed from our recent past, apparently, with only one purpose: to set Slavic nations against each other, to help the fighters to destroy themselves.

One more genetic defect of the BNF—it is programmed to bring about the disintegration of the Soviet Union, "the dying empire" in Poznyak's words. Of course, he repeats them after V. Landsbergis.

Z. Poznyak is lying in claiming his authorship of the idea of collective actions directed at the disintegration of the USSR. This idea was brought from foreign lands by the Sajudis, and it was implemented in practice in the creation of the union of the three Baltic republics at a time when the BNF teams were just learning the ABC's of nationalism in Vilnius, financed by Sajudis' money. At the same time, Sajudis intellectuals were whipping up Lithuanian nationalism by the noisy propaganda of Lithuanian past glory "from sea to sea," leaving Belorussia an outlet to the Baltic Sea through a land corridor in "Little Lithuania," as they now call the territory of Kaliningrad Oblast.

In the nationalists' design, the Black Sea-Baltic Sea union should play more than just the role of a battering ram that would destroy the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Its final goal, stemming from its rabid Russophobia, is to isolate Russia from the West, to push the Russians up from the South, squeezing them into the taiga along the line between the northern Urals and Leningrad- Novgorod region. The same as the design of the Third Reich leaders!

The futility of the ambitious political concepts of the nationalists is obvious. Perhaps, not everybody knows yet that in the nationalists camp—where they all declare their unity on the plank of antisocialism and Russophobia—there is a hard battle for the hegemony going on. Z. Poznyak misleads the Belorussian people by his references to the past, to the function of Belorussian language (or, to be exact, old Russian language) in the Great Duchy of Lithuania, as some sort of guarantee of equal footing in the union between Belorussia and Lithuania. There are myths being cultivated in Lithuania now, according to which the Lithuanians are the direct—and the only one—descendants of the ancient Greeks, and Lithuania is Athens of the North. There is even a

magazine with such a name. So where does the Belorussian language fit here? The team of Lithuanian nationalists, under the leadership of V. Landsbergis, claims the role of the leading force, which makes the Latvian nationalists—much closer to the Lithuanians in spirit—quite upset. For the Belorussian brethren they leave the role of a tail helping the nationalistic beast to move. I think that the Belorussians should understand this. And the time will come soon when the "contender" for the supreme power in Minsk will be told in Aesopic words: "Go, Zenon, and drink the sea." The wits will probably add: Why not drink two—the Black and the Baltic?

Political Opinion Poll Results in Moldova

91UN0936A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 12 Jan 91 p 2

[Article by A. Zavtur, director of the Social and Political Research Institute and corresponding member of the Moldovan SSR Academy of Sciences, and Prof G. Entelis, head of a department of the Social and Political Research Institute: "Whom Do We Trust? A Barometer of Public Opinion"]

[Text] The year 1990 was a complex and contradictory one for the republic. Endeavoring to evaluate the social and political situation in Moldova as soberly and comprehensively as possible, we conducted a poll in mid-December for the purpose of ascertaining the people's attitude toward and their degree of trust in the activity of certain organs of power and parties and movements and their leaders. Unfortunately, the population's knowledgeability of specific institutions of power and the top leaders is insufficiently high. This primarily explains the fact that practically one out of every five failed to respond to questions on the poll. It should be borne in mind also that there is a preponderance of quite simplistic ideas in connection with the activity, and particularly of local authorities, of a number of parties and public formations which are being newly created and others. In addition, quite an extensive backdrop has taken shape in society today of a negative attitude toward all institutions of power which have been unable to secure social harmony and order locally, organize supplies to the populace of food and industrial commodities, and restructure the work of health care, cultural, public education, municipal service, and other establishments.

Approximately 1,000 persons in five rayons of the republic (Aneniy Noy, Dondushenskiy, Rezinskiy, Ungenskiy, and Leovskiy) were polled altogether. The makeup of those polled in terms of nature of occupation was as follows: workers of industry and agriculture and other spheres, 38 percent; collective farm members, 19 percent; specialists, office workers, and others, 43 percent. In terms of national composition: Moldavians, 71 percent; Russians, 10 percent; Ukrainians, 13 percent; Bulgarians, Gagauz and others, approximately 6 percent. In terms of age group: 29 years of age and under, 23 percent; 30-49, 62 percent; 50 and over, 15 percent.

So which authorities and to what extent enjoy the trust of those polled (percentage)?

	Trust completely	Trust, but only to a certain extent	Do not trust
Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet	33	26	22
Moldovan SSR Government	30	26	29
Rayon (city) soviet of people's deputies	14	32	32
Rural soviet	15	25	30
Law enforcement authorities (militia, the courts, procuracy)	13	31	33
Army	41	21	17

Thus those polled mostly trust the Army, as the most stabilizing and supranational force capable of protecting people and helping them in extreme situations. People are worried, very tense, and tired of the mass meetings and unrest and extremism. Whence the expectations that the Army might at least "bring order to bear." The appreciable preponderance (by a factor of 2.5) of the numbers of those completely trusting the Army over those who do not trust it is noticeable. The fact that democratic institutions and authorities enjoy the least trust is disturbing.

One out of every three persons completely trusts the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet (22 percent do not trust it). At the same time we are particularly concerned by the increasing attacks on the democratically elected highest legislative authority of the republic. As far as the government of the republic is concerned, the numbers of those trusting it completely are only slightly more than those rejecting it.

As is known, other parties and public movements, aside from the Communist Party of Moldova, have really taken official shape also. The extent to which some of them enjoy the trust of those polled is attested by the figures presented below (percentage):

	Trusted	Trusted, but only to some extent	Distrusted
Communist Party of Moldova	21	27	31
Rayon (city) committees of Communist Party of Moldova	14	24	34
Moldovan People's Front	14	16	49
Moldovan Social Democratic Party	6	10	33

	Trusted	Trusted, but only to some extent	Distrusted
Christian Democratic Women's League	12	14	30
Moldovan Peasant Union	24	16	20
Organization of Democratic Youth	5	11	32

Let us briefly analyze the results. The Communist Party of Moldova obtained absolute recognition from 21 percent of those polled, and a further 27 percent trust it to some extent. Practically every second person polled relies on it and believes in it, one out of every three does not.

As far as the Moldovan People's Front is concerned, only 14 percent of those polled trust it completely, 49 percent (practically 3.5 times as many) do not trust it. The Peasants Union has many supporters.

We attempted to ascertain the popularity rating of political leaders by the most prevalent method. Participants in the poll were asked an open question, without prompting: "Which political leader of the Moldovan SSR enjoys the greatest authority with you?" Those polled wrote down the names themselves. The results were as follows: More than 39 percent were unable to give any name. Some of those polled did not answer at all. The majority of the "votes" (over 19 percent) of those polled was obtained by Mircha I. Snegur and Petr K. Luchinskiy.

We would not want to make an absolute of the given figures. What is important is the tendency and change of the public mood. The more so in that in a number of rayons sympathies were divided. Thus in Rezinskiy Rayon the name of Mircha I. Snegur was written down by 32.5 percent, and in Aneniy Noy, the name of Petr K. Luchinskiy by 30 percent, of those polled.

Real politics has now come to replace formal democracy. It requires of politicians and statesmen new qualities, mainly an ability to adopt decisions and be responsible for them. Unfortunately, some "new" leaders frequently take the path of populism and, where they should be acting prudently, confine themselves to slogans and appeals. Under the conditions of an extreme lack of political culture in the population of the republic demagogues who know how to manipulate a crowd frequently make it as "leaders" (temporarily). Fortunately, people quite soon grasp the essence of such populists.

It was proposed that the participants in the poll express their opinion on the degree of trust in certain statesmen and politicians of Moldova. The times are changing rapidly and abruptly, and the attitude toward state and

public leaders is also changing literally before our very eyes. These are the realities of December 1990. The greatest trust is enjoyed by the president of the Moldovan SSR. The number of those completely trusting him is 1.5 times higher than the number of those who do not trust him. Aleksandr K. Moshanu's authority is gradually increasing.

There is a different degree of trust in respect of the prime minister of the Moldovan SSR and the group of ministers. It is, on the whole, low. This is explained, in our view, by the fact that there have been no real changes in the people's life in the past year. Thus 60 to 84 percent of those polled expressed their dissatisfaction with the supply of food and industrial commodities, municipal services and utilities, housing provision, the solution of interethnic relations, and a recovery of the environmental situation. Unfortunately, this is happening because national issues are squeezing social and political issues into the background. Democratic processes have begun to decelerate. The work of the local authorities is ineffective. The aspiration of certain groupings to shape and strengthen in people's minds a negative image of a union of sovereign republics is highly dangerous.

Thus the reforming of society, the agonizing processes of the renewal of all spheres of the life of republic, the insufficiently professional actions of many institutions of power and their leaders and, most importantly, the absence of real results have determined the growth of a pessimistic mood and created an atmosphere of disbelief in a change in the situation for the better. A sharply critical mood predominates in respect of the Moldovan SSR Government and a number of ministry and department leaders. This is an objective reflection of the socioeconomic situation which has taken shape in the republic. Given this attitude, it will be difficult for many senior officials to continue to operate successfully in office.

The aspiration of the Communist Party of Moldova to civil harmony within the framework of an integral and sovereign republic and the recognition of the need for the republic to be part of the Union are encountering an ever increasing response in various strata of the population. For only in a democratic, free, and economically strong society can each person show what he can do as an individual. A majority of those polled believes that we are at last switching from words, mass meetings, and demonstrations to action—creative and highly efficient labor. And are beginning to understand one another better.

Legal Expert on Aspects of Moldovan Citizenship Draft Law

91UN0960A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 2 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by G. Fedorov, chairman of the State and Law Theory Department of the Moldova State University: "A

Line for the Chosen? Discussing the Draft Law: 'On Moldovan SSR Citizenship'"

[Text] One may have noticed lately in our country an assembly-line approach to the adoption of numerous legal acts—laws, directives, decrees, declarations, and so forth. In a number of cases they are being passed hastily, without deep-reaching and comprehensive debate. None of the normative acts were adopted on the basis of a referendum, although a referendum is the most democratic form of expressing the people's will. Is this not why some normative acts turn out to be of low quality and not effective enough?

The desire to make the Law "On Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic Citizenship" an exception to this rule is easy to explain: So far, only all-Union laws on citizenship have been adopted in the country. Therefore, each clause of the draft law "On Moldovan SSR Citizenship," every line and every word of it should be weighed a thousand times, and thought through, in order to make it a positive influence on the political and socioeconomic situation in the republic. This law should be aimed at consolidation and unification, not at creating disunity and confrontation. The citizens of the republic, their present and their future, and the future of their children and grandchildren depend on this law. However, the draft law is provoking certain questions and concerns. It is strange that its publication was delayed for so long (it was ready more than a year ago); it is also hard to explain why it was so speedily presented for the parliament's consideration (its first draft was put up for debate there five days after its publication). What kind of popular debate can there be in such a case? There was no such debate, and there could not be.

The need to adopt such a law and its significance are beyond any doubt. Some clauses of an organizational nature are not objectionable, either. However, the very concept on which this draft law is based is wrong and unacceptable. Its substance has been reduced by its authors, first, to the affirmation of the supremacy of the rights of the nation over individual rights—which contradicts international legal acts; second, there is a visible desire to limit to a maximum degree the number of people eligible to receive SSR of Moldova citizenship; third, the qualification-based nature of the draft may lead to a situation whereby between one and 1.5 million Soviet citizens currently in the republic may lose their citizenship; fourth, it is clear that many clauses are fashioned along the "foreign pattern;" and, fifth, the mechanism (procedure) of granting and acquiring citizenship is bureaucratized.

In order for our statement not to appear unsubstantiated, let us look at some of its clauses. First of all, let us point out the clause contained in the draft preamble, and further developed in article 5, that the Moldovan SSR does not recognize dual citizenship. This clause contradicts international law, the USSR and Moldovan SSR Constitutions, and the draft Union Treaty (article 2). The draft constitution of the RSFSR, with which

Moldova recently signed a treaty, and which is often mentioned as an example in speeches, also recognizes dual citizenship (article 2. 2.3[1]).

The Union law on citizenship clearly confirms the same clause: "Each citizen of a Union republic is at the same time a citizen of the USSR." Even if the republic does not intend to sign the Union treaty, international law still permits dual citizenship. For instance S. Tyminskiy, who had been running for the office of the president of Poland, has triple citizenship—of Poland, Canada, and Peru.

The definition of republic citizenship could have been done better, too, from our point of view: "Citizenship of the SSR of Moldova is the belonging of an individual to the state of the SSR of Moldova." It would be more correct to say that "citizenship of the Moldovan SSR is a permanent political and legal link between an individual and the SSR of Moldova" which is expressed in their mutual legal rights and obligations. A citizen is not an inanimate object and therefore cannot be an object of belonging.

Explanations, and therefore changes, are needed to the preamble clause stating that only SSR of Moldova citizens have the right to perform public, civic, and military functions. Leaving aside the "military functions," but what do "public and civic" mean? Is it that individuals without citizenship and citizens of other Soviet republics and states (foreign) who reside here cannot engage in charitable activities on Moldovan territory, fight for peace, or engage in cultural and educational activities, healing, or useful labor in general, since this is precisely what public and civic activities are?

It appears to us that the most heated debates will unfold (and it cannot be helped) both within parliament's walls and among the general public on the issue of who among us will receive citizenship at the time this law is passed or immediately after it becomes legally effective.

There is a good reason to expect that the issue of Moldovan SSR citizenship will follow the Baltic pattern. Therefore, we can predict the future: There will be a limit, to a maximum possible extent, on the number of people who will be eligible for Moldovan citizenship.

Another doubtful and arguable provision for granting citizenship concerns certain conditions—namely, knowledge of the state language, with the exception of people over 60. Yes, the ability to speak the state language is a noble intent, but in reality this requirement should be an imperative. On the other hand, how does this clause reconcile with the Law on Languages, which says that knowledge of the state language is not required of people over 55? Let us note in passing that the 60-year age limit and the requirement for knowledge of the state language also are borrowed from the citizenship laws of the Baltic republics. They are also the source of the idea of taking a virtually military oath of allegiance to the republic, also in the state language (article 18 of the draft law on Moldovan SSR citizenship). Another condition for

granting citizenship is knowledge of the basics of the Moldovan SSR Constitution. By itself this is not bad, but it would not hurt a citizen to know other laws as well, since ignorance of the law does not relieve one of responsibility to it. Besides, the fact of granting the citizenship by itself is sufficient proof that, together with certain rights, a citizen also assumes certain responsibilities before the state.

If after the law is adopted we have to strictly follow the qualifying criteria—both those enumerated above and those that are largely unspoken—there will be a waiting list of about four million people. Either we do not understand how laughable this situation will be, or we are so used to lines by now that we cannot live without them. We have already reached the stage where we form a line for everything: an apartment, furniture, telephone, car, carpets... Now we are being offered another line—the line for citizenship. But while in the line for consumer goods one only has to meet one condition—to have money—there is a whole set of conditions attached to citizenship, and if you do not meet even one of them you will not get this citizenship, even after waiting in line for 10 years.

It is also inadmissible to make it a part of the law that citizenship applications are to be handled through the internal affairs organs at the place of residence (article 30 of the law). This solemn and sacred act should not be reduced to a simple police procedure. At the very least these matters should be under the jurisdiction of the soviets of people's deputies, not in the hands of a police representative even though he wears epaulets and a cockade. The soviet of people's deputies may charge the latter with carrying out some tasks related to this matter, but it should be under the control of the soviet power organs.

I think that article 23 regarding the possibility of stripping a person of citizenship should be removed from the draft law. This contradicts the norms of international law and the norms of natural law. Someone who was born in Moldova and lived his entire life in the republic would suddenly, in his old age, be deprived of citizenship, of his natural roots. Citizenship should be an inalienable right of a citizen. It is not the state that should grant its citizens appropriate rights but, on the contrary, the citizens delegate appropriate rights to the state. Citizens should not be turned into servants of the state. By the way, the preamble states that citizens of the republic will be under the protection of the state of the Moldovan SSR. What kind of protection is it if the state may, to put it simply, throw the citizen out of its territory?

Thus, strict conditions for proof of citizenship, no less strict conditions for granting citizenship, and a long list of conditions that may cause loss of citizenship may all lead to a situation in which the population of the state of the SSR of Moldova will be shrinking fast numerically from one year to the next. This shrinkage will lead to a situation in which the republic finds itself without

workers, peasants, or specialists; there will be nobody to develop the economy, culture, health care, education, and science. Perhaps some "democrats" are dreaming of this; perhaps they want to get rid of "non-natives," "migrants," "occupiers," "out-of-towners," and such. But who knows, the time may suddenly come when we will turn around and start to encourage citizenship of Moldova, make it easier to obtain, but the people will be loath to come here for whatever benefits we promise them. Then, instead of a gain we will be left with a loss. Finally I would like, jurist to jurist, to remind the authors of this draft law that no law can be retroactive if such an application worsens the individual's rights or infringes upon them. Basing the draft law on qualifications alone (settled life, knowledge of the state language and Constitution, possession of a certain morality, and others) that are typical of bourgeois legislation undoubtedly infringe on individual rights and as such are inadmissible in either the theory or the practice of a socialist law-based state. A wise, civilized, and democratic legislator should follow the road of encouraging, not limiting, citizenship.

Democracy by qualifications is a bob-tailed, limited democracy.

Reading these notes, some opponents of these views may think that my way of thinking is predetermined by the fact that I myself do not meet these qualifications and therefore am in danger of finding myself without Moldovan SSR citizenship. I would like to speedily reject their suspicions—I meet all the requirements of citizenship; I am of the right nationality, was born and have lived on the territory of the SSR of Moldova before 1940 and still live there, I am fluent in the state language (Moldovan), perfectly familiar with the basics of the SSR of Moldova Constitution, have permanent residence and a legal source of income, etc. Thus, myself personally and my family, as well as my close and far-removed relatives, are not negatively affected by this law in any of its versions.

However, we cannot live for ourselves and engage in self-adulation. We should reach outward and speak for all of us and each of us—the millions of people who live and work in Moldova today in the name of its progress and commonwealth.

Everything mentioned above is proof that the draft law on citizenship—in the raw form in which it was published—cannot be adopted. It needs serious additional work and further nationwide debate. Only after that, and only after the Union treaty is adopted and signed, may this law be presented again for the consideration of the republic parliament.

The adoption of this law in its present form will lead to massive and large-scale violation of the political, socio-economic, and personal rights and freedoms of the citizens, and to a new round in the escalation of political tension in the SSR of Moldova.

Resolution on Moldovan Migration Law

91UN0927A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 25 Jan 91 p 3

[“Resolution of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet: On Implementation of the Moldova SSR Law ‘On Migration’”]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic resolves:

1. To implement the Moldovan SSR Law “On Migration” beginning 1 January 1991.

2. The Moldovan SSR Government:

- will prepare, within two months from the date of adoption of the Moldovan SSR Law “On Migration,” normative acts to provide for its functioning;
- will present to the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet, within one month from the date of adoption of this law, appropriate changes to republic legislation currently in effect.

A. Moshanu, chairman,
Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.
Kishinev, 19 December 1990.

Moldovan Migration Law Published

91UN0927B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 25 Jan 91 p 1

[“Law of the Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic: ‘On Migration’”]

[Text] The Moldova SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Law “On Migration” administers the processes of population immigration and emigration in the territory of the republic and regulates them.

This law is drawn up based on the Moldova SSR Constitution, the Declaration on Republic Sovereignty, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, conventions of the International Labor Organization, and other republic and international legislative enactments.

I. General Provisions

Article 1. Subject Entities of the Law and Types of Migration

1. Subject entities of the Moldova SSR Law “On Migration” are, on the one hand, a private individual or family and, on the other, the Moldova SSR Ministry of Labor and Social Protection.

2. Migration is subdivided into family, labor, education-related, and special. One type of labor migration is pendulum migration.

Article 2. Moldova SSR Ministry of Labor and Social Protection

1. The Moldova SSR Law "On Migration" is implemented by the republic government through the Moldova SSR Ministry of Labor and Social Protection.

2. The Moldova SSR Ministry of Labor and Social Protection:

- conducts through organs of local self-government migration policy developed by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet and Moldova SSR Government;
- examines the applications of persons who have petitioned for residence entry into the republic, and facilitates settlement into the Moldova SSR primarily of citizens exiled from it or subject to repression and their descendants, as well as emigrants from Moldova, regardless of their place of residence;
- records and transmits to the "population data bank," along with other involved ministries and departments of the republic, information on immigrants and emigrants desiring, in the event of departure from the republic for a period of more than one year, to retain their status as Moldova SSR citizens and who have asserted this desire within the time frame established by the Moldova SSR Ministry of Labor and Social Protection;
- has the right to rescind or annul residence permits and assignments or invitations to engage in studies issued to immigrants who have provided false information.

Article 3. Obligations of Enterprises, Establishments, Educational Institutions, and Organizations (Including Cooperative, Lease, and Social Organizations), Law Enforcement Organs, Civil Status Document Registration Organs, and Organs of Local Self-Government to the Moldova SSR Ministry of Labor and Social Protection

To avoid encroachments on human rights and in the interests of providing assistance to immigrants, enterprises, establishments, educational institutions, organizations (including cooperative, lease, and social organizations), law enforcement organs, civil status document registration organs, and organs of local self-government are obliged to inform the Moldova SSR Ministry of Labor and Social Protection within a 10-day period of the following:

- (for enterprises, establishments, and organizations—including cooperative, lease, and social organizations): early termination of labor contract with an immigrant;
- (for educational institutions): conclusion or termination of studies, transfer to another educational institution, or dismissal of students or pupils from an educational institution;
- (for law enforcement organs): all violations of law committed by an immigrant, and any court decision concerning changes in his family status;
- (for civil status document registration organs): changes in an immigrant's family status;

- (for organs of local self-government): early departure of an immigrant from the territory under its jurisdiction.

II. Quotas and Immigration Regulation

Article 4. Immigration Quotas

1. The Moldova SSR Law "On Migration" regulates the settlement of persons in the republic in accordance with established quotas consisting of a limitation on number of immigrants, determined taking into account the proposals of local organs of self-government.

2. Immigration quotas are established by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet upon proposal by the republic government for each calendar year by rayons and cities, simultaneously with ratification of the Moldova SSR state budget and in accordance with it. Quotas must not exceed 0.05 percent of the permanent population of the Moldova SSR.

3. The quotas encompass all immigrants moving to the Moldova SSR for residence, with the exception of:

a) Moldova SSR residents sent or resettled abroad, or who departed for residence, employment, studies, or medical treatment outside the republic, or who are engaged in active duty military service abroad;

b) persons released from confinement facilities who, prior to committing their crime, permanently resided in the Moldova SSR.

Article 5. Regulation of Family Immigration

1. In regulating family immigration, assistance is provided to reunite families and preserve their integrity. The family of an immigrant may include wife (husband), children, father, and mother, who are his (her) dependents.

2. In observance of immigration quotas, preference is given to minors moving for the purpose of residing with their parents, and to aged parents or parents in need of assistance in the event they do not have children or guardians outside the Moldova SSR.

Article 6. Regulation of Labor Immigration

1. Labor immigration is regulated on the basis of Moldova SSR state policy in the sphere of utilization of labor resources.

2. Pendulum migration of the population in border regions of the republic is regulated according to procedure established by the Moldova SSR Government.

Article 7. Regulation of Education-Related Immigration

1. Education-related immigration is regulated in accordance with agreements concluded between the Moldova SSR and other states.

2. Persons from other states sent to pursue studies in the Moldova SSR must have assignments or invitations for study from the appropriate organizations and educational institutions.

Article 8. Regulation of Special Immigration

1. Pertaining to matters of special immigration are questions concerning return to the Moldova SSR with residence permit of military servicemen released from active military duty to the reserves or entering retirement, and persons released from confinement facilities who were permanent residents of the Moldova SSR.

2. Settlement and stay in the Moldova SSR of personnel belonging to USSR Armed Forces military units, of persons from embassies, consulates, and representative delegations, and of refugees and persons applying for political asylum are regulated by special legislation of the Moldova SSR.

Article 9. Suspension of Immigration

For objective reasons, the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet can restrict or suspend immigration. Suspension or restriction of immigration does not impede movement to the Moldova SSR for residence of persons enumerated in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 3 of Article 4.

III. Residence Permits, Their Issue, Revocation, and Annulment. State Fees for Immigrants

Article 10. Residence Permits

1. Issue of residence permits to immigrants arriving for settlement in the Moldova SSR lies within the jurisdiction of the Moldova SSR Ministry of Labor and Social Protection.

2. Moldova SSR residence permits are divided into the categories of temporary, term, and permanent.

3. Temporary residence permits for a period of up to three months are issued to immigrants who have arrived in the Moldova SSR for personal reasons. In this regard, permission is not given for job placement.

4. Term residence permits are issued to immigrants who have official agreement drawn up in writing concerning work or other activity in the Moldova SSR for a period of up to three years. Immigrants registered with educational institutions of the republic are issued term residence permits for the entire period of their studies.

5. Permanent residence permits are issued to immigrants possessing specialties of particular need to the republic and to highly qualified specialists. Preference in this regard is given to former Moldova SSR citizens and their descendants.

6. An immigrant whose term of residence permit has expired and who desires to continue living in the Moldova SSR following termination of job contract or conclusion of study at an educational institution may, together with his close relatives (husband, wife, children,

parents), apply for a new term residence permit or permanent residence permit on general principles.

7. The place of residence of an immigrant applying for temporary or term residence permit is determined in accordance with agreement with the organ of local self-government.

8. The Moldova SSR Ministry of Labor and Social Protection examines and decides in accordance with established procedure questions on declaring temporary or term residence permits invalid for immigrants who do not observe the laws of the republic or who commit violations.

Article 11. Issue, Revocation, and Annulment of Residence Permits

Procedure for the issue, revocation, and annulment of residence permits and the issue of instructions to leave the Moldova SSR are established by the republic government.

Article 12. State Fees for Immigrants

The scope of state fees for immigrants is established by Moldova SSR legislation.

Article 13. Job Placement Authorization

1. The issue and annulment of job placement authorization is effected according to procedure established by the Moldova SSR Government.

2. Persons who have a term or permanent residence permit (paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 10) may be accepted for employment without job placement authorization.

Article 14. Immigrant Assistance Fund

With the aim of providing assistance to immigrants, and to emigrants when necessary, a budgetary fund is established within the Moldova SSR Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, whose means and assets are formed through allocations from the state budget and local budgets, and also from the resources of enterprises, establishments, educational institutions, and organizations (including cooperative, lease, and social organizations) which initiate the settlement of persons in the Moldova SSR. The scope of allocations from the state budget is established by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet. Procedure for use of the Immigration Assistance Fund is determined by the Moldova SSR Government.

IV. Emigration From the Moldova SSR

Article 15. Right of Citizens to Emigrate

1. Citizens of the Moldova SSR have the right to change their place of residence and to move to employment in any population center outside the Moldova SSR.

2. The interests of Moldova SSR citizens located outside the republic are protected by the state of Moldova.

3. Matters related to affording emigrants benefits, in resettlement out of the Moldova SSR according to their own desires, are regulated by agreements concluded between the Moldova SSR Government and the governments of other states, with assistance provided by human rights organizations.

4. Acknowledgement of emigrant status for persons forced to emigrate from the Moldova SSR as a result of natural disaster or encroachments upon the inviolability of the individual and his abode, as well as the provision of compensation and benefits related to moving to a new location of residence, pertain to the jurisdiction of the Moldova SSR Government.

5. The departure of Moldova SSR citizens for temporary employment in foreign countries is regulated by Moldova SSR legislation.

Article 16. Temporary Emigrants

1. The following persons are considered to be temporary emigrants:

a) persons who have left the Moldova SSR for military service outside the republic. Their accountability is effected according to procedure established by the Moldova SSR Military Department;

b) persons in confinement facilities located outside the Moldova SSR. Their accountability is effected according to procedure established by the Moldova SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

V. Other Legal Issues Related to Migration

Article 17. Obligations of Immigrants

1. In the event of extended (more than one month) stay in the Moldova SSR, immigrants are obliged to apply in writing to the organ of local self-government, requesting issue of a residence permit.

2. The appropriate organ of local self-government is obliged to examine an immigrant's application within one month of the date of submission and give its consent to the Moldova SSR Ministry of Labor and Social Protection for registration of a residence permit or justify its refusal to do so.

3. Immigrants are obliged to observe the laws of the Moldova SSR in effect.

4. Upon departure from the Moldova SSR, an immigrant is obliged to submit to the appropriate organ of local self-government necessary documentation in accordance with procedure established by the republic government.

Article 18. Operations With Real Estate and Housing Rental Contracts

1. Only a person who has a Moldova SSR permanent residence permit may conclude transactions involving the sale or purchase of real estate (with the exception of assets designated for production).

2. The acquisition of real estate located in the territory of the Moldova SSR or obtainment of real estate on the basis of a donation agreement provide no advantages to a person in the event he makes application to be issued a permanent residence permit.

3. Housing rental contracts for premises in the Moldova SSR may be entered into only by persons who have residence permits.

VI. Legal and Organizational Guarantees of Implementation of the Moldova SSR Law "On Migration"

Article 19. Responsibility for Violations of the Moldova SSR Law "On Migration"

1. Charges will be brought against persons guilty of violating this law in accordance with procedure established by Moldova SSR legislation.

2. Implementation of this law is monitored by the Moldova SSR Government.

Article 20. Resolution of Disputes

Disputes arising in connection with the application of this law, in instances envisaged by Moldova SSR legislation currently in effect, are resolved through legal proceedings.

Article 21. Procedure for Application of the Moldova SSR Law "On Migration"

With the implementation of the Moldova SSR Law "On Migration," legislative acts presently in effect in the territory of the republic remain in effect to the extent that they do not contradict this law.

[signed] M. Snegur, president of the Moldova SSR.

Kishinev, 19 December 1990.

Moldovan Local Government Reform Disputed

91UN0890A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
12 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by V. Solonar, Moldovan SSR people's deputy and candidate of historical sciences, under the rubric: "A Question of Reform;" "Are the Soviets Outside the Law?"]

[Text] A radical reform of local self-government is being prepared in our republic. I will attempt to describe the new structure in detail so that readers from other republics will understand the issue.

Instead of the usual division of the Moldovan SSR into rayons (there are currently 40 of them) and cities, there is a plan to create seven uyezds with cities subordinate to uyezds and two municipalities—major cities. The lowest territorial unit should be the commune—one or several villages—and between it and the uyezd will be the volost.

I will focus on one situation. The basis of the new system will be the communes—"autonomous social organisms where all social services granted by passport bureaus, notary's offices, etc. will be rendered." This sounds quite unusual, but that is what is being considered. Furthermore, representative organs of the new administrative-territorial formations are supposed to be named "councils" [konchilium]. At the head of the communes, cities, and municipalities will stand mayors [primar], and in the uyezds it will be prefects. Note that the primars of the municipalities and the prefects of the uyezds are appointed by recommendation of the administration.

At first glance the draft bill stipulates a significant broadening of the economic independence of the local organs of power and grants legal guarantees of local self-government and independence in the realization of their rights. We will try then to discern why passions are raging in the parliament. Why are the representatives of the People's Front and the organizations close to it defending the authors of the draft bill so ardently? It was they who, at the so-called Second Great National Assembly on 16 December 1990, demanded that the Supreme Soviet immediately approve the draft bill.

But there is also another point of view. Some see the attempt to appoint prefects and mayors with very broad rights at the center a new dictatorship. And precisely in this appears the desire to intensify the administrative and bureaucratic control of the republic's center over the situation at the local level. The prefects and mayors appointed from above will deprive the future organs of local self-government of rights by forbidding them to adopt any political rulings at all. What, for example, is the cost of prohibiting the people from expressing their will in regard to the administration and its officials!

Something else gives rise to concern. Representatives of the regions of non-Moldovan population fear that the borders of the uyezds will be determined in such a way that each of them will have a majority of Moldovans. They speak about the "liquidation of Soviet power," and not without foundation! It comes to the same thing no matter how it is expressed. The young soviets will be doomed. And what a paradox: This may happen after the first truly democratic elections. It is an affront! The new soviets are currently up to their ears in work! And now they are being threatened—their days are numbered.

From everything that has been said, one may ask whether the Soviets are worth saving.

But after all, what is easier and more democratic than to reinforce the young Soviet power at the local level, train the government's personnel, and delegate them a portion of the rights from the republic organs. I do not deny that it is also worth thinking about enlarging existing rayons. But everything should be done reasonably and wisely. Nor let us forget about the cost of the reform. It will not be cheap—tens of millions of rubles. And that when the treasury is running low!

The administration of M. Druk promises effectiveness of leadership with the new organs of power, but it is difficult to believe him. Why am I so pessimistic? When the new administration came to power it was very vocal about looking into matters of personnel. It planned tests, questionnaires, competitive selection of the best specialists, and multicandidate elections. And what in fact has happened? The practice of choosing personnel has turned out to be banal and traditional, taken from the "arsenal" of the era of stagnancy. They are not putting competent workers into posts but rather "their own," those who share the political convictions of the leaders... They are nominating fellow townsmen, wives, brothers, and favorites. Will not just such a practice predominate in the appointment of prefects and mayors as well?

Moldova's Future Political State Assessed

91JUN0766A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 22 Jan 91
Union Edition p 2

[Article by *IZVESTIYA* correspondent E. Kondratov: "Moldova: Alignment of Forces Today"]

[Text] In Tiraspol the participants in a special congress of deputies of all levels of areas of the Left Bank and Bender treated the edict of the USSR president on "Measures Pertaining to a Normalization of the Situation in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova" with understanding. But declined to implement it, nevertheless.

More precisely, they rejected the article of the edict depriving the Dnestr-Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], which has been formed here but which is not recognized by the Moldovan parliament, of any legal status. The deputies decided to stick to their guns, believing that only the preservation of the republic independent of Moldova which they have created may secure for the inhabitants of the region equality and a better life. The participants in the congress accused the Moldovan Supreme Soviet of contempt of the USSR president's edict inasmuch as Kishinev has no intention of concurring with what in their opinion are the most fundamental provisions of the edict.

Having resolved that the sole acceptable version of the preservation of the integrity of Moldova may be merely a federation of three equal republics (the Gagauz is the third), the participants in the congress appealed to the USSR Supreme Soviet requesting legalization, finally, of the existence of the Dnestr-Moldavian SSR.

The first working day of the new year, 2 January, was its tuning fork: At the end of the work day aggressive crowds brought public transport to a halt in the center of Kishinev. This was done by opponents of the Union treaty who had been sustaining a political hunger-strike at the Stefan the Great monument.

A situation typical of Moldavia today: daily nervous expectation of an outbreak of unrest, lack of confidence in the present, and complete uncertainty as to the future.

The increasingly palpable consequences of the economic crisis are today forcing both the president of Moldova and the parliament to devote the lion's share of time to down-to-earth realities. Big hopes are being placed in an economic treaty among the republics for 1991. But Moldova did not even manage to prepare for embarkation upon the "market year" legislatively even, and the Supreme Soviet session continued its business on 16 January. There will be discussion of laws on taxes, the budget, property, land, the socioeconomic development of the countryside.... The electorate is not concealing its unhappiness with parliament, which has wasted hundreds of plenary hours on procedural and political debate and is now attempting to hastily catch up with the train of the economy, which is headed for impasse.

So dangerous a tilt into pure politics, which has confronted the republic with the threat of economic collapse, would be taken as a natural occurrence were we to recall the spring campaign of elections to the supreme and local soviets of the Moldavian SSR. The powerful wave of struggle for national revival, the incredibly long debate, which inflamed passions, on language and the law which was subsequently enacted, the change under the pressure of masses storming into the squares of the party and state leadership—these were the circumstances preceding the elections. Political and, even more keenly, national delineation emerged in Moldova at that time. And although communists constituted 83 percent of those elected to parliament and business, party and soviet leaders acquired the greatest representation (approximately 60 percent), it was not they who from the very outset called the tune at the sessions. Having won approximately one-third of the 380 seats, deputies from the Moldovan Popular Front (MPF), representing mainly the artistic, scientific, and rural intelligentsia, involved parliament in the discussion of purely political matters connected in one way or another with the idea of the speediest "liberation from Moscow's imperial diktat." They were fiercely opposed by the leaders of the "Yedinstvo" Intermovement, who also successfully negotiated the election hurdles. The problems of the economy could have been grounds for cooperation, but here, however, confrontation emerged immediately. Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians—approximately one-fourth of the corps of deputies—became Moldavians' intractable opponents on all political matters.

Passions became heated not only in the hall. This developed into physical violence against Russian-speaking deputies and the walkout from the session of almost 100 members of parliament. Since the end of May through the present the majority of them have not taken part in the work of the Supreme Soviet. They were practically all elected in the Dnestr region and the areas with a Gagauz population.

The opposition's walkout from the debating stadium facilitated the legislative work of the now virtually unipartisan parliament, enabling it to adopt quite easily a number of fundamental documents—specifically, the

Declaration on the Sovereignty of the SSR of Moldova and the findings in respect of the evaluation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. It followed from the latter that the formation in 1940 of the Moldavian SSR was an illegal act, after which the gulf between parliament and the deputies who had abandoned it became even wider. Following the news of the elections of supreme authorities of the Gagauz Republic, deemed illegal by the Moldovan Parliament, 12 deputies were deprived of their authority, almost all Gagauz.

What is the breakdown of political forces in Moldova's parliament today? Compared with the first sessions, it is changing. The strong group of members of the Moldovan Popular Front and the deputies who sympathize with it, who have been in the lead up to now, are losing their former popularity, experiencing the increasingly palpable opposition of the "agrarians," with whom the "Club of Communists" and the "Independents" are closing ranks increasingly often. Prior to the walkout of the deputies of the rebellious regions, the "Soviet Moldavia" group was strong, but now the voices of its members are considerably quieter. But speaking of the quantitative composition of some blocs is difficult, they vary depending on the issue being discussed. However, it is emerging clearly that radical political solutions are having a much harder time passing than before. Having defined their views, the centrists are no longer, as before, afraid of being suspected of a lack of patriotism and no longer intend rocking the boat in choppy seas. Evidence of this is parliament's adoption of a decree still recognizing 7 November as a holiday together with national and religious holidays inasmuch as it is, as before, respected by substantial numbers of the population. Other evidence is the sober attitude toward the edict of the president of the USSR. Harsh criticism on the part of the Moldovan Popular Front was not avoided here, come to that, and the leadership of the Supreme Soviet, which was accused of "collaborationism with imperial forces," came in for it most.

Yet the chairman of the Supreme Soviet and his first deputy are former leaders of the Popular Front. Professor Aleksandr Moshanu quit the Moldovan Popular Front himself, disagreeing with the super-radicalism of the decisions of its congress, but the poet Ion Khadyrke, head of the Moldovan Popular Front Executive Committee, was forced to choose one of two executive positions.

The low productivity of parliament's business is making a reform of its structure necessary. It is proposed making it a standing "working parliament" of 95 deputies proportionally representing regions and national groups. It would incorporate the most qualified deputies who have proven themselves in practice. The probability of a change in the structure of executive power is linked with parliamentary reform also. It is believed that the creation of a cabinet of ministers headed by Mircha Snegur, president of Moldova—the sole figure capable of consolidating the political forces—could alleviate the lot of Moldova's economy under the conditions of the food

shortage, commodity shortage, and inflation. The president of Moldova is an agronomist by profession, formerly a top business executive, then a party leader of a rayon and secretary of the Communist Party of Moldova Central Committee. Although Snegur's popularity rating is, as before, high, he has recently been criticized increasingly by the national radicals, who consider him indecisive in relations with the Gagauz and the Dnestr separatists. However, the more popular opinion is that it is thanks to Snegur's sober circumspection that the conflicts in Moldova have not grown into mass clashes.

At the time of the events in Dubossary the president of Moldova was in Moscow, and the order for the use of force by the militia was given by Prime Minister Mircha Druk. He is today the subject of sharp attacks—and not only from the Dnestr people, who are blaming him for people's deaths, but also from Moldavian "practical" members of parliament, who have a negative evaluation of the government's economic program and who have even begun to talk about the premier's resignation. M. Druk, a translator, psychologist, and economist by specialty, is being accused of incompetence and a facile approach to the complexities of transition to the market economy.

The Moldovan Popular Front is today, as before, the most populous social and political organization, with influential strong points throughout the Right Bank. Recently, however, its actions have diminished repeatedly—in connection with the people's rejection of the call for Moldova to be called a Romanian republic, the recalcitrance locally of the volunteers and the mass disturbances, any connection with which the Moldovan Popular Front emphatically denies. The political program of the Moldovan Popular Front is oriented toward implacable struggle against the idea of a Union treaty in any form, and its fire is trained on three points, what is more: the "empire," the "communist poison," and the "army of occupation." The Moldovan Popular Front program consists of immediate secession from the USSR and the unification in an independent democratic Moldova "of all occupied Romanian land"—Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and a number of areas of southern Ukraine. "The fate of the occupied Romanian territory may be decided only by the whole Romanian nation," the summary document of the Great National Assembly held on 16 December in Kishinev says. Some 800,000 persons took part, according to the Moldovan Popular Front, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, approximately 100,000.

Moldovan Popular Front leaders Yu. Roshka, A. Shalaru and others are cooperating actively with the Romanian parties and movements in opposition to Iliescu. Following its second congress, the Moldovan Popular Front de facto took official shape as a party, although de jure reserved to itself the status of popular movement. In many areas of Moldova the local authorities operate to the diktat of the Moldovan Popular Front organization.

The Communist Party of Moldova is more often than others becoming a target of the Moldovan Popular Front's attacks, but only rarely does it appear as a tough opponent of its ideological adversary. Headed by Petr Luchinskiy, the Communist Party of Moldova Central Committee, compromised in the eyes of the people by the stubborn orthodoxy of the former leadership, has abruptly changed its relations with the national democratic forces, having put the emphasis on the achievement of consensus. This flexibility of policy, which initially enhanced the authority of the Central Committee, has borne bitter fruit also. The tractability of the communists, unaccustomed to political struggle, sharply weakened the influence of the Communist Party of Moldova on social processes in Moldova, evoking a wave of discontent of the most assertive section of the party loyal to the ideas of Leninism. Particularly of the communists of the Dnestr region, who have accused the Central Committee of confusion and class collaboration with the enemy of the socialist system—the Moldovan Popular Front. Having resolved "not to feed the Communist Party of Moldova Central Committee," the party organizations of Tiraspol and other cities and rayons of the Left Bank are transferring their dues to a special account. The Left Bank is speaking openly of the need for separation from the Communist Party of Moldova.

Whether the integrity of the Communist Party of Moldova will be preserved will become clear following the republic party conference to be held on 26 January. Meanwhile, as Ion Gutsu, secretary of the Communist Party of Moldova Central Committee, maintains, "it remains a most influential force in the republic, in parliament included."

Are there other political forces in Moldova? On the right bank of the Dnestr these include the Women's Christian Democratic League led by the poet Leonida Lari, people's deputy of the USSR, who is known as a fierce enemy of "Russian imperialism," and the Organization of Democratic Youth, which manifests its political ambitions very aggressively. The "Yedinstvo" Intermovement, once a notable counterweight to the Moldovan Popular Front, has lost its former assertiveness. The Moldovan Social Democratic Party, which attracts the intelligentsia by its humanitarian position, has yet to become fully fledged.

But the main political potential of the opposition is undoubtedly located across the Dnestr—in Tiraspol, Rybnitsa, Dubossary, and the Left Bank rayons—and also in Bender and in the southern steppe. In other words, on the territory of the Dnestr and Gagauz republics. Neither republic conceives of itself outside of the USSR, in which they see themselves as equal subjects of the treaty.

The Dnestr area has, as is known, elected its own Supreme Soviet, which is bicameral, what is more. However, the main directive force there remains the United Council of Labor Collectives. The majority of leaders of the public and elective organizations are

leaders and specialists of enterprises of Union jurisdiction. Their political palette is sustained in crimson tones: fidelity to the socialist choice, counterpoise of the red banner to the tricolor, the inseparable nature of the Union of fraternal republics, and language equality. The "Soyuz" group of deputies of the country's Supreme Soviet is the Dnestr area's main support in its political struggle.

Such today is the political atmosphere in Moldova—very transitory and capable of changing abruptly every day. Its counterpoint is fulfillment of M. Gorbachev's edict on a normalization of the situation in Moldova. It is as yet being ignored by the Gagauz, who are continuing to form bodies of the republic abolished by the president of the USSR and appealing to Russia and the Ukraine for support. The edict is being furiously opposed by the national radicals. TSARA, organ of the Moldovan Popular Front, has published a declaration on the establishment of the "16 September" national alliance for independence, which unites the forces that reject both the idea of a Union treaty and the president's edict. "And if the motherland expects it," it says, "we will show that the spirit of the volunteers will be reborn beneath the cross of Stefan the Great."

How did the republic's parliament take this direct threat? It kept quiet. Events in Lithuania have heated up the atmosphere even more, and mass protest meetings have been held in Moldova. The unpredictability of the development of the situation is becoming fatal. Will the Moldovan clot be resolved or will it burst?

Caucasus

Integration, Development of Armenian 'Nation' Stressed

91US0286A Yerevan EPOKHA in Russian No 18, 20 Dec 90 p 6

[Unattributed article: "National Interest"]

[Text] Once again, as in the 3rd century, as in the late 19th-early 20th centuries, the Armenians find themselves in the orbit of a gigantic world process, in another world revolution. While in the 3rd century it was Christianity, and in the late 19th-early 20th centuries it was the "worldwide" socialist revolution, today a new world process is becoming clearly delineated—the world democratic revolution. The analogies may be continued—the struggle against paganism, the struggle against capitalism, and the struggle against totalitarianism. Once again the world is being divided up into blocks—this time into "democrats" and "conservatives". And once again the Armenians are one of the first to welcome the new ideology with open arms, with all their maximalist irreconcilability, not wanting to wait and seek compromises, with fanatical assurance of the fact that this new phenomenon is our salvation. Of course, there are more than enough reasons for this: The ruined economy, the

decline of national culture, and the degradation of citizens who have become bogged down in a mire of consumerism. However, there are also more than enough reasons to stop and think: To what degree is this next world process **beneficial** to us as a nation?

The testimony of history tells us that less than 100 years after the acceptance of Christianity we "received" a divided homeland. Less than 20 years after the creation of the first social-democratic group in Armenia we lost half of our people and most of our homeland. Less than a year after the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia we lost another part of our land and, frankly speaking, we have continued to lose it for 70 years.

Here is a curious instance: Each of these new ideologies represented itself as the savior of the nation. This is somewhere correct: The onset of a new ideology is accompanied by losses, but it is specifically the last piece which had not been devoured by the enemy, that was saved and this new ideology was founded on it. Thus, there is always an answer: Had the new ideology not been established on this little piece, then it too would not exist, and it is difficult to argue with this answer.

There is also another curious moment: Our homeland has always been subject to division. More precisely, we always lost land whenever the question arose: Who are you with, Armenians? Are you with the West or with the East? In the 3rd century this was the choice between Byzantium and Persia, in the 20th century it is a choice between the North and Russia. Today it is a choice between "independence" and Karabakh (i.e., federation or confederation, i.e., the Union). All this once again emphasizes the borderline nature of our situation between the two civilizations—the West and the East. As Kipling once said, the two shall never meet. From here stems the pressing need to look in both directions and to conduct the politics of compromise. If we speak metaphorically, if we leap to the embraces of the West, the East splits off its portion from us, and vice versa. Why is it that the part of the East is always—this is our land, and the portion of the West is ideology. In general, the exchange of land for ideology is perhaps an inherent quality for us. Both in the past and today we give up land without the pain of an organism from which a living piece is cut. In exchange for this we engage in various activity, scattering our forces and coming to a state of sociopolitical apathy, while the question of land—and history has shown this—is the strongest idea. It would be a good idea for us to learn from our neighbors. On 28 April 1920 they gave up their independence to the Red Army without bloodshed. In return, they retained their cadres, communications, technology and obtained new lands. Today they are ready to opt for independence already with these lands. This once again indicates that the real ownership of land is above state decisions and historical truth, and that all evaluations lose their meaning after the land has been won.

In general, ideology is our "thing". Whether you agree or not, we are very prone to falling for new ideologies, with

a nihilistic attitude toward the old one for whose sake we not so long ago shed rivers of blood. Rushing to embrace each new ideology, we are simply proving once again that ideology is specifically what we do not have.

Of course, parties may have an ideology, and these parties may exist to this day. There are many such examples in Armenian reality. However, we do not have a **national ideology**.

Look at the condition in which the representatives of this very same Armenian people find themselves. Armenians enter into various military-political blocks. Armenians find themselves under the influence of different, often opposing, political systems. Armenians even espouse different religions (there are even Armenian Muslims), and also belong to different churches and sects, or practice no religion at all. Armenians speak different languages, and Armenians live among the most varied peoples who have their own customs and laws...

Tell me, what can unite these people from the same ethnic background? Language? That is not enough. Culture—that too is not enough. In our opinion, only ideology. A single national ideology and culture would organically enter into both language and culture, and everything else.

However, it is difficult to be maximalists in establishing certain narrow national standards, as there is the danger of losing a large part of the nation. Another matter is the prudent integration of these standards with the conditions of existence. Thus, the Armenian language in Armenia must reign supreme in all spheres of life, but to demand the same of a diaspora is simply absurd. Let us try to go from the concept of "national ideology", which tells us little, to the more easily understood "national interest" and "national benefit". In essence this is one and the same, since this is why it is the ideology of the nation, to bring it benefit and good.

Thus, let us speak about **national interest**. (By the why, we are not making any discovery here. Nations which have had long experience in statehood have long been guided in all their actions, both inside and outside their boundaries, by only one principle—the interests of their state, which is in essence the interest of the nation. However, for us who, first of all, have not had a state for a long time, and secondly—and more importantly—who live in our homeland as well as in a diaspora, it is specifically national interest which is important).

What is national interest? Obviously, it is all that which facilitates the development of the nation—economic and spiritual. It is all that which preserves the nation physically. Finally, it is all that which allows the nation to exist safely—its home and its land. The loss of each of these components leads—in the long or short-term future—to the destruction of the nation and to its disappearance. This is why national interest is a complex of irreplaceable elements but, as in any complex, these are elements which interact with and supplement each other. Thus, the loss of the spiritual will sooner or later lead to

degradation of the economic, and vice versa. The absence of physical security will sooner or later lead to the loss of cultural values and economic achievements. Economic weakening will sooner or later lead to colonization by stronger peoples and states. And it is not important how this colonization will take place—by military means, by purchase of property, or by founding of enterprises.

Thus, national interest is the factor which can unite the Armenians throughout the entire world. Only their recognition of themselves—due to the circumstances which have arisen—as a world nation, and the recognition of the interests of this nation will help the Armenians to exist and develop as a people. Otherwise, if we are more interested in human rights or democracy, for example, and if we want to establish these principles at home, we must first clarify how this relates to our national good (for example, the right to free emigration—who has even once stopped to think whether it corresponds with our national interests?).

Furthermore, there is no ideology without structure, if this ideology wants to guide the lives of the people. [This means] a structuring of the Armenian nation and its division into levels of subordination and management, so that each component part of the structure—from the individual Armenian to the group, region or all the world's Armenians—would know **WHAT** they are doing and would know that it is for the good of the nation.

(Today we do not have this. Today one Armenian may bankrupt another, today an Armenian may...[word illegible]...his nation and work for others. He may engage in anything, including that which tomorrow will turn against his own children, not to mention the entire nation. In short, complete chaos reigns in the national organism. We need order, i.e., structure).

The organization of the nation is its priceless capital. Structure is the skeleton which supports the entire nation. If you disintegrate the structure, you will have a crowd which is easy to scatter and disperse in all directions. It is no wonder that our enemies directed their first and primary blows at the institutions which organize the nation—the intelligentsia and the church. It is time to rise above various pathetic conceptions and to finally understand that we are a united Armenian world community. Thus, it is time to understand that we have our own interests throughout the entire world.

What do we do when, turning on the radio, we hear of events taking place in one region or another? Perhaps we think about the region, and about the countries taking part in the given events. Yet we must think about how these events relate to us, Armenians, and our national interests!

A national structure will allow every Armenian to feel benefit from belonging to the nation—material benefit, as well as spiritual and physical. A national structure will create an entire world which will be very difficult, simply unbeneficial, to leave—from all points of view. Structure

will create harmony between the interests of the individual and the nation. Today the lack of correspondence between these interests leads to degradation—of the former as well as the latter. The absence of a national organizing structure today leads to the situation where the gigantic volume of information which the Armenians have at their disposal (knowledge, experience, art, languages, technology, skill and many others) remains unused, and being in essence the national wealth, does not give any national benefit, does not enrich the nation materially or spiritually, and does not become a component of the nation's strength.

Often our national wealth—the cadres, finances, etc.—serves other, often even anti-Armenian goals, i.e., it is wasted. To organize this wealth, to force it to circulate within the national organism and to reproduce itself—that is the goal of structure.

Thus, the Armenian consciousness of being a world nation, a single organism, dictates the need to create a world Armenian structure which would include—and this is natural—the representatives of the communities on one hand, and the representatives of organizations on the other. This is a successful method of combining the interests of the communities as a whole and organizations as its component parts. Here structuring must proceed upward, from the level of the communities, organizations, through the level of regional associations, associations of organizations, and up to the all-Armenian ruling organ. Armenia may be included in this structure as a community, with the only difference being that it would have the status of a "permanent community" (other communities may disappear and emerge, but Armenia is eternal!).

The principle of operation of this structure (as generally any structure of the international type with relatively independent elements which comprise it) may be only one thing—centralization around an idea (around a developed political, economic, etc. line) and decentralization of the methods of action.

The latter circumstance will make it possible to find a successful integration between the interests of the individual and the nation, between working for oneself and for the nation. Our motto is: BY BRINGING GOOD TO THE NATION, BRING GOOD ALSO TO YOURSELF; BY BRINGING GOOD TO YOURSELF, BRING IT ALSO TO THE NATION.

All that we have said above allows us to speak of structure as a general federation of Armenian communities and organizations which is not bound by rigid ties and is autonomous, repeating itself at every level, and therefore viable and capable of regenerating itself under unexpected blows and attempts to destroy it.

Together with structure come the necessary elements—informational service, the financial network, specialized services, etc.

Let us understand once again that without a structure we will not survive as a nation...

The final aspiration of all Armenians must become only one thing—**integration**. Specialists, students, businessmen and politicians must all integrate with each other. If you like, the value of any process for Armenians may be determined by its effect on the integration of the nation. General integration of Armenians will mean that the events in any Armenian community will immediately become part of the spiritual and material life of the entire nation and will develop a sense of involvement in the common, unified national historical process. They will allow every Armenian to feel himself a part of a single unified national organism.

What is the benefit of a worldwide structured Armenian nation for the world as a whole. This question must necessarily be answered, since it is easy to foresee accusations of nationalism and other sins.

First of all, such an Armenian nation will be able to develop more actively and fruitfully, thereby making a more significant contribution—cultural and material—to the cause of development of all mankind.

Secondly, the Armenian nation may become the reconciling and integrating force—again cultural as well as material—for various peoples and countries. And this is good, since it coincides with those processes which have emerged in recent times and which are expressions of the the interrelationship of the world, the peoples and countries.

Thirdly, global worldwide processes are objectively anational and directed at obliterating national differences and peculiarities. In our nation, which lives in its homeland as well as in exile, there is a unique capacity for actively participating in worldwide processes through the Armenians which are dispersed throughout the entire world, without any fear of losing national self awareness.

Here we approach the concluding thesis of our article. It consists of the fact that the Armenians must assume some **function** which would harmonize with global processes and which would bring these processes into equilibrium and thus would become necessary—to the Armenians as well as to their surrounding system. A state or a nation without a function in that system where it exists, and where it interacts with other elements of the system, becomes superfluous and unnecessary. In the ultimate case it becomes an idle toy in the hands of someone else, an instrument which if necessary may be taken out of its case, and put back again when it is not needed. Perhaps in this too we should seek the reasons for our misfortunes in the recent past. We cannot live only for ourselves. We must be useful to others and thereby also to support our own security.

Of course, the question of selecting a function is not an easy one. However, we must show the world that we hope and intend to enter the international division of labor. Without a definite function, partnership is an

illusion. The choice of the function must depend on Armenia's geographical position, as well as on the peculiarities of the nation as a whole and the social and economic position of the Armenian nation.

In touching upon the former, we must finally understand our affiliation with the Near and Middle East (as well as with the Caucasus).

In speaking of the latter, we must understand that history, although bitter, has given us the opportunity to become a nation—an informational complex. Having noted that it is specifically information which is becoming the most valuable capital, we will understand what potential wealth we possess.

Creating a structure and developing functions—this in itself is the goal and method of activity of the Armenian people. They will help us to have a definite timetable of activity, a certain hierarchy of goals, to introduce a gradual approach in the life activity of the nation, and to be guided by the principle of "better less than nothing". We will avoid the chaos which arises when everyone who feels like it proposes grandiose tasks without knowing what is needed for their resolution.

A clear example of this is the question of independence. Many who argue in favor of immediate independence do not even know what we will have to do tomorrow. Moreover, the example of unification of the FRG with the GDR clearly demonstrates the advantages of a gradual approach and harmonization of this approach with the processes in the world around us.

And finally. That which had been squandered for tens and hundreds of years, that which had been degraded all these years, cannot be restored in a year or two, or even five. Therefore, we must give up the illusions of a rapid restoration of all we have lost. Nothing, no statutes, declarations, etc. will become a reality if the entire nation and system does not work, allowing the nation to operate effectively. And since the goal is clear, any reservations expressed such as "they will not let us", "they will not allow it" are simply an indication of an unwillingness to act.

Arms Thefts in Transcaucasus Deplored

91US0295A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Colonel L. Arshantsev and Captain Third Rank Yu. Gladkevich: "When Will They Bid 'Farewell to Arms?'"]

[Text] For many years now there has been no peace and accord in our common house. Marks designating conflicts and internecine wars have appeared here and there on the political map of our country. People who lived for centuries on the same land without asking one another about their ethnic backgrounds have split into hostile camps.

Erstwhile neighbors and good friends have gone at one another—us against them. People blinded by hatred have reached for weapons...

Justice Major General V. Ivanov, military procurator of the Transcaucasus Military District, said: "Last year, a powerful surge of arms and ammunition theft among the troops occurred in Transcaucasia. I see a rule here: After all, interethnic passions flared up as never before in 1990 as well. Overall, more than 800 weapons and over 130,000 rounds were stolen from the military stocks stored in the territory of Transcaucasian republics. Sixty-three cases of attacks on military installations were registered, as well as more than 20 cases of servicemen being attacked in order to take weapons or explosives...

Statistics are eloquent: Between 1946 and 1 January 1990 not even 100 weapons were stolen from the troops of the district or lost by servicemen. Everything else was lost in just one year. Armenia accounts for the lion's share of the "stray" arsenal. The statistic of stolen weapons in Georgia is "more modest"—176 "barrels," of which 84 have already been recovered. In Azerbaijan, it is 15 weapons...

In a conversation with one of us, K. Kazaryan, minister of internal affairs of Armenia, unequivocally indicated that the inability of some officials to provide security for weapons and ammunition facilitates the theft of weapons from the troops.

Certainly this is not the primary cause of the upsurge in weapons theft; it is the complex political situation that has emerged in Transcaucasia. Nonetheless, the following was noted at a recently held meeting of the Transcaucasus District Military Council: The troops were very slow to respond to the unstable sociopolitical situation in Transcaucasia and the activation of extremist representatives of various political parties and movements and criminal elements who seek to acquire weapons in any way possible. Moreover, massive violations in the organization and performance of guard and routine garrison duties have become commonplace, as well as failures to comply with requirements for organizing the storage of weapons and ammunition in depots and arms rooms in units and small units...

There is an explanation for this—difficulties which the troops of the district have recently experienced. Vacancies in command and political officer positions and the loss of contact and mutual understanding with local soviet, party, and youth organs have brought about a serious weakening of political and indoctrination work in units and small units. Hence an increase in the number of servicemen who have taken part in weapons and ammunition theft for various reasons.

For example, five first-year cadets of the Tbilisi Higher Artillery Command School stole 30 assault rifles and 1,500 rounds for them for political reasons (according to available data, the criminals are currently with one of the armed nationalist groups of Georgia). One-quarter of the

crimes have been committed for mercenary reasons: At present, commandos pay 15,000 rubles per assault rifle...

By now, serious though belated measures have been taken by the troops to prevent weapons theft. Weapons and ammunition have now been concentrated at well-fortified depots which are properly equipped and guarded. However, this could have been done sooner. What interfered with this, and who was responsible for unintentionally arming the commandos?

The assault rifles and pistols, grenade launchers and flame throwers that have already fallen into the hands of the latter-day "fighters for the national independence" of Georgia and Armenia and criminal elements still pose a genuine combat threat. Current leaders of Armenia and Georgia maintain in all forums that on the whole the political situation in the republics is stable (with the exception of "hot spots"—Artsakh, Tskhinvali), and that the crime situation gives no particular cause for alarm and is under the control of law enforcement organs.

For example, K. Kazaryan, minister of internal affairs of Armenia, said: "It is unnecessary for us to enlist the help of military units in order to maintain order on the territory of Armenia, as envisaged by the well-known decree of the USSR president. We are capable of solving our own problems with our own resources, without exposing the army to the wrath of the people and without causing tension in the republic. At present, our militia is vigorously making operations and search efforts aimed at uncovering individuals who have gained illegal possession of weapons, confiscating these weapons, and returning them to those they have been stolen from. For example, yesterday an operations team confiscated an assault rifle from criminals which had been stolen a year ago from a military unit. On the whole, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Armenia has already recovered more than 100 weapons stolen from, among others, the troops..."

Referring to data received at the Military Procuracy of the Transcaucasus District, we are compelled to remind Karlos Bagratovich that this is not exactly the case. The Armenia MVD recovered only about 10 "barrels" seized by the criminals last year and in January of this year, and another 30 were seized with the assistance of territorial KGB organs. Most strangely, virtually none of the commando raiders have been apprehended or had criminal charges filed against them. Almost all of those convicted in cases associated with gaining illegal possession of weapons have been servicemen. As they say, they have been the responsibility of the military procuracy rather than the militia organization.

Justice Lieutenant Colonel V. Khoroshun, military prosecutor of the Investigative Department of the Transcaucasus Military District Procuracy, told us: "Last year, the courts tried 34 cases involving 58 servicemen who participated in stealing weapons and ammunition. All of them have been convicted..."

Therefore, at present the troops of the district themselves and the military procuracy are the echelons "concerned" the most about the instances of arms theft from the troops and are involved in the most active manner in looking for these "barrels" and returning them to their rightful owners. The contribution of the republic law enforcement organs to the elimination of underground arsenals in Armenia, as well as in Georgia, may be considered purely symbolic for now.

When discussing how difficult it is to organize the recovery of weapons stolen from the troops even when the thieves and their addresses are known, Justice Colonel A. Tokhmakhov, military procurator of the Leninakan Garrison, and Garrison Commandant K. Shevchenko noted that local militia employees do not strive to use their powers in such cases.

It is surprising that the actual helplessness of the local law enforcement organs is displayed against the background of quite stern decrees of the leaders of the republics on disarming illegal formations which were issued at various times following a similar decree of the USSR president. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia Z. Gamsakhurdia also signed such a decree, giving the commandos one month to turn in their weapons.

However, one month passed, and another one is about to end, but nobody has been or is willing to turn in weapons. Likewise, there have been no resolute actions on the part of the territorial law enforcement organs aimed at eliminating the underground arsenal.

In light of this, a statement made by the MVD of Georgia on 21 January of this year is interesting. On the one hand, it calls for "surrendering illegally seized materiel, weapons, and other combat assets to the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs," whereas, on the other hand, "...those deciding to engage in armed service to the Motherland will be given an opportunity to do so within existing state structures."

What legitimate state structures are meant here? Are these the recently created republic internal troops—the national guard? What about weapons: Will they be issued, or may one bring "his own?" Excuse us, but in this case this has to do with the legalization of illegal armed units rather than their disarmament. Will this altogether remove from the agenda the issue of punishing individuals who have gained illegal possession of weapons, murdering and inflicting severe bodily injuries on servicemen in the process? Is this not to say that indulgences are granted to those who will commit such crimes in the future and later take up the banner of the national guard?... May this be called a wise policy which promotes relieving tension in the region?

Something similar also happened in Armenia. It is now clear that the disarmament of the ANA (Armenian National Army) achieved its goal only in part. Actually, the ANA commandos by far did not surrender all their weapons to the law enforcement organs. Some assault

rifles and machine guns had "gone underground" ahead of time, and so did many commandos after the elimination of ANA structures. However, some of the illegally created military detachments were given an opportunity to be incorporated in "the existing state structures," having one way or the other sworn "allegiance" to the AOD (Armenian Pannational Movement) which had come to power in the republic. As is known, a special missions regiment was created in Armenia under the republic MVD. Those who see the soldiers of this regiment will easily recognize the familiar features of the former fedayeen in their countenance...

While legalizing this "soldiery" at present, do the leaders of the republic consider whose interests it is going to defend and who their issued (or, perhaps, criminally acquired) weapons will be used against?

At any rate, Zviad Gamsakhurdia has every reason to consider this seriously. In fighting "the dominance of the Communist Party in Georgia," he and his comrades did a lot in their time for the illegal armed units to appear and gain strength. However, now that Gamsakhurdia heads the republic and is in power, has he begun to reconsider his past deeds?

Soon after Z. Gamsakhurdia signed a decree on disarming the illegal units, D. Ioseliani, one of his main political opponents and the leader of the paramilitary organization Mkhedrioni, held a press conference in Tbilisi. He declared that surrendering weapons voluntarily is out of the question. His detachments need the weapons in order to restore order in South Ossetia...

After all, Mkhedrioni is not alone. The Legions of Georgian Falcons and the detachments of White George also have weapons... It is easy to imagine the kind of "order" they will restore on the land of Georgia using them...

When will peace come to the land of Transcaucasia? Perhaps, no one in our country is in a position to answer this question at present. However, it is obvious that the road to peace will be much easier if, for example, a radical solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem which suits both Armenia and Azerbaijan is found and if the causes of interethnic antagonisms in the republics are eliminated on the whole. This is up to the Union and republic parliaments and governments, to all politicians, to all people with common sense. However, do we have a right to toss firewood on the ever-burning fires of conflicts, arm ourselves feverishly and without scruples, line up in combat columns, and man the barricades as we await this radical solution? When will the sober voice of our peoples saying "farewell to arms!" sound? When will organs and politicians empowered by us, whom at present commandos firing automatic weapons and machine guns prevent from hearing and understanding one another, begin to quietly settle interethnic disputes?

Meanwhile...

Justice Major General V. Ivanov said: "New alarming statistics have appeared in the first months of 1991. Commandos and criminal elements have stolen 90 'barrels' in the territory of Armenia, and three in Georgia. So far, it has been quiet in Azerbaijan..."

People 'Freezing to Death' in South Ossetia

PM1202122791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 91
Second Edition p 1

[Interview with Ye.I. Petryayev, USSR deputy minister of power and electrification, by G. Yastrebtsov, date and place not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "Without Heat or Electricity: The Transcaucasus: Today's Commentary"]

[Text] On 6 February the examination of the emergency situation which has developed in the Transcaucasian republics concerning electricity supply began in the Union government. PRAVDA's editorial office asked Ye.I. Petryayev, USSR deputy minister of power and electrification, to talk about the reasons for the complication of the situation and about the measures that are being taken to remedy it.

[Petryayev] We at government level have just discussed the situation in Georgia. Tomorrow we will be dealing with Armenia. Matters are somewhat better in Azerbaijan, but even there they give rise to apprehension. The reasons for the "energy crisis" in the region are well known. There is a high percentage of hydroelectric power stations there. And whereas in summer there has always been surplus capacity because there was plenty of water in the mountain rivers, in winter there was a shortage of water resources. But I cannot recall a situation as grave as the present one.

It must be bluntly stated that the shutdown of the Armenian nuclear electric power station has aggravated the situation acutely. I am not going to explain in detail why the nuclear station had to stop working—quite a lot has been written and said about that already. I shall merely note that it provided 40 percent of the electricity generated in Armenia and withstood the powerful earthquake well.

It is clear even to a non-specialist that it is impossible to bring the so-called "backup" capacities on stream quickly. Furthermore, the problem of bringing in fuel has become acute in the Transcaucasus. The main types of fuel are natural gas and fuel oil. As is well known, oil extraction in the country has declined. There is less fuel oil as well. As for gas, it is simply dangerous to overload the old pipeline if we are to avoid catastrophe, and the construction of the new one which is supposed to reach here from the North Caucasus has been held up on Georgian territory by demand of the "Greens." As the Cabinet of Ministers conference noted today, the second segment of the gas pipeline will not go into service until October 1991 at the earliest.

[Yastrebtsov] Ecological catastrophe has been averted, but what can you tell us about the imminent catastrophe at Georgia's industrial enterprises?

[Petryayev] The energy dearth has virtually drained the republic's industry. Plants and factories are standing idle. Furthermore, many enterprises have to send their output to hundreds or even thousands of addressees throughout the country. A chain reaction of closures has begun.

[Yastrebtsov] But things can't go on long like this. What is the way out?

[Petryayev] We have to face facts: For six weeks or so things will be very difficult—until the mountain rivers begin flowing again in spring. The main thing now, however, is to ensure that uninterrupted supplies of fuel begin reaching the Transcaucasus both by rail and by pipeline. We will look for other reserves and increase the loading on operational power stations. In addition, a decision has been adopted to increase electricity generation in the neighboring North Caucasus, even though there too the situation is far from easy. Light and energy will be carried over the Main Caucasus Ridge by three power lines. We are also going to bring a whole series of mobile—diesel and gas turbine—generators into operation. Being mobile, they can be taken by road or rail straight to the enterprises whose output the country particularly needs.

[Yastrebtsov] The question which I must ask is this: Are the turbulent political events taking place in the Transcaucasian republics influencing the present energy crisis?

[Petryayev] Undoubtedly. They are deepening it. Take Georgia. They are trying to speed up the replacement of cadres at power stations there. It is not a matter of replacing bad people with good. Unfortunately the criteria used are different: On our side or not, Georgian or not Georgian. I recently visited Tbilisi. I said to my colleagues: Let us help you; after all, the work of your stations has deteriorated. They answered: No, we do not need your help; we want sovereignty, we need national cadres. I am not trying to be a prophet, but the path of isolation is a dead end. But how and from what human standpoint can you justify the appalling demand from the Georgian "union of free power workers" that the supply of light, heat, and energy to Tskhinvali and other adjacent regions be cut off? This act of barbarity—there is no other word for it—is a reality. People are freezing to death in South Ossetia, where homes and hospitals are not being heated.

[Yastrebtsov] What can the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification do to assist people in distress and help them without delay?

[Petryayev] We are doing all we can. But the key to the fundamental solution of the problem is in the hands of the Georgian government.

South Ossetia Deaths Show Cost of Separatism

PM1302111591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Vyacheslav Lukashevich report under the "Seven Days" rubric: "Will Your Alarm Bell Be Heard, Tskhinvali?"]

[Text] Two people's deputies from South Ossetia—one was a deputy for Georgia and the other for the autonomous oblast (I will not give their names at their request)—first of all telephoned the editorial office and asked if I could see them. They explained that they had already knocked at the doors of many central newspapers, but no one had any time for them there. Then they explained how they had made their way from Tskhinvali along a snow-covered mountain path to Vladikavkaz, and from there they had flown to Moscow. They brought with them some local newspapers containing obituaries of Ossetians who had died. Portraits, words of farewell, pain, grief, black borders covering almost the entire third page.

Interrupting one another, they explained that there is a civil war going on in South Ossetia, with shooting heard every day, the electricity has been cut off, there is not enough water, the bread has run out...

"No, you must explain why, when innocent people died in Tbilisi, Vilnius, and Riga, all the newspapers throughout the whole Union raised the alarm. Why all the newspapers are silent when Georgian militants are killing people in Tskhinvali. In our oblast no one is counting the dead, there are funerals every day, and more people have already been killed than in Tbilisi, Vilnius, and Riga added together. Surely Ossetians do not have different blood? Surely they are people too?"

They shouted out their questions:

"Why is the Georgian leadership trying to have the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] troops withdrawn? If they go, all our people will get down on their knees and beg the soldiers not to leave them..."

A few days ago, when I was listening to the "Vremya" program's indistinct commentary on the prevailing situation in this region of Georgia, I turned my attention to the footage filmed back on 13 January, in which posters pasted up on hoardings were clearly shown, saying: "Army! Defend Us!" and "Army, Save Our Children!"

The day I met with the Ossetian deputies, I promised them I would answer their questions in the newspaper this Saturday. That left a few days for reflection. In my desk I found some old notebooks with "On the Georgian Hills" written on the dust covers. There had been several such official trips in the past 10 years. I read my notes and remembered by Georgian friends. Once they took me to Kakhetia, to Kvareli, to the Ilya Chavchavadze museum and house. He spent his childhood in that settlement. I remember, we stood in the shade of an old tree, whose leaves used to rustle above the head of the

future eminent politician and poet, great martyr and saint, and I listened to the sad tale of the death of Ilya Grigoryevich, killed in 1907, at one o'clock in the afternoon, on the road to Saguramo, and of his public funeral. I found out that as the poet walked up Gora Mtatsminda, where he found his last refuge, his friend and kindred spirit Akakyy Tsereteli bade him farewell on Sionskaya Street. Already seriously ill and supported by his friends on both sides, he came out onto the balcony and said: "...May your death strengthen what you gave up your life for—unity, equality, fraternity, and love"...

In the past few years many public organizations and parties in Georgia, including some that rose on the crest of the wave of the struggle for freedom and state autonomy, have raised the banner of Ilya the holy and righteous. But apparently those who have occupied the leaders' chairs in the republic parliament have already taken this cloth down from the stage and hung it on a nail for people to wipe their hands on. The ideas of "unity, equality, fraternity, and love" are being replaced by nationalistic and separatist slogans.

The first thing that Eviad Gamsakhurdia did when he came to power was to announce on behalf of the people that Georgia would gradually leave the USSR. You cannot call this step innovative by any means, since similar words have issued from the lips of the leaders of certain other republics. But it seems to me that the head of the parliament did not take into account the fact that there are autonomous formations in Georgia and that the republic's people, who have lived together with Russia for centuries, do not change their friends and convictions in an hour. Naturally, the parliament's decision provoked an ambiguous reaction among the republic's population. For instance, as soon as the chairman of the Georgian Council of Ministers announced the Georgian leadership's position as regards the Union at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, this was immediately followed by, *inter alia*, a statement of dissent on this issue from South Ossetian deputies. To my mind, the logic was as follows: Who had asked the people with whom they did or did not want to live? (I make so bold as to suggest that Gamsakhurdia has no confidence on this issue even today—it is not for nothing that the nationwide referendum on the future of the USSR is being blocked in every way by Tbilisi.) In response there followed a tough policy toward the Ossetians, who had hinted at their insubordination to the republic center and the formation of an autonomous republic. It was not just the new status of South Ossetia that was revoked, but also the one that had existed previously. To stop anyone else from doing the same.

From my viewpoint that is the background to the situation. I just want to make clear that I do not support the division of the Georgian land or the pulling apart of the USSR, and I remain on the side of the President, who reiterated his opinion on Wednesday on television to the effect that "after everything that our peoples have been

through and gained together, if you think about it realistically, without any illusions, it is practically impossible for them to separate."

But what will it have cost us by the time we get to this truth! And will we get there?

Unfortunately I have never been to Tskhinvali—a town where, so the old inhabitants affirm, not a shot had been fired for almost 100 years to take the life of a Georgian or an Ossetian. It was our times that brought their bloody amendments into the rhythm of Tskhinvali's life. But why blame the times when it is not they but the people who become involved in contradiction and discord, and if the traditions and customs of our ancestors are forgotten in malevolence and evil? The South Ossetian tragedy, whose end we cannot see at the moment, is a problem for the whole of Georgia and the whole of our country. National egoism, intolerance, political lies and juggling with facts, and dictatorial ways in the guise of democracy—these things have all already happened... But why did they happen?

The latest incident in the Baltic republics is in Riga. The clash between special purpose militia detachment and republic MVD personnel has been portrayed in the democratic press as a threat to Latvia's independence and to democratic processes. Everything has already been described in detail and I do not want to repeat it. But, as has become known, another chronology of events also exists. The same timeframe, but turned upside down. Here it is:

"The night before the incident, the night of 18-19 January, on the personal instructions of the republic MVD minister, a rehearsal for repelling an attack on the MVD building was carried out in which the opponent was directly presented as a special purpose militia detachment. On 18 January Baznis sent telegram No.184 to the organs under his jurisdiction containing an order to open fire and hit special purpose militia detachment personnel.

"On 20 January an aircraft flew from Riga to Helsinki on which 13 correspondents from Finnish and Danish television were missing from the passenger list, and these later "happened" to be at the scene of events.

"One hour before the incident, some unidentified people rang the special purpose militia detachment base and played an audio recording of an outrage committed against the wife of the commander of a special purpose military detachment platoon, who had just been kidnapped by militants from the "Kartibas Sargi" [as transliterated] special detachment and raped, beaten, and thrown out onto the street.

"According to eye-witness accounts, 15-20 minutes before the shooting started some armed members of "defense detachments" and militiamen took up their positions near the MVD building, and they opened fire in the direction of the ministry immediately after the first shots were fired from the MVD building..."

I will not go on. I think it is clear how the incident started.

From my viewpoint, the course of another tragic event, whose second anniversary is approaching—Tbilisi, 9 April—is likewise becoming clear. Evidently the calculations were as follows: The Georgian authorities at the time would be intimidated by pressure from demonstrators demanding their resignation and would appeal to the army for assistance. And that is what happened. General I. Rodionov, who did not realize what was going on, was made the only person responsible for people's death. And he is alone to this day.

"Rodionov the executioner"—I imagine that these terrible, unjust characters still stand before Igor Nikoleyevich's eyes. But I fear that a stereotype has already been prepared for the next person in conjunction with this. The exact progression is as follows: The Army, therefore dictatorship from the center, which means occupation, an alliance of generals and conservatives, and so on. I have already had occasion to write about the Lithuanian version of this.

And while the seemingly undisciplined armed formations or, to put it more simply, militants are constantly combing the streets of Tskhinvali and adjacent districts, the Georgian parliament is adopting a resolution "On Conscription into the Internal Troops-National Guard in 1991." With their military titles, including that of Mr. guards commander in chief, and, we have to assume, with their tasks. In Latvia the parallel existence of two MVD structures—a union one and a republic one—led to bloodshed. Where are the guarantees that the existence of two armies on Georgian territory will not lead to the same thing? A reason, as reality shows, can always be found.

A few days ago the chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet published an open letter to the military district commander, and right away afterward another one to the USSR President, in which he accuses the Army of supporting the Ossetian extremists and demands the redeployment of military subunits elsewhere as well as the arraignment of officers of Ossetian nationality. Perhaps because they are wiring up Army portable power units to maternity hospitals or because they bake bread for the sick?

The Law on the Press is not valid on Georgian territory, so the head of the republic parliament recently noted. This is a union law, he said. It seems as though glasnost has gotten stuck on the Caucasus ridges. It is practically impossible for correspondents from central newspapers to get to South Ossetia. But, to make up for it, they received many accusations from the head of the Georgian parliament last Saturday. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was placed on the same list as IZVESTIYA, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and our permanent correspondent Colonel V. Kaushanskiy was publicly ranked with "Kremlin agents."

It is not surprising. Here they adopt a "tough" stance even with their own publications. MOLODEZH GRUZII has just been shut down—it had taken the liberty of allowing "pluralists" to express their views, and a correspondent of "Svoboda" [freedom] radio who talked about this story concerning the youth newspaper was called a "traitor to the nation."

It is not out of the question that my name is also on this blacklist. But I think that I would more likely betray the Georgian people if I did not write down everything that I think and everything that pains me today. I hope that my friend Vakhtang Nikolayevich, genatsvale [meaning unknown] Givi, and many other respected people from the land of Sakartvelo will understand. And maybe they will help, so that peace and accord is restored in the republic as soon as possible. After all, as I was informed yesterday at the USSR MVD, around 30 people on both sides have already died and over 100 have been wounded by firearms in South Ossetia, where the state of emergency expires in two days' time.

South Ossetians Detail Georgian Oppression

91US02934 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 12 Feb 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by M. Mikhalkov: "The Boomerang Is Returning—Our Correspondent Reports From the Scene"]

[Text] Nalchik-Vladikavkaz-Tskhinvali-Nalchik—An announcement is posted at the entrance to the building of the North Ossetian republican committee of the party that notifies refugees where they must go on questions concerning their unfortunate situation. These refugees are from South Ossetia.

Very likely, many have taken notice: In the uproar surrounding the events in the Baltics, information about the threatening wave of violence rolling over the territory of the autonomous South Ossetian Oblast, which is part of the structure of the Georgian SSR, is very scanty and has appeared at odd moments. Just as sparing and passionless was the information that Tskhinvali, the oblast center, was cut off from the power supplies of Georgia. And this is now, when the frosts have hit, and when snow avalanches, coming down from the mountains, are cutting off all routes for the delivery of living necessities. Such selectivity in compassion and reporting on the events in places of social tension, as well as the different reactions to it, in particular of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, is not comprehensible to everyone, to put it mildly. What is behind this? Perhaps the desire to show the "attack of the center on democracy" in the Baltics, and, on the contrary, to hush up in every way possible the objectives and methods of operations of the "democratic" leadership of Georgia in South Ossetia?.. In short, when I set out for the scene of events, I had many questions.

And so there came the first meetings and the testimony of those whose fates were scorched by troubles. L. Kochiyev, secretary of the party committee of the Kvaishi

REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

mine administration, and N. Khabadov, the chief mechanic of this same administration, give an account of what happened:

"Electric power was turned off at 2200 hours on 1 February without warning. Five thousand residents of the gorge were left without heat and bread and in pitch darkness. The critically ill and those who need an emergency operation are practically doomed... The mines are at a standstill—700 people work there, and the pumps are not operating, and this means that 3,000 cubic meters of water a day spreads out into drifts. The main level is already filled. The economic losses are incalculable."

"The same kind of an electric power cutoff occurred on 13 January, and it lasted 30 hours. We knew what a repeat provocative act could cost, and on the morning of 2 February we appealed at first to the Dzhava and afterwards to the Tskhinvali and Gori electrical network, but we received a hopeless reply. We decided to send our own representatives—chief power technician Chikhelidze and bulldozer operator Betiyev (otherwise, there was nothing else to ride on) to the settlement of Iri with a request to provide electric power on the Iri-Kvaysi LEP [electric power transmission line]. They were detained at the post next to the settlement, the bulldozer was taken, and they themselves were delivered to the Onskiy militia station. They were beaten unmercifully there and sent by foot to Kvaysi."

V. Chochiyev, deputy chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] and chairman of the agroprom [agroindustrial committee]:

"Everything began on 6 January, when the Georgian militia entered Tskhinvali. Their detachments seized buildings of the party obkom [oblast committee] and the oblispolkom, the hotel, the theater, the court and militia, the department store, the pedagogical institute, schools No. 4 and 6, the party gorkom [city committee], and the gorispolkom [city executive committee], and they set up machine guns on the roofs of these buildings. On the morning of 7 January, there was random firing, accompanied by the barking of the sheep dogs of the 'guardians of order.' Panic arose in the streets, and the first killed and wounded appeared. The population of Tskhinvali began to set up self-defense detachments.

"Our public tried to establish peace and order. We entered into communications with D. Khabuliani, the Georgian minister of Internal Affairs, and we submitted a request to Major General G. Kvantaliani, the city commandant and the chief of the branch of the Tbilisi militia school, to withdraw the militia subunits from the city, and to stop the terror. Well, many days passed, but the outrages continued. And it was only on 29 January that the Georgian militia left the city, and Kvantaliani left with it.

"Many tragic events are associated with this person. I will recount only one of them. On 29 January, a delegation—T. Kulumbegov, the chairman of our oblispolkom,

and with him a group of representatives of Northern Ossetia, people's deputies of the RSFSR, and the neighboring republic—arrived at the tourist center, the location of the residence of General Yu. Balakhonov, who heads the subunits of the Internal Troops of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. General Kvantaliani was present at the meeting. After the negotiations, he lured Kulumbegov into his vehicle by deceptive means and drove off. Since that time, it is not known where our oblispolkom chairman is and what happened to him, and whether he is even alive.

"No bread has been baked in Tskhinvali since 28 January," continued Chochiyev, "there is no flour, and only 600 tons of grain is left for the production of concentrate feed, but it is impossible to use it now either—there is no power for grinding. The city and the entire oblast are blockaded by militants. Tskhinvali is ruined. The theater property has been burned, and representatives of the Georgia militia have made a toilet out of the office of the first secretary of the party obkom. The plaster bust of Kosta Khetagurov was shot up with a burst from an assault rifle, all of the premises were dirtied, and the 'guardians of order' even shot up the oblast hospital and monuments at the cemetery."

According to the information that comes to me, it is known that attacks were made on 40 Ossetian villages. Robberies and looting are thriving. Television sets, rugs, refrigerators, and rings are being stolen, cattle are being driven off, and poultry is being destroyed. According to reliable data, more than one and a half thousand head of cattle have already been stolen, and homes are being set on fire—more than 200 were burned down. The village of Mamitykau of the Tskhinvalskiy Rayon no longer exists—it was completely burned down.

Now the Georgian leader Z. Gamsakhurdia is trying to convince the world that there were no criminals in the ranks of the Georgian militia, and that no militants from nationalist formations participated in or are participating in the blockade of South Ossetia. All of this is a lie. On 5 January, criminals who were pardoned and released ahead of time assembled in the stadium in Gori and changed into militia uniform. They were armed with native shortened modern assault rifles, and quite a large number of Israeli Uzi automatic weapons and Czech Scorpion pistols. And up to the present, pickets of armed informals are deployed around the oblast center and in the villages of Tamasheni, Achabeti, Kurta, Kekhvi, Eredan, and Avnevi.

Persons who do not support the official policy conducted by Z. Gamsakhurdia, and who do not sign the proclamation against the ukase of the president of the country of 7 January 1991, are deprived of their constitutional rights in Georgia, are discharged from work, and are even evicted from their residences. And on the night of 28 to 29 January, militants from Tbilisi took about 40 persons of Ossetian nationality (the people were first blindfolded) in the direction presumably of the village Megvrekisi in Goriiskiy Rayon and were shot there. Only one person was able to save himself. After receiving information from

him, the leadership of South Ossetia requested the command authorities of the Internal Affairs military unit of the USSR MVD located in Tskhinvali to establish a commission to verify these events...

I think that there are enough testimonies. This is what we should ponder. Some of the political columnists, for example, G. Borovik, exclaim with perplexity: They say it is difficult to understand the reasons that prompted the excesses in South Ossetia, and that thorough information is needed. And he decided to obtain it by sitting in Moscow. He rang Tskhinvali—there are no connections. He finally got through with difficulty to one KGB employee, and he pleaded for, but he still did not get, an answer to the question he asked. But if he had just gone to Tbilisi. There, for example, he would learn that the thesis on the purity of the Georgian nation has not come off the lips of many “democratic” leaders for a long time, but that one could learn from local television about a so-called program of “regulation of migration processes on its territory, based on the interests of the people of the republic.”

Of what people and what kind of interests? Naturally, Georgian. And the “regulation of the migration processes” is to their advantage. It is said that many live in neighboring Turkey who pine for their native Georgia, but who have nowhere to settle; there is not enough land, and, therefore, the Ossetians must leave for the other side of the Rokskiy Pereval. That is, to North Ossetia. Well, then, will the predictions of the famous American futurologist John Nesbitt who said that nationalism will be one of the principal and threatening trends of the next thousand years come true? Has this not begun already? Recall Sumgait, Fergana, Namangan, Dubossary, and other “hot” spots. National self-consciousness under the active instigation of manipulators of the shadow economy, which is being engendered by the Soviet bourgeoisie and the criminal world that is closely associated with it, is developing into national egoistic aspirations.

Now the South Ossetian people by their own bitter experience are undergoing all of those humiliations, sufferings, and losses that the actions of the malicious nationalists bring with them. These events compel us to think about something else, perhaps something that is a still more serious phenomenon. The parade of “sovereignties,” when each “village” proclaims its own hastily baked laws to be superior to all-Union laws, voluntarily or not, whip up the process of Russophobia. One can already hear words in the declarations on the sovereignty of some former autonomous formations of the Russian Federation about the priority of interests of indigenous nationalities. The logic here is simple: If someone has a priority, this means that someone else is hurt. Russians are being banned from a number of managerial positions on the sly under a veiled form. In North Ossetia, where Ossetians comprise only half of the population, there recently has been an aggressive expansion of the “nationalization” of managerial cadres. Movement in this direction has also been noted in Kabardino-Balkariya. Ye.

Zaytsev, the editor of the Russian-language republic newspaper KABARDINO- BALKARSKAYA PRAVDA was practically banished; V. Zakharchenko, the secretary of the republic's party committee, left because of persecution; E. Denisov, the procurator of the republic, is being “targeted,” and V. Popovich, the chief of the Kabalprojektstroy association is being “endangered” from all sides. This list can be continued, but the essence is not in the number, but in the trend.

In this connection, I recalled the speech of Doctor of Philological Sciences Z. Abdulayev at the Dagestan Second Congress of People's Deputies. “The national movements,” he said, “that have recently begun to multiply more and more, are based on a national idea, but a national idea, sooner or later, leads to national exclusivity... It is rumored, and we hear this clearly, that there is an historic chance of separating from Ivan, and that it would be unforgivable to miss this chance. Those people are proposing separation who were not averse to exchanging Ivan for the conventionally so-called ‘turban wearers.’ The role of ‘turban-wearers’ can be played either by the bearers of the idea of national exclusivity, or by the bearers of the idea of Islam. The danger is that the bearers of the idea of national exclusivity can take advantage of the political immaturity of their supporters and direct them along a false path; that is, against the Russians, and in concert against Communists as well.”

Thus, it is hardly worthwhile getting lost in conjectures about the sources of the tragedy of the South Ossetians. And further: I think that the new power-seekers considered many things in their actions, but they forgot about one thing—about the principle of the boomerang.

One of the groups of refugees—115 persons—is quartered at the Nart dispensary, which is next to Vladikavkaz. Only women and children. The number of refugees that are accounted for is over 3,000, but it is not known how many have found shelter with families, relatives, and friends. When I appeared, people literally packed the hall. Women with tears in their eyes recounted everything that they had to live through: about murders and pogroms, about pillaging and fires, and about how, hastily putting on their shabby clothes, they walked with their children in the deep snow to Vladikavkaz. Two questions were heard continuously during this conversation: “Who will protect us from the bandits?” and “Is there a Soviet authority in the country?..”

People's Front Supports Ossetian Abolition

91US0239B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
18 Dec 90 pp 1, 3

[Open letter to M.S. Gorbachev and the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, Moscow, the Kremlin, by N. Natadze, chairman of the People's Front of Georgia and deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia]

[Text] Mr. President!

Esteemed people's deputies!

As you presumably know, a "South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast" was set up in Georgia in 1922 by a decree of the Georgian Central Executive Committee which, as has now been commonly acknowledged, was not a representative body to any degree, and could not express the will of the Georgian people or the population of Georgia as a whole. A certain territory of Georgia, which has never been a single entity from a political, administrative, geographic, or economic point of view, and which has never stood out among the adjacent or more remote regions of central Georgia, i.e., Kartalinia (Kartli), namely, Leningorskiy (Akhalgorskiy), Tskhinvalskiy, Dzhavskiy, and Znaurskiy (Kornisskiy) Rayons of Georgia, for any peculiar feature, was separated out and incorporated in a new administrative unit. The name of this unit, "South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast," was picked in such a manner as to create the impression that the territory in question was not Georgia, that is, not the native land of Georgia the only indigenous population of which consists of Georgians, but merely a territory administratively reporting to Georgia. In order to visualize the logic of such an administrative act, it would suffice to imagine that, for example, a part of Rostov Oblast in which Armenians account for a substantial percentage of the population is transformed into "North Armenian Autonomous Oblast," which will subsequently demand to be unified with "South," i.e., real Armenia. Similarly, an area in Paris where great numbers of Algerians reside may become "North Algerian Autonomous Oblast" in order to subsequently seek unification with South, i.e., real, Algeria.

This is precisely what happened in the aforementioned segment of Georgian territory. The Ossetian population of this territory began to settle here at the end of the 18th century (having wandered over the Main Caucasus Range); the main bulk of this population arrived in Georgia in the second half of the 19th century (that is, already under Russian power). Finally, the remainder of this population came to Georgia from the "North Ossetian ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]," that is, real Ossetia, under the Ossetian autonomy existing here. Official propaganda has impressed on this population that it lives on Ossetian land; consequently, Georgians, i.e., the indigenous population, have a lesser claim to the territory in question than the Ossetians. In this manner, an **aggressive** attitude toward the Georgians has been created among the Ossetian populace: "The Georgians are not historical masters of the land on which we live, but representatives of some microimperial nation to which my Ossetia belongs for some reason." Authorities have never tried to explain to the populace that the word "Ossetia" with regard to the territory in question was only used by the Russian administration and on its orders, and that according to even the last prerevolutionary official census, there was not a single Ossetian owning at least a tiny lot of land in Georgia; there were only settlers. Nobody has invited the attention of the Ossetian population to the fact that the

territory of so-called "South Ossetia" is dotted with Georgian historic monuments. They have merely repeated to the populace over and over again that the Mensheviks, that is, the rulers of the Georgian Democratic Republic (1918-1921) were cannibals, and that the rule of the Georgian nation over its own territory amounted to the rule of "Georgian princes." Likewise, the administration has not deigned to answer the following question: Why in Georgia, where about 160,000 Ossetians live at present, precisely the four aforementioned rayons with the current Ossetian population of 60,000 (65,000 according to falsified official statistics) and the Georgian population of 30,000 were separated out as the Ossetian "autonomous entity" rather than other areas of eastern Georgia where the Ossetian population resides in an equally compact fashion and is likewise intermixed with the Georgian population? The only answer to this question is that the empire strove to secure a bridgehead close to the Mamisonskiy Pass in order to claim the land of Georgia from it in the future! With a view to a correct understanding of the state of affairs, it is necessary to note right away that by the time the autonomous entity was created in 1922 the Ossetian population of the aforementioned four rayons **did not constitute a majority**. (Thus, for example, fewer than 10 Ossetian families lived in the city of Tskhinvali at the time.) They did not become a majority until later, in the environment of the existing autonomy, as a result of asserting Ossetian ethnocracy here and of using the entire might of the party administrative apparatus for achieving imperial demographic (anti-Georgian) goals (including the armed extermination of Georgian villages even after Sovietization, thus forcing other Georgian villages to leave the aforementioned rayons).

Probably you know that recently "the South Ossetian Soviet Republic" was proclaimed in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast by the local soviet and, accordingly, illegal elections were held in contravention of the USSR and Georgia Constitutions, under which the local soviet of an autonomous oblast is nothing but a municipal organ of self-government. That is to say, **the supreme power of Georgia in its own territory was infringed upon** in this instance. Probably, you surmise that these steps, as overtly anti-Georgian as they are unconstitutional, could not have been taken by the Ossetian leadership without the sanction of imperial forces that strive to compel Georgia to sign the new Union treaty by destabilizing its internal situation as much as possible.

We will take the liberty to remind you that the very principle, in keeping with which the Ossetian territorial autonomy was created in Georgia in 1922, that is, an "Ossetia" was created in Georgia, is not only unrealistic but also criminal. The point is that the right of people to their national territory within a given civilization—moreover, within a given statehood and structure of historic self-awareness of the peoples—cannot depend on demographic dynamics or, in general, on the percentage ethnic ratios within the populace of a given territory. If rights to a given territory increase along with

the growth of the percentage of a given nation in the population of this territory and vice versa, this will unavoidably promote enmity between ethnic groups and, ultimately, prerequisites for bloody conflicts because everyone will be afraid that in the future the rights of his ethnic group will be restricted due to the demographic prosperity of the other ethnic group (or other ethnic groups). Therefore, the path the creators of "South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast" opted for in 1922 is not a path humanity may follow. Statesmen have no right to ignore this fact by failing to discern a lack of vision with regard to the fundamental principles of state construction behind the anti-Georgian orientation of the 1922 policy.

As far as we have been able to judge, you, esteemed people's deputies, and you, esteemed Mr. President, intend to fundamentally reform the structures of the state entrusted to you with a view to curing them. If this is so, you have a duty—moreover, it is in your interest—to facilitate the correction of at least the most egregious mistakes in principle (or deliberate crimes) that were allowed to occur (or committed) by your predecessors at the helm of power.

At present, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia, as well as the public of Georgia, foresee the extremely undesirable prospect of interference in the internal affairs of Georgia by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in order to hinder the implementation of the Law of the Republic of Georgia on Abolishing South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast dated 11 December 1990. Moreover, we expect intervention by the USSR Armed Forces that will, as a matter of fact, act against Georgia and its government. The People's Front of Georgia believes that declaring the secession of Georgia from the USSR immediately and issuing an ultimatum to the USSR with a demand to stop its armed intervention may be the only correct response to this policy.

We call on the Supreme Soviet of Georgia to act in precisely this manner in order to fulfill its duty to the Georgian people and the entire population of Georgia.

At the same time, we want to declare to you and the public of the world: We, the Georgians, respect people of all nations and religions; never in our entire history have we encroached upon any of them on our land.

We have always recognized and recognize the right of all peoples to self-determination and self-government. However, we do not recognize anybody's right to rule our territory or any part of it contrary to the interests of our country, to say nothing of tearing away a part of our land. This is our sacred right on which we will not yield. By coming out against the aforementioned law of 11 December 1990, you will infringe upon this right.

On behalf of the People's Front of Georgia

[Signed] Chairman of the People's Front of Georgia,
Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia N. Natadze

Georgian Officials on Current Situation

91US0317A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 8, Feb 91 p 4

[Article by V. Savichev: "Georgia: War of Laws—War of Peoples"]

[Text] Since the end of last year, about 7,000 Georgians and about 12,000 Ossetians have left South Ossetia.

At present, the following reside in Georgia in a compact manner: 437,000 Armenians, 307,000 Azeris, 100,000 Greeks, 64,000 Ossetians (in South Ossetia; there are a total of 164,000 Ossetians in Georgia), 95,000 Abkhazians, 33,000 Kurds, and 6,000 Assyrians. Two interethnic conflicts have occurred in the years of perestroika. However, even participants in these conflicts themselves believe that the grounds for these conflicts have been political rather than ethnic.

The Parliament and the Opposition

The parliament and the opposition are the two main forces influencing the development of political processes in society. Representatives of a single bloc of parties united in "a roundtable" account for three-quarters of the Georgian Supreme Soviet. Approximately another quarter of the seats belong to the communists who on the whole adopt a loyal attitude towards the actions of the majority, having given up "the CPSU platform" and not come up with their own platform yet.

Nonparliamentary opposition is represented by another bloc of political parties, movements, and public organizations which belong to the National Congress. At present, the opposition criticizes the actions of the current government sharply, whereas at the initial stage their goals were the same.

A Period of Transition

If the numbers of participants in elections to the Supreme Soviet and the National Congress are compared, a majority of the population of Georgia supports the policy of the current government aimed at gradual transition to the complete independence of the republic. T. Paatashvili, chairman of the Commission for External Relations of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet, said in an interview: "Our government has virtually nothing at present except the trust placed in it by the people. A decaying economy, an annual budget with a billion deficit, and a whole knot of the most complex socioeconomic problems—actually, these are all of our 'assets.' So far, the government has signed three economic cooperation treaties with the Ukraine, Estonia, and Moldova. Treaties with Lithuania and Latvia are being prepared for signature, and negotiations with Russia are under way."

This is how Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Khoshtariya defined the position of the republic with regard to the Center: "When a person is in prison, he cannot sign any treaties with the chief of the prison. Georgia is against

signing the Union treaty in principle, and against taking part in the scheduled referendum. The duration of the transition period will depend on the degree to which our economy and the sociopolitical institutions of our republic are ready to exist independently."

Two decisions of the Supreme Soviet in the sphere of internal policy are noteworthy: on the organization of a new form of local self-government and on the formation of the National Guard.

Elections to local prefectures should be held on 31 March. The posts of apparatus employees are elected, whereas the selection of candidates and the appointment of prefects themselves fall within the jurisdiction of the parliament.

The drafting of young men into the republic National Guard has begun; by April of this year, its personnel strength may reach 12,000. This formation will report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia and will accomplish law-enforcement tasks.

In the Conflict Zone

On both sides, dozens have been killed, hundreds have been wounded, and thousands have become refugees, fleeing their looted and torched homes. Violence and tyranny still prevail in South Ossetia: A war of laws has brought about a war between the people. This is the price some have paid for being a republic for several hours and others for regaining territory not yet lost.

On 11 February, the deputies of the Vladikavkaz Soviet of People's Deputies stated in an open letter to the USSR president, disseminated by the mass media of the North Ossetian SSR, that "the situation in South Ossetia has already transcended the framework of a local interethnic conflict and has assumed the form of genocide with regard to the Ossetian people."

The Georgian side believes that the conflict has been instigated by the Center which wants to interfere in this manner with the republic gaining independence. As many conversations suggest, the leadership of the republic, and a majority of the residents of Georgian nationality along with it, believe that Georgia has lost too many of its territories throughout its history. They believe that it would be unforgivable to lose the last ones on the eve of independence.

When we met, Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia D. Khabuliani said that politics and bloodshed are incompatible. Everything needs to be resolved through dialogue. Extremists who engage in looting and violence are bandits who should be held responsible under the law.

I believe, concluded D. Khabuliani, that USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs troops should be withdrawn. The Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs should implement measures aimed at restoring legal order.

What the minister said was backed up by specific actions. On 19 February, forces of the Georgia Ministry

of Internal Affairs carried out an operation aimed at disarming one of the largest illegal armed formations, the Mkhedrioni, which was deployed in Tbilisi. Other illegal formations were also instructed to turn in their weapons. The Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs called on those "who indeed want to serve the Motherland" to join the ranks of the Georgian militia or the National Guard.

This may give some hope to the residents of Tskhinvali and nearby rayons where almost no representatives of Georgian nationality remain. The residents of South Ossetia are genuinely afraid of the withdrawal of USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs troops. G. Khugayev, first deputy chairman of the Executive Committee of the South Ossetia Soviet of People's Deputies, said: "Let us assume that after the expiration of the state of emergency the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs troops will be pulled out of here, and so will the official Georgian militia. Who will take away with them the armed informants who are not subordinated to anyone?" It became clear from my conversations with other representatives of the city public that these people no longer need a republic or an autonomous unit—they merely want to survive.

It makes no sense to give examples of individual incidents because all of them are crimes which should be classified and evaluated by the law. However, it appears that at present there is no law in South Ossetia. This is why Georgians from Tskhinvalskiy Rayon continue to inhabit the hotels of Tbilisi, and Ossetians from the same rayon go over the pass to North Ossetia. The chairman of the Commission for External Relations of the Georgian Supreme Soviet noted that at present the parliament is considering a draft law on the cultural autonomy of ethnic minorities residing in the territory of the republic. Is this a ray of hope?

Georgian CP Addresses Republic Parliament

91US0239A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
19 Dec 90 p 3

[“Declaration of the Independent Communist Party of Georgia Central Committee”—ZARYA VOSTOKA headline]

[Text] A universally complex situation emerged in Georgia; in many spheres, a critical situation emerged. Despite extreme tension, multiparty democratic elections were held in the republic for the first time after many years of authoritarianism, a single-party dictatorship, and uncountable moral, physical, and material losses. In theory, the beginning of an end of the Communist Party monopoly occurred when our people adopted the Law on Multiparty Elections; in practice, the end of this monopoly began when the results of the democratic multiparty elections were tallied. The will of the people was fully revealed by the elections, and a new political force won a victory.

The Communist Party of Georgia and its representation have taken up a firm national position in the parliament

of the republic that has been expressed through its fervent support for decisions made in the parliament.

The consolidating position of the Independent Communist Party of Georgia has been infused with new content in the decisions of the recently completed founding congress of party independence that has been reflected in an appeal by the Communist Party to the political parties and sociopolitical movements of Georgia.

It is our profound conviction that the actual and legal independence of the Communist Party of Georgia should have caused nothing but a positive response on the part of all existing political forces. However, this is not always the case. All political forces are in opposition of sorts to the Independent Communist Party of Georgia; they refuse to see its national content, which foreshadows a new wave of opposition. This cannot but facilitate the advancement of secret and overt forces with imperial and destructive ambitions in the political arena.

Independence always gives rise to many problems. Against this background, the attitude of certain forces toward party establishments and employees, especially recently, appears to be absolutely intolerant and absolutely unacceptable.

We call on the bloc that has won the multiparty elections, the parliament that enjoys the trust of the people, and other political forces of the republic to resolve all issues in dispute on the basis of a sincere dialogue and constructive mutual cooperation.

We, the members of the Independent Communist Party of Georgia, and deputies elected from the Communist Party, are a great national force. We do not consider ourselves to be in opposition to any other political force, with the exception of imperial, schismatic forces.

Georgia will be saved by wisdom, by mutual tolerance, and by genuinely appreciating our bond with the domain of the Holy Virgin. We call on all to remember everyone, to remember each other, and to remember our lofty goal. Let us build an independent, democratic, and Christian Georgia together.

[Signed] Press Center of the Independent Communist Party of Georgia.

Comment on New Developments in Georgian CP
91US0318A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
23 Feb 91 p 2

[Correspondent A. Mgeladze report: "Cadres Decided Everything"]

[Text] Tbilisi—Just a few months ago, at stage two of the 28th Communist Party of Georgia Congress, delegates elected a new first secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee. He was A. Margiani, first secretary of the Gardabanskiy Raykom [Rayon Party Committee]. The details of what happened are still fresh in the memory. I remember the sincere, profound speech with

its concept of party revival of A. Sakvarelidze, deputy chief editor of the Georgian Encyclopedia and former head of the Central Committee Science Department. A. Kavasdze, first secretary of the Gori Raykom, spoke in businesslike fashion at that time also. Many people were attracted by the concise, vigorous speech of A. Margiani...

But earlier, contrary to the comforting, reassuring results of polls conducted on the eve of the multiparty elections to the republic parliament, the Communist Party had sustained a serious defeat. The "Roundtable—Free Georgia" party bloc occupied the vast majority of seats in parliament. It remained to derive consolation from the fact that it had been a whole bloc of parties which had won, and the Communist Party was able on its own to obtain almost one-third of the seats. Only this was bitter consolation. One way or another, the party ceased to be the governing party and now had to master a new, unaccustomed modest role. Disarray, apathy, and pessimism reigned at the congress. The 200 delegates who altogether failed to show at stage two of the congress added their "bit" also.

It was in this atmosphere that the vigorous, succinct speech of A. Margiani was heard. No, he did not propose anything specific and constructive, unless we count the information to the effect that he had ideas in connection with new party symbols and so forth.

"We know what to do," the candidate said significantly, emphatically slashing the air with his hand. He did not specify what he intended doing precisely. But hope of a miracle stirred noticeably in the hall following this magic incantation. This speech won over those present by its utmost simplicity. The Communist Party of Georgia had not before had such a leader. "Perhaps it is just such a leader who is needed at this time?" the hall warmed up and began to stir. It saw Margiani as embodying the new type of party leader: a simple country boy and austere highlander, upright, with a strong and integral character. Of somewhat confused articulation, maybe, but knowing how to speak with the people for he himself had come from the people quite recently.

He was assisted by his raykom secretary friends also, reporting how the raykom buildings were being seized in their rayons, how party property was being distrained, and how party officials were being cold-shouldered. The delegates, thus encouraged, forgave him certain lines of his resume of a criminal nature. "It was nothing, he was young, the devil made him do it. It is someone like Aftandil that we need now. He will not quake but will defend and repulse," the happy delegates urged one another.

And then came a surprise: A few days ago A. Margiani, as already reported, resigned, giving as the reason for his departure the fact that the republic Communist Party was wholly discredited and did not enjoy the people's trust.

Had Margiani suddenly gained an insight and realized, while on the captain's bridge, the hopelessness and futility of the position of the republic Communist Party? But the same political landscape had been revealed to him as a member of the party leadership of long standing before also. I can imagine how difficult it was for the congress delegates who had concurredly voted for his election to categorize the new statement of the Communist Party of Georgia's new leader! But this is not now the issue.

What happened provides a clear understanding of the seriousness of the crisis in the Communist Party of Georgia and of how profoundly corrupt was the "system of cadre selection and assignment," which for years had produced in its ranks careerists and opportunists. Is this not one of the main reasons why the republic Communist Party has found itself on the sidelines of political life, virtually, and failed to pass the first serious test? I cannot end the report other than with the bitter conclusion that it was a perfectly natural outcome.

Georgian Law on Forming National Guard

91US0248A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
21 Dec 90 p 1

[“Republic of Georgia Law on the Formation of Internal Troops- National Guard of the Republic of Georgia”—ZARYA VOSTOKA headline]

[Text] In accordance with the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet decree of 15 November 1990, entitled: “On Protection of Human Rights and Consolidation of Law and Order,” the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To form under the Republic of Georgia Ministry of Internal Affairs internal troops-national guard.
2. To form under the Ministry of Internal Affairs a Main Administration for the general leadership of the internal troops- national guard; the chief of the Main Administration will simultaneously be the first deputy minister of internal affairs.
3. The internal troops-national guard are commanded by a commander of internal affairs who is appointed by the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.

The internal troops-national guard are called upon to defend the interests of the homeland, its territorial integrity, the life and personal dignity of its citizens, and their constitutional rights and freedoms from criminal activities and other antisocial actions;

they take part in halting violations of public order if these violations are of a mass nature and create a threat to the lives and health of citizens and give rise to disorganization of the operations of enterprises, institutions, and organizations;

they take part in implementing a state of emergency declared by the supreme organ of state power of the

Republic of Georgia and in cleaning up the consequences of an emergency situation. They render assistance to the organs of internal affairs of the Republic of Georgia in the maintenance of law.

4. The internal troops-national guard are used for the execution of their assigned obligations only by decision of the chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.
5. The rank and file personnel of the internal troops-national guard are staffed on the basis of a universal military service obligation by citizens of the Republic of Georgia who have reached 18 years of age, and the command ranks, by citizens of the Republic of Georgia on a voluntary contractual basis.
6. For the Republic of Georgia Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Republic of Georgia Military Commissariat to carry out appropriate measures to staff the internal troops-national guard with conscripts and a command staff.
7. For the Republic of Georgia Council of Ministers to resolve organizational, material, and financial questions of the internal troops-national guard.

8. For Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet commissions on legislation and preservation of legality and on defense, national security, and law and order to prepare drafts of the appropriate legal acts connected with the formation and operation of internal troops-national guard.

[Signed] Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet

[Dated] Tbilisi, 20 December 1990

Tula Workers Reject Georgian Arms Deal

91US0316A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 91
Second Edition p 6

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent N. Kireyev: “Exchanging Mandarin Oranges for Rifles”]

[Text] Tula—Exchanging mandarin oranges for rifles—this is what the chairman of the Georgian Republic Council of Ministers has proposed to the people of Tula.

The people of Tula have their own sort of anthem, with the words: “Tula has forged weapons over the centuries, she has herself come to resemble a rifle...” The author of these lines may turn out to be a prophet—the city of gun smiths, samovar-makers, gingerbread bakers, masters of all trades is coming more and more to look like the rifle in a Chekhov play that must be fired in the second act.

But the patience even of the “iron workers” has reached its limit. Can a normal, healthy man live for a month on 800 grams of so-called meat products, 200 grams of animal and vegetable oil, a half kilogram of macaroni and groats, a dozen eggs? The fact that the oblast was at

one time loaded to the bursting point with defense and chemical industry enterprises and not capable of feeding itself is a secret to no one. Many times the leadership here has turned to Moscow for help, but the "cry from the heart" has yet to be heard in Union circles.

But reaction was instantaneous to the private telegram sent to the president of the country, recently published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, by oblast soviet deputy N. Matveyev, foreman of a team of weapons plant sanitary engineers and a Social-Democrat: "The food problem in Tula is near-critical... The situation compels us to propose an initiative on the sale of Tula weapons to other regions of the country in exchange for food..."

I will refrain from commenting on this message. What is important is what happened afterwards. The plant and the deputy himself were flooded with letters and telegrams with proposals on "cooperation." Offered in exchange for arms were meat and dried mushrooms, furs and cognac, cranberries and salmon... But the hunters, fishermen, members of cooperatives, and lessees are no comparison whatsoever to Chairman of the Georgian Republic Council of Ministers T. Sigua, who, as has already been reported, officially requisitioned from N. Maslennikov, general director of the scientific-production association Tula Weapons Plant, 10,000 rifled sports weapons, 500 pistols, and 500 Kalashnikov automatic weapons with cartridges, "to protect state facilities of the republic."

"In exchange for the above-mentioned weapons," the Council of Ministers chairman writes, "we are offering an amount equal in value of foodstuffs, including meat, sausage, canned stew meat, condensed milk, canned fish, tobacco products, tea, fruits, and juices. Upon your assent, the above-mentioned products will be shipped immediately. We guarantee settlement of any price difference."

It is not a bad idea, of course, to provide canned stew meat and condensed milk to our fellow countrymen. But really—our weapons plants have not yet turned into a private concern!

The reaction of weapons manufacturers to the message from Tbilisi was dual in nature at first. Some felt the transaction was entirely apropos, especially in view of empty store shelves. Others stated categorically that although they were half starving, they did not want people "in hot spots" to die from their weapons. All the same, common sense prevailed. Not a single weapon made it to Georgia in response to T. Sigua's letter.

Tula residents were also disturbed at the fact that the Georgian Council of Ministers had decided to acquire an arsenal...out of the Union fund, from which the republic receives hundreds of thousands of tons of food products (except for tobacco, tea, fruits, and juices).

Central Asia

Kazakh SSR Law on Status of People's Deputies
91US0233A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 9 Dec 90 pp 1-2

[Text]

Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Decree: "On the Procedure for the Enactment of the Kazakh SSR Law: 'On the Status of People's Deputies in the Kazakh SSR'"

Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Resolution:

1. To enact the Kazakh SSR Law on the Status of People's Deputies in the Kazakh SSR from the time of its publication.

2. Consider invalid:

22 February 1981 Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase: "On Ratifying the Regulation on the Organization of Work With Kazakh Voters in the Kazakh SSR" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA KAZAKHSKOY SSR, No 9, 1982);

Kazakh SSR Law Dated 1 December 1982 "Ratifying the Ukase of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: 'On Ratifying the Regulation on the Organization of Work With Voters' Instructions in the Kazakh SSR'" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA KAZAKHSKOY SSR, No 50, 1982).

Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet: Ye. Asanbayev

Alma-Ata, 13 November 1990.

Law of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic on the Status of People's Deputies in the Kazakh SSR

In the Kazakh SSR the people exercise the state power through the soviets of their elected deputies.

The deputies are the legitimate representatives of the people, called upon to formulate and defend in the soviets the public interests, to manage the affairs of state and socioeconomic development and to control the work of the state apparatus.

Comprehensive concern for the needs of the voters, the people's welfare, the strengthening of Soviet democracy and the observance of the rights and freedoms of the citizens are immutable principles governing the activities of the deputies.

The purpose of the present law is to strengthen the foundations of the status of deputies on all levels of soviets in the Kazakh SSR, their most important rights and guarantees for their activities in that capacity, the responsibility of the deputies to the voters or to the public organizations which have elected them, and providing the necessary conditions for their efficient work.

I. General Regulations**Article 1. Participation of the Deputy in the Exercise of the State Authority**

The exercise of the state authority by the soviets is based on the participation of every deputy in the work of the soviets.

Through their participation in the work of the soviets and their organs, the deputies resolve the most important problems of governmental, economic, social and national-cultural building; they pass laws and other resolutions, assist in their implementation, set up the state executive organs and supervise the observance of the laws of the Kazakh SSR and the USSR and the resolutions of the local soviets.

The deputies are guided in their activities by the interests of the republic. They express and defend the interests of their constituents and the public organizations which elected them, taking into consideration the economic, cultural, national and other characteristics of republic and administrative-territorial formations.

The deputies organize their work in accordance with the laws of the Kazakh SSR and the USSR and on the basis of the resolutions of the respective soviets of people's deputies; they work for the implementation of their electoral programs and instructions of the voters and public organizations.

Article 2. Legislation on the Powers of Kazakh SSR Deputies

The powers of Kazakh SSR people's deputies are defined by the constitution of the Kazakh SSR and this law.

Article 3. Term of Deputy Powers

The powers of a deputy begin on the day of his election as people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR or of the respective local soviet of people's deputies.

The powers of the deputy end on the day of election of people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR or the new convocation of the local soviet of people's deputies, or else in the cases stipulated in Article 7 of this law.

Article 4. Relations Between the Deputy and the Voters or the Public Organization Which Elected Him and His Accountability and Responsibility to Them

The people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR and the deputy in the local soviet of people's deputies, elected by a given territorial district, will be in touch with the voters, the collectives and the public organizations located on the territory of the electoral district.

The people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR, elected by a public organization, will maintain contacts with it and with its primary organizations, the population, the collectives of enterprises, establishments and organizations, and the state organs and public organizations at his place of residence and work.

Voters and public organizations will issue instructions to their deputies.

The deputy is answerable and accountable to the voters or to the public organization which has elected him.

Article 5. Relations Between the Deputy and the Soviet and Its Organs

The deputy has all the rights ensuring his participation in the activities of the soviet or any committee, permanent commission or other organ set up by that soviet. He shall implement the instructions of the soviet and its organs.

The soviet, the committee or permanent commission of which the deputy is a member has the right to hear out the deputy concerning his work in the soviet and its organs and on the implementation of the assignments of the soviet and its organs.

Should the deputy fail to fulfill his obligations to the soviet or its organs, or the requirements governing deputy ethics, the question of the behavior of the deputy may be considered by the soviet or the pertinent soviet commission.

The presidium, and the executive and administrative organs of the respective soviets of people's deputies will give the deputies the necessary assistance in their work and inform them of the activities of the soviet and its organs, of the economic and social development of the territory and the execution of the budget, the implementation of the instructions of voters and public organizations, the steps taken to help the deputies to study Soviet legislation, the experience acquired in the work of the soviets and public opinion.

Article 6. Participation of the Deputy in the Work of Lower Soviets

The deputy has the right to participate in the work of lower soviets and their organs in a consultative capacity.

Article 7. Premature Termination of Deputy Powers

The powers of a deputy may be terminated prematurely by decision of the soviet, passed in connection with the election or appointment of a deputy to a position the holding of which is, by law, incompatible with the implementation of deputy obligations, or else as a result of the execution of a court sentence of a deputy, or else should the deputy lose his Kazakh SSR and USSR citizenship.

The powers of a deputy may be terminated prematurely by decision of the soviet, following a deputy's voluntary resignation because of circumstances which would prevent him from exercising his powers.

The rights of a people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR or of a deputy in the local soviet of people's deputies may be terminated prematurely also as a result of his recall by the voters or by the public organization which elected him.

II. Activities of the Deputy in the Soviet

Article 8. Participation of the Deputy in Sessions of the Soviet and Meetings of Its Organs

At the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and local soviet sessions the deputies consider and resolve problems, falling under the respective jurisdiction of these representative state organs.

The deputy must participate in the work of the soviet and of its organs, should he be their member.

If a people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR is prevented from attending a session, he must inform the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of this fact; a local soviet deputy must inform the presidium of the respective soviet or its chairman.

Within the time stipulated by the rules of the respective soviet, its presidium or its chairman must inform the deputy of the time and place of the session and its agenda, and supply him with the pertinent materials.

If a deputy is systematically absent from soviet sessions without legitimate reasons, the soviet has the right to raise the question of his recall to the voters or the public organizations who elected him.

Article 9. Deputy Rights at Soviet Sessions

The deputy has the right to vote on all problems debated at the session of the soviet to which he was elected.

The deputy has the following rights:

To elect and be elected member of soviet organs;

To express his views concerning the membership of the organs set up by the soviet and the candidacies of officials elected, appointed or approved by the soviets;

To submit problems for discussion by the soviet;

To submit motions and remarks concerning the agenda of the session, the procedure for their consideration and the problems under discussion;

To a request hearing at a soviet session of reports or information submitted by any organ or official accountable to or controlled by the soviet;

To query state organs and officials in accordance with legal procedures;

To submit to the soviet presentations on the need to supervise the execution of the laws of the Kazakh SSR and the USSR and other acts of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, the resolutions of local soviets, and state authorities and public organizations, enterprises, establishments and other organizations located on the territory of the soviet, on conducting deputy investigations on any subject within the competence of the soviet; raise the question of voting confidence in the organs which were formed or elected by the respective soviet and officials elected, appointed or ratified by the soviet;

To participate in the debates, and to address questions to the speaker and the chairman of the session;

To submit substantiated motions motivating his vote and to provide information;

To submit amendments to draft laws, resolutions or other acts passed by the soviet;

To acquaint soviet deputies with addresses of social significance, submitted by citizens;

To review the texts of his own speeches in minutes and protocols of sessions of the respective soviet.

A deputy who has not participated in the debates has the right to submit to the chair the text of his speech as well as motions and remarks presented in writing on the item discussed at the session. The text of the statement and the motions and remarks must be included in the session's minutes.

The suggestions and remarks submitted by deputies at the soviet session are discussed and taken considered in subsequent drafting and adoption of draft laws, Supreme Soviet resolutions, and legal acts passed by local soviets.

Article 10. Right of a People's Deputy of the Kazakh SSR to Initiate Legislation

A people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR has the right to initiate legislation in the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, which could be exercised as a motion to introduce amendments to current laws of the Kazakh SSR, draft laws amending current Kazakh SSR laws, arguments on the need for a new law to be submitted for consideration by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, or to draft new laws of the Kazakh SSR.

Suggestions and draft laws amending the current legislation and draft new laws must be submitted to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet accompanied by proper substantiation.

Article 11. Deputy Interpolations

A deputy interpolation is an official demand addressed by the deputy to a state organ or official to submit to the soviet session a substantiated explanation or present views on any matter within the competence of that authority or official.

At Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet sessions, the people's deputy or a group of people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR have the right to address an interpolation to the Kazakh SSR president, the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet chairman, the cabinet of the Kazakh SSR and the heads of other state organs, established or appointed by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

The people's deputy or group of people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR have also the right to address an interpolation to the manager of any enterprise, establishment or organization located on the territory of the Kazakh SSR on matters within the jurisdiction of the Kazakh SSR.

A deputy or group of deputies of the local soviet have the right to address an interpolation to the chairman of the soviet, the presidium of the soviet, the executive committee or the manager of its departments, administrations, territorial and public self-government organs, enterprises, establishments and organizations located on the territory of the soviet on problems within the jurisdiction of the respective soviet.

An interpolation may be written or verbal. An interpolation submitted in writing must be made public at the soviet session.

The state organ or official to whom the interpolation is addressed must submit an oral or written answer to it at the soviet session. The written answer to an interpolation must be submitted within the time stipulated by the soviet but must not exceed one month and must be made public at the session. Debates may take place on the answer to an interpolation. The deputy has the right to express his view on the answer to the interpolation. The manager of the state authority or the official who has failed to answer the interpolation of the deputy within the stipulated time must be held disciplinarily or administratively accountable in accordance with the legislation of the Kazakh SSR.

The soviet must pass a resolution on the answer to the interpolation and the results of its debate. The interpolation, the answer to it and the resolution adopted as a result of the consideration of the deputy's interpolation may be made public.

Article 12. Procedure for the Consideration of Motions and Remarks of a Deputy, Submitted at the Session of the Soviet

The motions and remarks expressed by a deputy at a soviet session or submitted in writing, must be recorded by the secretariat of the session and submitted to the respective state organs, public organizations or officials for their consideration. The state organs and public organizations and officials to whom motions or remarks of a deputy have been addressed must, within no longer than one month, consider such motions and remarks and report on the results directly to the deputy and to the soviet presidium.

Control over the discussion and implementation of the motions and remarks of deputies is provided by the committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, and the presidiums and permanent commissions of the local soviets.

Article 13. Participation of a Deputy in the Work of the Soviet Organs

A deputy who is a member of the presidium, a committee, a permanent commission or any other soviet organ, has the right to ask any questions and submit motions for consideration, participate in their formulation and consideration, and in the debates and the

resolutions passed on them, in organizing the implementation of the resolutions of the soviet and its organs and in supervising their execution.

A deputy who disagrees with the resolutions of the organ of the soviet of which he is a member, has the right to present his viewpoint at the soviet session or to present it in writing to the chair.

A deputy who is not a member of a committee or permanent commission of the soviet may participate in their sessions, submit motions, participate in the debate of the items under consideration and in the passing of resolutions in an advisory capacity. Should he disagree with the resolution of the committee or the permanent commission, the deputy may submit his own amendment to the draft law or draft resolution. Amendments submitted by the deputy are considered at the soviet session and voted upon.

Article 14. Deputy Participation in Implementing the Instructions of the Soviet and its Organs

Based on the instruction of the soviet or its organs, the deputy shall participate in controlling the implementation of the laws of the Kazakh SSR and the USSR, the resolutions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and the resolutions of the local soviets by the state organs and public organizations, enterprises, establishments, other organizations and officials. The deputy shall inform the respective soviet or its organs on the results of the investigations and, if necessary, submit motions on the correction of exposed shortcomings, annulment of illegal resolutions, and prosecution of responsible individuals who have allowed the violation of the law or the nonimplementation of soviet resolutions.

Article 15. Deputy Investigations

By decision of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, the local soviet of people's deputies could initiate a deputy investigation. All state organs and officials are mandated to provide the necessary assistance in the investigation and submit willingly the necessary information and documents. No one has the right to avoid giving explanations to deputies engaged in a deputy investigation.

The results of such an investigation are submitted to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet or the local soviet of people's deputies.

III. Deputy Activities in the Electoral District and the Public Organization

Article 16. Deputy Rights Related to Work in the Electoral District and the Public Organization Which Elected Him

With a view to implementing his tasks in the electoral district or the public organization which elected him, the deputy has the following rights:

To participate in the discussions held by state administration organs and organs of the corresponding public

organizations of any matter pertaining to the essential interests of citizens in the electoral district and the members of the public organization;

To control the activities of enterprises, establishments and organizations relative to their implementation of the laws of the Kazakh SSR and the USSR, and the resolutions of the USSR Kazakh Supreme Soviet and the local soviets of people's deputies and their organs, and to demand of the respective organs and officials the correction of exposed violations;

To supervise the discussion of motions, statements and complaints he has filed with state organs, public organizations, enterprises, establishments, and other organizations and personally to participate in them;

To hold meetings, and conferences with district constituents, to meet with labor collectives and organs of the territorial public government and public organizations;

To participate in meetings of voters, labor collectives and citizens at places of residence and military personnel in military units, and in the sessions of organs of the territorial public government in an advisory capacity.

Article 17. The Deputy's Obligations Related to His Work in the Electoral District and the Public Organization Which Elected Him

In his electoral district or the public organization which elected him, the deputy has the following obligations:

To defend the rights and legitimate interests of the voters or the members of the public organization which elected him, to study public opinion and the needs and demands of the population and the public organizations and report on them to the soviet and its organs, and to submit suggestions and take other steps to ensure their satisfaction;

Regularly to report to the population and the local organs of the public organization which elected him on the work of the respective soviet of people's deputies on the implementation of the programs for economic and social development of the territory, the resolutions of the soviet, and the implementation of voters' instructions and of his electoral program;

To contribute to the development of the various forms of self-government and to the involvement of citizens in the administration of governmental and social affairs.

Article 18. The Deputy's Consideration of Proposals, Petitions and Complaints by Citizens

The deputy must consider suggestions, petitions and complaints of voters and members of the public organization which elected him, to take steps for their resolution, regularly to see citizens in the settlements within his electoral district; a deputy elected by a public organization must see the members of the organization which elected him at their homes or place of work or any other place stipulated by the deputy.

By request of the deputy, managers or other officials of state organs and public organizations, enterprises, establishments and other organizations on which the resolution of the questions asked the deputy depends, must be present at the meeting with the voters.

The deputy must study the reasons for the complaints and make suggestions concerning their elimination to the respective soviet, to the organs of the public organization which elected him, or to other state organs and public organizations, enterprises, establishments and organizations.

Article 19. Reports Submitted by the Kazakh SSR People's Deputy to Voters and Public Organizations

Periodically, but no less than once every year, a people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR must report on his work, and on the course of implementation of the electoral program and the instructions to the voters who nominated him or to the public organization which elected him.

A deputy also must submit a report on the demand of the collective or public organization which nominated him or on the request of a group of voters or members of the public organization which elected him, if they number no less than 300 people, in accordance with the procedure of the Kazakh SSR Law on the Election of People's Deputies of the Kazakh SSR.

The deputy submits his report at meetings or conferences of voters in a given electoral district or members of the public organization which elected him, convened for this purpose.

The meeting (conference) at which the people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR submits his report passes a resolution which includes the suggestions and remarks of the voters, reported to the voters in the electoral district or the members of the public organization which elected him.

Article 20. Reports by the Deputy of a Local Soviet to the Voters

Periodically, but no less than annually, the deputy of a local soviet must report to the voters or the collective which submitted his candidacy on his work, on the course of the implementation of the electoral program and of instructions on the work of the soviet and its organs to which he was elected. A deputy may also have to report if so requested by the collective or the public organization which nominated him for deputy or by request of no less than 200 voters in the case of an oblast soviet deputy, 100 people in the case of a rayon, city and city rayon soviet deputy, and 25 people in the case of a deputy of the city (city under rayon administration) or a settlement, village or aul soviet, in accordance with the procedure stipulated in the Kazakh SSR Law on the Election of Deputies of Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Kazakh SSR.

REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

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The deputies submit their reports at meetings or conferences of the voters of the given electoral district, convened for this purpose.

The meeting (conference) at which the deputy submits his report adopts a resolution which contains the suggestions and remarks of the voters addressed to the deputy and of which the district voters are informed.

Article 21. Assisting the Deputy in Submitting Reports and Meeting With Voters or Members of the Organization Which Elected Him

Meetings and conferences of voters and members of public organizations, at which the deputy submits a report and meets with the voters are convened by the presidiums (chairmen) of soviets, councils of labor collectives, local organs of public organizations or organs of territorial self-government.

The deputy is given the necessary facilities for submitting reports and in meeting with the voters and members of the public organization which elected him. To this effect, the presidium (the chairman) of the respective soviet, the local organs of the public organization and the administration or public organization of enterprises, establishments and other organizations assign a premise, notify the citizens on the time and place of the submission of the report by the deputy and of his meeting with voters or members of the public organization, guide their representatives, as invited by the deputy, to participate in the reports and meetings, and provide other needed assistance.

Referential and other information data which the deputy may need for his reports and addresses are made available by the presidium (the chairman) of the respective soviet represented by the deputy, the presidiums (chairmen) of soviets located on the territory of the electoral district, and the organs of the public organization which elected him. Such materials may be requested by a deputy of state organs, enterprises, establishments and organizations.

Article 22. Deputy Groups and Clubs

For purposes of joint work in electoral districts, labor collectives and public organizations, deputies may form deputy groups and clubs in the exercise of their plenary rights.

IV. Organization of Work With Instructions of Voters and Public Organizations

Article 23. Deputy Instructions

Voters' instructions must be approved at electoral meetings or conferences of voters in the district and accepted by the deputy; in elections by public organizations, the instructions must be adopted by the congresses or conferences or else plenums of their republic organs.

Instructions issued to people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR are those the implementation of which is within the

jurisdiction of republic state and public organs and, in the case of deputies of local soviets of people's deputies, under the jurisdiction of the respective local organs.

Article 24. Passing Resolutions on Instructions

The soviets of people's deputies must pass resolutions on the adoption of instructions for implementation and approve a consolidated plan for their implementation. The soviet has the right to pass a motivated resolution on the inexpediency of implementing individual instructions.

The soviets of people's deputies take the instructions into consideration in formulating their programs for economic and social development and for drafting the budget and formulating resolutions on other matters. The steps required for their implementation are included in separate sections of programs and budgets.

Article 25. Organizing the Implementation of Instructions

The implementation of instructions approved for execution by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet must be secured by the cabinet of the Kazakh SSR and the other republic state and public organs; instructions adopted for execution by the local soviets of people's deputies must be secured by their executive and administrative and other local organs.

Control over the implementation of instructions is provided by the respective soviet of people's deputies, its presidium, committees, permanent commissions and individual deputies.

The executive and administrative organs are answerable to the respective soviets of people's deputies for the implementation of resolutions related to instructions and, no less than once annually, must report to the soviets on the course of their implementation.

Article 26. Participation of the Deputy in Work With Instructions

The deputies participate in the formulation and discussion of measures for the implementation of instructions and supervise their implementation. The people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR regularly informs the voters and respective public organizations and the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet or its organs on the course of implementation of instructions; the deputy of the local soviet informs the voters and the respective soviets of people's deputies.

Article 27. Glasnost in Work With Instructions

The resolutions of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and the local soviets of people's deputies pertaining to instructions are subject to mandatory publication.

The mass information media shall report on the course of implementation of instructions of voters and public organizations.

V. Fundamental Guarantees of Deputy Activities

Article 28. Material and Technical Support for Deputy Activities

In order to enable the deputies' participation in the work of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet or the local soviet of people's deputies, their committees and their permanent commissions and deputy groups, the presidium of the respective soviet makes it possible for the deputies to use premises, libraries and records of the soviet, communications and transportation facilities, computers, and duplicating and printing facilities available to the soviet.

In order to exercise deputy rights in the electoral districts, the presidiums of the local soviets of people's deputies provide the deputies with premises equipped with means of communications, as well as transportation facilities, and duplicating and printing equipment.

The deputy must be provided with hotel accommodations. The state organs, the public organizations and enterprises, establishments and other organizations offer the soviet the use of their computer, duplicating and printing equipment in support of deputy activities and assist deputies in organizing their trips around their electoral district and provide them with transportation facilities in the exercise of their deputy powers.

Article 29. The Deputy's Right to Obtaining Information. Providing Deputies With Consultations and Legal Assistance

The presidium (chairman) of the soviet supplies the deputy with documents of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet or the local soviet of people's deputies and with officially issued information and reference data of the soviet and its organs or of other state organs and public organizations.

The presidium, the executive committee of the soviet, managers and officials of other state organs and public organizations and enterprises, establishments and other organizations located on the territory of the soviet must, if so requested by the deputy, assign to him consultation specialists on matters related to his deputy activities and provide the deputy without delay or, if no such facilities are available, no later within 1 month, the information he requests.

The deputy has priority in speaking out on problems of his deputy activities in the press organs controlled by the respective soviet of people's deputies or the public organization which elected him, and on television and radio. Materials submitted by the deputy may not be edited without his consent.

The presidium, and the executive and administrative organs of the soviet, and the administrations of enterprises, organizations, scientific juridical establishments, educational institutions and law enforcement organs must give the deputy assistance on legal matters arising in connection with his deputy activities.

Article 30. Right of the Deputy to Meet With Officials on Request

In matters of deputy activities, the deputy has the right freely to visit state organs, public organizations, enterprises, establishments and other organizations located on the territory of the soviet, and the right to be immediately received by managers and other officials.

The procedure governing the deputy's visit to organizations whose activities are related to state or any other legally protected secret is set by law.

Article 31. Right of the Deputy to Demand the Elimination of Violations of the Law

As representative of the state authority, a deputy who has knowledge of violations of the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens or any other violation of legality, has the right to demand the immediate end to such violations and, if necessary, to address his demand to the respective organs and officials to stop such violations.

Cases of violations may be entered in the minutes drafted by the deputy or on his demand, by the representative of the respective law enforcement or supervisory organ.

Officials of state organs and public organizations, enterprises, establishments and other organizations and militia personnel to whom the deputy addresses his demand, must take immediate steps to eliminate the violations and, if necessary, to hold the culprits liable, and subsequently to inform the deputy of this fact. Should they fail to take the necessary steps, the officials must be charged with disciplinary, administrative or criminal liability in accordance with legal procedures.

Article 32. Protecting the Rights, Honor and Dignity of the Deputy

The Kazakh SSR guarantees to each deputy conditions for the uninhibited and effective exercise of his rights and the protection of his rights, honor and dignity.

Publicly insulting or slandering a deputy or else trying to influence him or his close relatives in any way whatsoever, with a view to inhibiting the implementation of his deputy obligations entail liability, including criminal liability, in accordance with the legislation of the Kazakh SSR.

Officials of state organs and public organizations, enterprises, establishments and other organizations, who fail to meet their obligations to the deputy, who supply him with patently false information and who violate the guarantees related to deputy activities, may be held liable, including criminally, in accordance with the legislation of the Kazakh SSR.

Article 33. Deputy Immunity

A people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR may not be held criminally liable, detained or subjected to measures of

administrative penalty imposed by a court without the consent of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

A criminal case involving a people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR may be instigated only by the Prosecutor General of the Kazakh SSR.

A deputy of the oblast, rayon, city, city rayon, settlement, village or aul soviet of people's deputies may not be held criminally liable, detained or subjected to measures of administrative penalty imposed by a court without the agreement of the respective soviet on the territory of the corresponding soviet.

No consent for holding a deputy of a local soviet of people's deputies criminally liable, for his detention or for subjecting him to measures of administrative penalty imposed by a court, is required if the crime or the administrative legal violation committed by the deputy has taken place outside the territory of the soviet of which he is a member.

A criminal case involving a deputy of an oblast soviet may be instigated by the Prosecutor General of the Kazakh SSR or the prosecutor of the oblast; in the case of a deputy of a rayon, city, city rayon, settlement, village and aul soviet, by the prosecutor of the oblast, rayon, city, and city rayon.

A deputy may not be detained or taken to court and his personal objects, luggage, transport facilities, and housing and official premises may not be searched.

A soviet deputy, whose mandate has expired, may be prosecuted for any violation of the law, committed during his term as deputy only in accordance with the procedure stipulated in Article 34 of this law.

Article 34. Procedure for Obtaining the Consent of the Soviet for Impleading a Deputy

In order to obtain the consent of the soviet for instituting criminal proceedings, detaining, or executing an administrative penalty imposed by a court, the respective prosecutor must make a presentation to the soviet. The presentation may be submitted by the superior prosecutor as well.

The presentation must be made before the deputy has been charged or detained or else a case involving administrative legal violation has been submitted to the court.

The superior prosecutor may withdraw a presentation requesting the indictment of the deputy submitted to the soviet by the lower prosecutor.

The soviet must consider the presentation within 1 month and may demand of the prosecutor additional materials. The soviet must pass a motivated resolution and send it to the prosecutor, within a three-day period. If necessary, the soviet may revise its resolution. The deputy has the right to participate in the soviet's discussion of the matter of his immunity.

A superior prosecutor who disagrees with the resolution of the local soviet of people's deputies may submit to the superior soviet a presentation on repealing the resolution and submitting the matter for a reconsideration by the respective soviet. Respectively, the rayon, city, city rayon soviet and rayon or city, and city rayon prosecutor has the right to submit a presentation on repealing the resolution of a city (city under rayon jurisdiction) settlement, village, and aul soviet and submitting the matter for reconsideration. Should the soviet ratify its initial resolution, the case may be resolved by the oblast soviet of people's deputies on the basis of a presentation by the oblast prosecutor.

If the presentation of the prosecutor, submitted in accordance with the procedure stipulated in this article, is not considered by the local soviet of people's deputies within 1 month, based on the presentation of the respective or superior prosecutor, the superior soviet must take steps to ensure its consideration without delay.

A prosecutor who has submitted a presentation to a soviet must inform the soviet on the result of the investigation or the trial within 3 days following the end of the proceedings.

Article 35. Protecting the Labor Rights of a Deputy and the Rights of a Deputy Who Is Serving in the Military Service and of Other Categories of Citizens Whose Service Is Governed by Statutes and Regulations

During his term, and for the two years following the end of his term, a deputy may not be dismissed from his job at an enterprise, establishment or organization or expelled from a kolkhoz or any other type of cooperative, or educational institution or transferred as a disciplinary penalty to a lower paid job on the initiative of the administration or the trade union committee, without the preliminary agreement of the soviet.

If the wife (husband) of a people's deputy is dismissed from his or her job as a result of the permanent transfer of the deputy to another location in order to fulfill his or her deputy obligations within the soviet or its organs, the period of interruption of his or her position will be considered part of the person's overall and uninterrupted work (service) seniority. Such individuals retain for that period of time their work (service) seniority in their field, their work (service) seniority which gives them the right to salary supplements (including climate coefficients) and the percentile markups and one-time bonuses for seniority (for work seniority in their specialty at a given enterprise), bonuses based on the results of the work of the enterprise, establishment and organization for the year, and work seniority entitling them to pension under favorable conditions and in favorable amounts, should such individuals, at the time of the transfer, have held a position or worked in his or her profession or worked (served) in areas for which such benefit is stipulated.

A deputy serving in the military or other categories of citizens whose service is subject to statutes and regulations, may not be dismissed from the service, demoted in position or rank, or transferred on the initiative of the administration or the command without his agreement. Nothing must be done to prevent his promotion in rank as an officer or to an equivalent special rank based on his position.

A deputy who has been relieved from implementing production or official duties in order to exercise his deputy rights is given his former job (position) after the expiration of his term, at the same or another enterprise, establishment or organization, with his agreement.

A deputy relieved from the implementation of his official obligations, serving in the military, or other officials whose activities are guided by statutes and regulations, may be assigned to the respective soviet, while remaining in active military or other service. This category of individuals retain their benefits and advantages. After the expiration of his term, the deputy relieved for work in the soviet is placed at the disposal of the respective ministries or departments for further service in his previously held position or in an equal or superior capacity, with his agreement.

A term labor contract is signed with an official hired to replace the deputy; the contract is terminated with the resumption by the deputy of his previous job.

Article 36. Relieving the Deputy from Production or Service Obligations and Reimbursement of Expenditures Related to Deputy Work

As a rule, the deputy exercises his powers without interrupting his production or service activities.

During a session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet or the local soviet of people's deputies, or sessions of organs to which the deputy has been elected, the deputy is relieved from the implementation of production or service obligations and is paid the average daily wage and a reimbursement of expenditures related to deputy activities, out of funds provided by the republic or respective local budget.

In order to carry out the assignments of the soviet and its organs or work in his electoral district or in the public organization which elected him, a people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR or a deputy of a local soviet is relieved from the implementation of his production or service obligations for, respectively, five and three working days per month, and is paid the average wage and reimbursed for expenditures related to deputy activities out of funds provided by the republic or local budget.

Enterprises, establishments and organizations may, by decision of the labor collectives, pay for the working time of their deputy, used by the latter in the implementation of deputy obligations.

The procedure for reimbursing the expenditures related to deputy activities and the procedure for paying for

their work the people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR, relieved from the implementation of production or service obligations for the period of their activities as members of committees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, are stipulated in the 27 April 1990 Kazakh SSR Law on Ensuring the Activities of People's Deputies of the Kazakh SSR and Reimbursement of Their Expenditures Related to Deputy Activities.

The procedure for reimbursing the expenditures of deputies of local soviets is defined with the present law and the Regulation on the Procedure for Reimbursing to the Deputies of Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Kazakh SSR expenditures related to the exercise of deputy activities, as ratified by decree of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, dated 13 June 1990. The procedure for compensating for their activities deputies relieved from work in the local soviet is defined by the respective soviet.

Article 37. The Deputy's Right to Free Transportation

A people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR has the right to free transportation within the republic's territory on all railroad, automobile, water, and air lines and all types of urban passenger transportation (with the exception of taxis) and the right to be issued travel documents on a priority basis. This right is extended also to any individual accompanying a people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR if that individual is classified as first group disabled.

A deputy of oblast, rayon, city, city rayon, settlement, village and aul soviet has the right to free transportation by automobile or on waterways under republic jurisdiction and all types of passenger transportation (with the exception of taxis) on the territory of the oblast, rayon, city, settlement, village or aul soviet; a deputy of an oblast or rayon soviet has the additional right to free transportation by rail and air.

Article 38. Deputy Leave

A people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR or a deputy of a local soviet is granted annual paid leave of 36 and 30 work days respectively, unless the law allows for a longer leave period. The procedure for paying for the leave of a deputy relieved for permanent work in the soviet is set by the respective soviet.

Article 39. Providing the Deputy With Official Housing

A people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR, relieved from the implementation of production or service obligations, for reasons of work in the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, who has no permanent residence in Alma-Ata, is granted temporary official housing, fully furnished in accordance with hotel standards, where he can reside together with the members of his family.

For the same period of time the permanent residence of the deputy and the members of his family is not relinquished.

A deputy of the local soviet, released for permanent work in the soviet and residing in a settlement distant from the soviet may, if so desired, be granted temporarily the use of official housing.

Article 40. Assistants-Secretaries of a People's Deputy of the Kazakh SSR

A people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR is entitled to have assistants-secretaries who work at enterprises, establishments and organizations, or who, if so requested by the deputy, may become personnel of the executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies; and to voluntary assistants-secretaries, who may give the deputy organizational-technical and scientific-consultative assistance in implementing his deputy activities.

The conditions and procedures governing the work of assistants-secretaries are regulated by the labor legislation of the Kazakh SSR and the Regulation on Assistants-Secretaries of the People's Deputy of the Kazakh SSR, ratified by decree of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, dated 6 July 1990.

Article 41. Deputy Certification and Deputy Badge

The deputy is issued a deputy certification and a deputy badge after the soviet has accepted his mandate. The deputy makes use of the deputy certification and badge for the term of his plenary rights.

Regulations governing the certification and badge of the people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR and the deputy of the local soviet, and their model and description must be approved by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

N. Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic

Alma-Ata, 13 November 1990.

Kazakh Writers' Union Secretary or Writer Activism in New Social Environment
91US02744

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata, LENINSHIL ZHAS in Kazakh carries on December 25, 1990, on page 3 a 2200-word interview with Sayyn Muratbekov, second secretary of the Kazakhstan Writers' Union Administration, recorded by Abdilghazy Qyrbekov. The interview, entitled: "Deeply Held Convictions," focuses on the role of the writer and of the Writers' Union in a new era of perestroika, glasnost and an open questioning of many of the assumptions of the past (including the past oppressions of Kazakh history in the Soviet period). Asked about this, Ayyrbekov emphasizes the great responsibility of the writer, for whom there are now no taboo subjects, and the need for a higher order activism. In this connection he praises individuals such as Olzhas Suleymanov and Mukhtar Shakhanov for what they, and movements led by them, have accomplished, and the intense interest in writing for the press exhibited by most leading Kazakh writers. However, while seeing the unofficial organizations (and movements) as a sign of the time, which only the future can judge, Muratbekov also seems to sound a note of caution as well, stressing both his ultimate optimism about the future (Kazakhstan, he makes clear, while it has many problems, has many resources for solving them as well) and confidence in the leadership of the party. Also touched on in the interview are the difficulties being created for writers by paper shortage and the increasing cost of newsprint, and the furor created by the nationalist pronouncements of Solzhenitsyn and others. Pronouncements like Solzhenitsyn's, he makes clear, are just what we must guard against.

Critics of RSFSR Draft Constitution Cited

*91UN0870B Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 50, 23-30 Dec 90 p 6*

[Text] From a speech by Ivan Polozkov, first secretary of the Russian Federation Communist Party's Central Committee, at a Plenary Meeting of that Committee:

"The draft Russian Federation Fundamental Law doesn't speak about democratic change, but rather about eliminating the Soviets and changing the form of state administration. In effect, it is a proposal to renounce the historical choice made by the people in 1917 and reaffirmed by the 28th Congress of the CPSU."

From a speech by Yuri Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, at a City Party Conference:

"The so-called deideologization of the Constitution is carried out against a background of apology, as frank as it is cynical, for private property and enterprise. The draft Constitution doesn't say a word about socialism as the people's historic choice. And considering that even any mention of Soviets as the state's political mainstay has been deleted from the draft, there's every reason to speak of a 'quiet counter-revolutionary coup' fundamentally modifying our state's political system and character."

From a speech by A. Solotenkov, district procurator, at a special session of the Shilovo District Soviet, Ryazan Region:

"The draft presented to us will lead to capitalism's restoration in the Republic—the adoption of the Constitution on its basis amounts to a 'quiet' coup d'etat."

From a discussion in the newspaper PRIOKSKAYA PRAVDA of the Regional Soviet and Committee of the CPSU:

"...On the whole the draft Constitution is reactionary and anti-popular in character. It stands for the interests of 'chosen' dealers, purges and legitimizes the money amassed by shadow economy tycoons, and is spearheaded against diligent and honest working people."

From comments in LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, the Lipetsk Communist newspaper:

"...One's heart aches from bourgeois names reappearing on newspaper pages and in the Russian Federation draft Constitution: duma, governor, and so on. For what? Why do our democrats believe that our country is neither Soviet nor socialist? Do they want a return to capitalism? Back to bondage, to slavery?"

"The editorial staff should systematically, as they've already started doing, rebuff these experts and their ilk, who are traitors to the people."

Benefits of USSR Membership in Interpol Noted

91UN0917A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 91
Second Edition p 6

[Interview with Militia Lieutenant General V. Ignatov by L. Chausov: "The Sword of Interpol"—date and place of interview not indicated]

[Text] **O.Sidelnikov from Volgograd, L. Kushnir from Kishinev, and many others are interested in what joining Interpol gives our country. We asked the principal expert, USSR MVD representative in international organizations, Militia Lieutenant General V. Ignatov, to tell about this.**

As a member of the UN Committee on preventing and combatting crime, he has visited a number of foreign countries for the purpose of exchanging the experience of law-enforcement organizations and has participated in international forums. Here is how he began the conversation:

"The end of the 'Cold War' has improved prospects for collaboration on problems of curbing crime which, indeed, knows no borders and is increasingly often becoming transnational.

"An exchange of information and a widening of mutual action are necessary for victory over transnational crime. Collaboration with foreign colleagues is not a bow to fashion, but a vital necessity. I note the following aspect: The international community, first of all the UN, has developed a fairly large quantity of principles, norms, and standards in the sphere of crime prevention and the exercise of criminal justice. Unfortunately, these documents so far have been the property of specialists, of professionals. And only recently, in the preparation of our own legislative acts, have we begun to compare them with the experience that already exists in the world.

"The Eighth Congress on Combatting Crime recently took place in Cuba. At it were approved and later ratified by the forty-fifth session of the UN General Assembly very important documents with regard to practical (!) mutual action—model treaties on extradition of criminals, mutual assistance in the conduct of criminal cases, transfer of these cases to one another, prevention of theft of cultural treasures..."

[Chausov] Apparently, more and more people are coming to the conclusion that if measures are not taken "by the entire world," then civilization will be exposed to the strongest of blows from the "black international" of crime...

[Ignatov] Absolutely right. An increase in crime on the national level is accompanied by growth of "international" criminality. But here is a paradox! The more we erect various kinds of border and customs barriers, playing at "sovereignty," the greater are the chances for criminals to hide themselves.

To the point, the sharp dealers of the criminal world are managing to crawl into the cracks that exist between various systems of justice. Having committed crimes in one country, criminal predators move to another and burrow in abroad, while managing to "launder" criminally acquired money. Of course, there is no talk of "tearing down" borders. However, the right way to protect the rights of citizens is to create a united front of battle with this evil. Without borders.

[Chausov] Are there concrete results of joining Interpol?

[Ignatov] Within a short time (since last September) we have received from abroad about 400 inquiries and communications through our national bureau and have ourselves sent almost 200 "data packages." And we now have at our disposal information about a number of criminal groups and societies. Apropos of this, a murder of two trade union officials from Sweden in the Baltic area was also solved in Interpol channels. Or take the latest "affair of the century"—involving 140 billion rubles: It turned out that a foreign individual mixed up in the deal is being sought—we established through Interpol—by law-enforcement organs in Great Britain. Incidentally, there also have already been cases when criminals have been extradited to us from abroad; one them, who had inflicted damages of tens of millions of rubles, was turned out of the South American area and handed over to justice.

[Chausov] So that the hardened wolves of the criminal world have felt the sword of the law on their hides...

[Ignatov] Of course. We are actively collaborating with organs for the protection of order in the countries of Eastern and Western Europe. Criminal elements have ceased to feel themselves immune to the law. Retribution must be inevitable. And more and more often it is catching up with them. It serves them right. The sword is sharp.

[Chausov] How are the specific characteristics of the USSR influencing this cooperation?

[Ignatov] The entry of many cooperatives into the international market, the establishment of joint enterprises, simplification of procedures for entry into the USSR and for the departure of citizens from the country, as well as the "bottomless" nature of the domestic market with its shortages, have sharply increased interest in our country by the bosses and ringleaders of international crime. And here vigilance is necessary.

Economic crimes have extremely negative consequences for society: illegal industrial and trade practices, "laundering" of money, adventuristic financial operations, tax evasion, computer swindles, dirty business by smugglers.

Precise reaction to threats of terrorism and organized crime are a special aspect of our collaboration with colleagues.

Many delegations at the conference in Havana expressed concern in connection with crimes against cultural heritage.

In short, there is no shortage of problems in the struggle against international and "homegrown" crime. Participation in Interpol and other measures provide us with the possibility of using the experience and support of the intentional community as a basis in the fight against criminals.

Draft Law on Higher Arbitration Court Examined

91JUN0901A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 9 Feb 91
Union Edition p 1

[Article by V. Romanyuk: "Law Instead of Directives: The 'First Test' of the Draft Law on a Higher Arbitration Court"]

[Text] A review of the Draft Law on the USSR Higher Arbitration Court has been included in the agenda of the next session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Well, its "first reading" took place on 7-8 February 1991 at the All-Union Conference of State Arbiters of the Union and the republics.

Well, there is no denying, the problem is an acute one. The disintegration of economic relations has reached threatening dimensions today, the opposition of the center and the republics, individual regions and enterprises, will become increasingly more acute, obtaining at times an uncompromising character. This, above all, was the question: About the interaction of arbitrations in the conditions of the transition to market relations? What should be the forms of the legal regulation of their activity, connected with the conclusion and execution of economic contracts?

"The projected reforms are appropriate," V. Yakovlev, the chief state arbiter of the USSR, declared. "If new forms of property and new forms of management make their appearance, if there is a change in the correlation of the plan and the contract, and if the contract is put first and foremost, this inevitably should have an effect on the procedure for solving disputes and the very functions of arbitration. Previously the State Board of Arbitration was entered into a certain system and carried out government functions, and now it must carry out exclusively functions of justice in the economic sphere."

With the beginnings of the Higher Arbitration Court of the USSR, the system of the organs for the resolution of economic disputes in the republics must also be transformed. In so doing, it is important that the procedure for the examination of economic disputes not become extremely complex and formalized, that the independence of arbitrations be guaranteed, and that attempts to control them on the part of the organs of power not be permitted. V. Yakovlev resolutely spoke against the amalgamation of the arbitration court with the judicial system and for the independent situation of the state

arbiters. The pursuit of departmental and local interests—this is "what is destroying our economy," he emphasized. Arbitration is obliged to oppose the breaking-up of the Union as a single organism into parts, which destroys it.

If previously the activity of state arbitration reduced itself to numerous verifications and reports of the lower organs to the leading ones, now coordination, the exchange of information, and the development of coordinated recommendations is now becoming the main thing. As far as the economic disputes themselves are concerned, the center will examine only those among them which the republics will delegate to it. The Higher Arbitration Court can become the arbitration organ in the resolution of inter-republic disputes (this is extremely important in the present-day confrontational situation in a number of republics) and can examine economic disputes of enterprises of union subordination.

Academician V. Laptev, who took part in the discussion, emphasized that today the content of the economic dispute itself is changing. During the transition to the market, the old idea—that the parties to economic disputes are without fail the enterprise and organizations—is being destroyed. Now even individual entrepreneurs and citizens who engage in private activity may enter into an economic dispute, as well as foreigners who take part in joint enterprises. There is a corresponding change in the atmosphere of economic life, which is increasingly acquiring a market character.

The conference in Moscow coincided in time with the examination of the draft republic Law on State Arbitration in Kiev. The deputy chief state arbiter, N. Grichkovskiy, declared that there are no fundamental disagreements between the Ukrainian variant and the draft union legislation. This is all the more important because economic relations between the republics will develop and, correspondingly, there will be an intensification in legal regulation within the framework of the Union. In any case, the judicial legislation should remain unified. And those economic disputes which will be taken to the center can be easily decided by agreement with the republics. This idea was supported by the chief state arbiter of Latvia, Yu. Markevich: "An organ is needed," he said, "which would coordinate the work of the arbitration courts and resolve the disputes of the republics." At the local level there persists lack of confidence in the supervision exercised by the union organs. It is in the interest of the cause to overcome such doubts. The State Board of Arbitration examines cases that result from economic contracts between enterprises, and the main thing here is to guarantee the objective examination of the situation and the equality of the parties in the realization of their rights.

The Latvian state arbiter also expressed the—in my view, quite reasonable—idea: It is impossible to induce the conclusion of contracts by force—every time it is necessary to find ground for common interests, above

all, commercial interests. Absurd are also those contracts which are not based on the necessary resource procurement: It is impossible to balance the national economy only on paper. The fewer "paper" contracts there remain, the fewer occasions there will be for economic disputes in general.

Latest MVD Figures on Rising Crime

91UN0913A Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 15 Feb 91
Second Edition p 6

[Article by A. Batygin: "In the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs: 1990 Results and View to 1991"]

[Text] The first feeling you get when you read the document prepared by the ministry is one of alarm. Alas, with respect to all items, everything is getting worse. There is obviously no point in going into the underlying causes: Crises are shaking the socioeconomic and political spheres, in the local areas constitutional guarantees of legal protection of the rights of the individual and the state have been weakened and in some places have been nullified, and the confrontation between the Union and republic power organs is growing stronger.

Initially it was thought that perhaps it was not worthwhile to stir up the already uneasy situation and frighten the people. It is just that all these "secrets," previously hidden under threatening "for official use" stamps, have long since ceased to be kept under lock and key. Any of us could tell many terrifying, soul-chilling stories; our newspapers and radio and television air waves are full of them. Still one must be aware of the "breakdown" of the crime-generating situation in the country. And the people the state calls its citizens are mainly those it trusts to protect its honor and dignity.

And so, first the general picture. The crime-generating situation continues to get worse. Last year the number of reported crimes reached 2,786,600 (a 13.2 percent increase over 1989), including serious crimes (a 15 percent increase). The crime level per 100,000 residents increased from 862 to 969. The aggravation of interethnic relations and separatism ended with tragic consequences. The Transcaucasus, the Baltics, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Moldova... Blood was shed in these places. This is the bitter price of the mass disturbances and conflicts resulting from interethnic strife: 795 dead and 3,660 wounded.

Venting their anger and hatred for the existing system and provoking and stirring up tension, the extremists have defiled monuments and memorials (484 cases of this have been reported, including 182 involving the name of V.I. Lenin). It is even more vile when they resort to explosives and threaten people's lives. In 1990 there were 70 cases of this, and 16 occurred in Riga.

The fist, brass knuckles, and the switch blade are increasingly merely reminders of the criminal world—and fire arms have been put to use. Crimes involving fire arms

have increased by more than a third and, understandably, the increase is directly related to the numerous cases of theft of arms and ammunition. There have been 228 attacks on weapons storage facilities in order to seize them, including 93 attacks on internal affairs organs. The criminals got their hands on 4,500 rifles, only one-fourth of which have been returned. They are looking for 12,300 weapons.

Frightened by the growth of crime and frequently acting out of selfish motives, people are creating real "home arsenals." Hunters are in possession of 3.6 million firearms.

Previously we were fairly well informed about the crimes of the Sicilian Mafia, the Colombian cocaine barons, and the American gangsters. Now that the cloak of secrecy has been removed we learn that in our country as well people are killed for monetary gain and people are kidnapped, later to be returned for a significant amount of money.

The criminal world is spreading into economics, its tentacles are reaching into the administration, economic, and financial structures, it engages in bribery, blackmail, and extortion, and it is reaching the interregional level. The number of cases of bribery increased by nine percent last year.

The current shortage of everything is advantageous to the speculators. During 1990 charges were brought against 312,000 people engaged in illegal resale of goods, including 14,900 engaged in speculation on a large scale and on an especially large scale.

People have various, dissimilar attitudes toward cooperators. Some people consider them profiteers, and in many cities they provide perhaps the only source for acquiring fashionable goods—the stores are completely out of them! But still, in the opinion of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, we are not putting a stop to these negative processes in the cooperative sector; 14,000 crimes were uncovered there (76.6 percent more than in 1989).

The introduction of new forms of management and economic relations into domestic activity, alas, is not proceeding without abuses. The beginning of the privatization of state property, the expansion of export and import operations, and the transformation of credit and financial relations are clouded by various kinds of crimes. Thus in June of last year, in conjunction with workers of the USSR KGB, workers of internal affairs organs uncovered a series of illegal financial relations of the Zenit youth commercial center and the Agrokhim association with their partners in Poland, as a result of which criminals stole \$10 million.

Narcotics are a special subject. More than 27 tons of processed and unprocessed narcotic substances were confiscated from illegal circulation, and 24,000 drug-related crimes were committed. Closely related to this vice is drunkenness.

...Slipping more and more frequently into our vocabulary are such words as the "wooden" ruble and devaluation. Another devaluation—in the sphere of morals and ethics—is perhaps no less alarming, especially among adolescents and youth. Listen to these terrible figures: 234,700 crimes were committed by minors or with their participation, and every sixth one was a serious crime. About a million underage law violators were taken to the militia and many crimes are being committed by adolescents with psychological disorders. The prisons are hardly the place to "intercept" youth crimes. We shall not placate ourselves with illusions: Last year individuals who had been in prison committed more than 350,000 crimes as repeat offenders.

And, finally, let us read through the section devoted to problems of the Ministry of Internal Affairs organs themselves. They are largely explained by the inadequate and not always effective efforts of the police in their fight against crime. The main "sore spot" is the slow resolution of problems of personnel and material-technical and financial support for the activity of Ministry of Internal Affairs organs.

The professional level of a considerable number of employees is fairly low. We need free, intellectually and physically trained personnel, and it is difficult to staff many of the services with such people because the wages are not in line with the heavy loads and the difficult working conditions. As a result, the personnel shortage amounts to 45,200.

There are also many difficulties with the delivery of technical equipment for internal affairs organs. GAZ, ZIL, VAZ, and AZLK are refusing to conclude contracts for the delivery of automotive transportation, blaming the absence of firm plans for deliveries of automotive equipment for 1991. It is impossible to negotiate a contract for the manufacture of bullet-proof vests—the enterprises do not have enough of the proper materials.

Another crucial problem might be the main one. Up to now we have not adopted the USSR laws "On the Soviet Militia" and "On Internal Forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs." The work is made more difficult by the lack of a public normative act regulating operational investigative activity.

But be that as it may, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, taking the existing situation into account, is taking measures for strengthening law and order and public safety. Ties are being strengthened between the Union and republic Internal Affairs Ministries, and a complex of measures for fighting economic sabotage, theft, corruption, speculation, organized crime, and drug trafficking has been earmarked and is being implemented.

With the participation of involved ministries and departments and the Children's Fund imeni V.I. Lenin,

we have drawn up and are implementing an interdepartmental program of measures for legal and moral education of adolescents and youth. In large cities, in conjunction with the State Committee for Education we have begun to create centers for sociopsychological aid to adolescents. A reform of the criminal-executive system is in progress. It envisions improving sentencing and bringing it into line with international standards.

...We have taken only a few of the figures from the document prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. You cannot get away from them, you cannot hide. Such is the harsh reality of our life and the present day. To protect the Soviet person, our rights and freedoms, and the country's laws and constitution are, understandably, too much for the militia alone. A good deal here depends on a firm and consistent position on the part of our leaders, the Cabinet of Ministers, and soviets at all levels.

The militia is in need of practical assistance. One of the pages of the report prepared by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs is devoted to a prognosis of crime for next year. Of course, a prognosis is just a prognosis, but it is constructed on a real foundation, and one cannot but take the opinion of specialists into account. So, without trying to scare people with the figures, I can say that it does not inspire an iota of optimism—the growth dynamic spreads everywhere, in all respects. Need I say more?

MVD Official on Coordinating Anti-Drug Operations on National Level

91WD0441A Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 12 Feb 91
Second Edition p 6

[Interview with Major General of the Militia Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Kotlyarov, deputy chief of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Criminal Investigations Main Administration, by A. Chereshnev: "A Ticket To Nonexistence: Who Benefits by Dividing the Narcomafia into 'Ours' and 'Someone Else's'"]

[Text] More than 34,000 drug-related crimes were discovered in the country last year. The number of drug users reached a half million people. The annual volume of the illegal turnover of assets has approached three billion rubles. According to experts, the drug abuse problem in the country continues to worsen. How do we withstand the onslaught of these businessmen who deal in death? Our correspondent talks about this with Major General of the Militia A. Kotlyarov, deputy chief of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Criminal Investigations Main Administration.

[Kotlyarov] Yes, the scale of drug smuggling is growing. As a rule, they transit through the territories of several union republics. So (and this is precisely our primary problem), drug-related crime is becoming ramified and inter-regional in nature. At the same time, republic internal affairs organs frequently operate autonomously

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and only carry out local tasks. Naturally, this significantly reduces the effectiveness of the steps taken because, in order to effectively combat the narcobusiness, we need to first of all destroy inter-regional crime structures and break the chain: Manufacturer—courier—dealer—user. Resolution of these tasks is inconceivable without union republic cooperation that is coordinated from a single center. And today the stormiest arguments are flaring up around precisely this fundamental issue.

[Chereshnev] How and in what instances is opposition provided to the narcomafia? Really, as far as I know, our country also has international obligations on this issue....

[Kotlyarov] Of course. The Soviet Union has ratified all international conventions that concern the problems of combating drugs.

Nine intergovernmental agreements have been concluded. Contacts have been established with special subdivisions of other states and cooperation is being set up to expose specific criminal groups. Unfortunately, ordinary cooperation within the country is a somewhat more complicated task.

We have joined Interpol, one of whose primary tasks is to combat the narcobusiness, and we recognize that crime is international and knows no borders. Now we need to understand that it is also union-wide and that is why we cannot get by, figuratively speaking, without our "intra-union Interpol." That is precisely why we organized seven inter-regional departments to combat the narcobusiness. Subunits are located in 39 cities which provides us with the possibility to talk about creating a single system in the country.

[Chereshnev] Is it still too early to talk about the specific results of their work?

[Kotlyarov] Why not? During just several weeks of work and even while not fully manned, these subunits, in close contact with local organs, have eliminated 45 inter-regional drug distribution channels. We have discovered 71 groups of dealers, almost half of whom had stable communications at their disposal. We solved a total of 341 drug-related crimes. We also detected 314 other parallel crimes, including murder, rape, armed robbery, robbery, larceny, and racketeering.

[Chereshnev] But nevertheless this form of work is encountering resistance?

[Kotlyarov] Unfortunately, yes. For example, RSFSR MVD has unilaterally taken steps to impede normal operations of the organs we have created, although 80 percent of the crimes solved by them are recorded precisely in the Russian Federation. And practically every other one is linked with inter-republic drug dealing.

[Chereshnev] And what is the cause of the difficulties that have arisen?

[Kotlyarov] The RSFSR MVD leadership views the activities of the departments on their territory as incompatible with the provisions of the Declaration on the Republic's Sovereignty. In particular, a Russian Federation MVD January 14, 1991 telegram orders the MVD—UVD [Administration of Internal Affairs] to cease assigning agents to inter-regional departments and to take steps to return those assigned to them to their previous jobs. In my opinion, this attitude is entirely unjustifiable both from the point of view of internal republic interests and for organizing the struggle with the narcobusiness on a union-wide and international level. Really, about half of the country's drug users reside in the RSFSR and more than 10,000 drug-related crimes are detected annually. The Russian Federation is the primary drug dealing market and is one of the regions of their most intense transit.

[Chereshnev] Does that mean that the situation is hopeless?

[Kotlyarov] I would not say that. We will operate anyway, we will do our thing, and ultimately believe me, life itself will force us to unite our efforts. And we will do this, but... late as always. We will lose the valuable opportunity to learn from someone else's errors and to work to outstrip the impending narcotics threat. No matter how much we repeat it: "The Mafia is here and the mafia is there," no matter how much our fellow citizens are afraid that "the lion has already leaped"—the criminal world feels better and freer the more graphically the center and the republics argue among themselves without finding a common language where they cannot get by without cooperation. But I hope that common sense will nevertheless prevail. We need to understand that too much and something too valuable is at stake—human lives. But for now due to political ambitions, we are encountering a wall of alienation and increasing numbers of new people are receiving "tickets to nonexistence" from the dirty hands of drug traffickers....

Police Cite Growth in Drug-related Crime, Narcobusiness

91WD0437A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 7, Feb 91 p 14

[Article by S. Petrovskiy: "How To Subdue the Drug Mafia"]

[Text] The European Conference of the heads of national law enforcement organs on combating drugs occurred in Moscow. This fact was cited in particular: Up to 30 tons of drugs and the raw materials for their production are confiscated in the USSR annually and the money turnover in this evil business is approaching three billion rubles. V. Roshchin, head of USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Criminal Investigations Main Directorate inter-regional department, said at a meeting with journalists: "An organized narcomafia formation is operating in the country."

Just like throughout the entire world, in recent years drug addiction has become a serious social factor in the USSR that is having a negative impact on society's development. This phenomenon to a greater or lesser degree exists in practically all regions of the country and primarily depends on the availability of a raw materials base for drug manufacturing and on traditions and customs that occur among the population. The greatest drug use occurs in the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, in the North Caucasus and in the Transcaucasus, in the Ukraine and Far East, that is in regions where wild hemp [Cannabis] grows on significant territory and where the population has engaged in the cultivation of poppies and has used it as folk medicine and as foodstuff since time immemorial. The concentration of drug addicts is great in the major and very large cities, international ports and resort cities.

Sowing opium poppies has been banned since 1974 and we have also stopped sowing oil poppies since 1987. However, a significant portion of citizens continue to be illegally involved in growing poppies and hemp. A study that was conducted demonstrated that more than 60 percent of drug users acquire them through ties established with drug distributors and on the "black" market. Just one in five of them independently prepares potions from hemp and poppies and one in nine obtains his drugs at medical institutions.

During the last nine years, we have noted an increase in the number of registered drug patients and individuals who use drugs in the country but still without signs that the disease has developed (so-called "users"). As of January 1, 1990, public health and internal affairs organs had registered 118,200 individuals who engage in the non-medical use of drugs, including more than 60,000 drug patients. Right now an average of 50,000 people are added to the lists each year.

The structure of those registered consists of 65.8 percent—young people up to 30 years old, including 5.6 percent juveniles and 11.5 percent women, and three quarters are city dwellers. Nearly 72 percent of drug users are workers, peasants, and employees and one in six neither works nor studies. A third of those under consideration have previously been charged with a crime and more than half of them for crimes associated with illegal drug dealing. Before the militia spots them, the overwhelming majority of drug addicts have already been using drugs for a long time.

The increase of users of medicines with strong side-effects or other psychotropic substances that are not drugs has been tracked since 1987. In 1989, their number reached 24,400 people, more than 70 percent of the individuals of this category have been registered in the RSFSR, mainly in regions that do not have a drug manufacturing raw materials base. Particular concern is caused by the fact that more than half of the users of these substances are juveniles.

Drug addiction is closely related to crime, including with its organized forms. Up to 30,000 narcobusiness-related crimes are detected each year and 25-30 tons of narcotic substances and raw materials for their manufacture are seized from illegal turnover every year.

In 1989, a 9.3 percent increase was noted in the number of recorded drug-related crimes and a 35.3 percent increase was noted during the first half of 1990 in contrast with the same period of the previous year. The number of drug embezzlements through larceny, theft, and robbery increased by 3.8 percent (from 731 to 759) and the illegal manufacture and acquisition of drugs for the purpose of sales increased by 0.3 percent (from 2596 to 2605).

Drug addicts or individuals under the influence of drugs annually commit thousands of more dangerous crimes. In 1988-1989, they committed 175 murders, more than 100 rapes, and 2,850 robberies, thefts, and larcenies. Research has shown that in certain regions drug addicts commit up to 50 percent of their larcenies from apartments. In 1990, 1,864 group crimes were solved. As a rule, drug dealers operate surreptitiously and with extreme caution. Experts note the existence of stable criminal ties with drug manufacturers, embezzlers, couriers and dealers in various regions of the country.

USSR MVD has recently conducted a number of successful operations to expose such formations. A dangerous group of embezzlers and morphine dealers was discovered that was operating at Chimkent Chemical Pharmaceutical Plant (37 persons were arrested). The criminals embezzled half a million rubles worth of drugs and sold them in Moscow, Leningrad, and Tashkent and in the republics of the Transcaucasus, the Baltics, and in the Far East.

In 1989, USSR MVD, jointly with this region's internal affairs agents, exposed 85 criminal groups with inter-regional ties in the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, discovered 365 crimes, including 93 drug dealing cases, and discovered 112 channels for their shipment and transportation to Moscow, Leningrad, and other industrial cities.

The measures conducted allowed us to somewhat reduce the quantity of arriving illegal drug turnover and "black" market price increases for their most widespread types are evidence of that. In contrast with 1985, the price of one kilogram of raw opium rose from R30,000 to R100,000, for hemp—from R200 to R1,000, for hashish—from R1,000 to R1,500, and for marijuana—from R350 to R1,000 (although it is impossible to exclude the impact of inflationary processes).

Internal affairs organs annually conduct widescale preventive operations code named "Mak" [Poppy] to prevent illegal sowing in the country. The problem of combating the growing of drug raw materials is especially difficult in areas overgrown with wild hemp bushes, especially in the southern areas where types with a high drug content predominate.

At the present time, wild hemp has been recorded in areas larger than 250,000 hectares. There are many methods to destroy it but there are practically no effective ones. For example, eliminating hemp using herbicides dispensed from aircraft results in the destruction of the soil and other serious ecological consequences. Therefore, its destruction is conducted using a slightly effective mechanical method and even manually in some cases.

Internal affairs organs monitor compliance with drug production, storage, transportation, shipment, and sales regulations. Up to 1,500 cases of crimes associated with violations of regulations are discovered annually.

The territory of the USSR has not yet become an arena of active international narcomafia operations for a number of reasons: The nonconvertibility of the ruble, certain difficulties of monetary sales due to the paucity of the goods market, and certain limitations on entry and exit into the USSR. However, the scale and geography of drug distribution, smuggling, and transit through our country is increasing. Since 1985, more than a thousand attempts to smuggle drugs and psychotropic substances were stopped at the border. The number of channels and suppliers is increasing. Along with the well-known suppliers—Afghanistan—Hungary—new ones have appeared—KNDR [People's Democratic Republic of Korea], Vietnam, Rumania, and Iran.

A hypothetical glance into the not too distant future convinces us that: The USSR's expanding foreign trade and humanitarian ties, simplified entry and exit procedures, and the main thing—the impending transition to the convertible ruble will provide a sharp impulse to the penetration of drugs into the country and simultaneously their "export" to other countries.

A complicated situation is developing in the area of the Afghan-Iranian-Pakistani border. Analysis of the information we have is evidence of the fact the Afghan opposition is pursuing the transformation of the country into a powerful center of the international narcotics business. Drugs from this region end up in many countries, including in the Soviet Union. Faced with this real drug threat, we need to consolidate the efforts of the entire world society in order to develop adequate measures to confront the spread of drugs from the region of the "Golden Crescent."

USSR MVD has discovered attempts to establish ties between the USSR's criminal world, on one hand, and the criminal worlds of Poland, the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], Hungary, and Austria, on the other hand. Therefore, the Soviet Union is interested in close cooperation with the police organs of the countries mentioned. We can only subdue the narcomafia with their complete cooperation.

Effect of Joint Patrols on Crime Rate

91UN0983A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain First Rank S. Turchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Patrols on the Streets"]

[Text] Is this measure warranted? Some are raising a hullabaloo about this, and others today are doing a very necessary job.

STAVROPOL. Convicted three times, citizen G. was apprehended by a joint patrol during the commitment of a grave crime.

SEVASTOPOL. After robbing citizen N., an unknown person tried to rape her. A joint patrol, which arrived in time, prevented the crime.

SAMARA. Joint details arrested 27 deserters who were hiding from justice and who constituted a potential danger to the civilian population...

More and more reports like this are arriving at the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] with each day. Here are some figures that were cited for me. According to data for yesterday, the joint patrol service in 484 republic, kray, and oblast centers and large cities of the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenia arrested more than 18,000 persons for various transgressions of the law. Of these, 127 were for committing serious crimes. Three thousand servicemen who left their military units without authorization were returned to their place of service. All of this indicates that the consolidation of the efforts of the Army and the militia to put things in order is beginning to bring a noticeable benefit. It is worth mentioning in what a demonstratively noisy way the "radicals" received both the joint order of the two ministries and the ukase of the USSR president.

The parliaments of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova, and also the Leningrad Soviet of People's Deputies, suspended their activity in their regions. The Moscow Soviet of People's Deputies recommended to executives of the president's ukase that they refrain from its implementation. A number of newspapers published dozens of letters in which these measures of the USSR president and government were severely criticized. For example, the newspaper VECHERNAYA MOSKVA wrote: "So, armored personnel carriers in the streets of our city? Are they not the ones on which there is the blood of the defenders of the Vilnius television tower?"... The newspaper KURANTY went even further: "If a gun appears on the streets of a peaceful city, it will without fail be fired. This is not a law of dramatic art but the logic of dictatorship. Referring to the interests of the workers, how many times has the ruling clique of the Communist Party resorted to weapons in a fight for its own interests and for power.

'Kalashnikovs' and armored personnel carriers are the last argument of the CPSU."

There were similar "horrors" in other publications. Such labels as "army of the dictatorship," "suppression of democracy," and the like cropped up.

But the first results of the joint patrolling clearly negate all the aforementioned "prophecies" and labels. There are neither tanks nor armored personnel carriers in the streets. Weapons were not employed even once. In Moscow, the patrols are not armed at all. This possibility, as an exception, is defined by the Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties of the USSR Armed Forces. But there are no reasons to deviate from it at present.

The false prophecy that the joint patrolling is aimed against rallies and the spontaneous protests of citizens is not materializing. Let us take the center of Moscow, where both rallies and demonstrations are held as a rule. The fifth section of the militia and the commandant's office of the first rayon jointly arrested 30 civilians recently, for minor hooliganism, speculation, and violation of trade rules and passport procedures... But not one was arrested for expressing any kind of protest. Incidentally, the patrols are not designed either organizationally or quantitatively "to fight a crowd." This is what Colonel V. Shukin, chief of staff of the commandant's office of the city of Moscow, told me:

"In the capital, the number of patrols and personnel serving in them has not increased since 1 February. (I was told the very same thing in the General Staff with respect to the whole country—S.T.) We are managing with the former strengths. The capital has a little more than 100 main routes. On regular days 300 persons are assigned to them; on days off and the day before, up to 600 persons, and on holidays, up to 900 persons. Service is performed in three shifts. They are deployed all over Moscow. What kind of "suppression of rally democracy" can one talk about here? Mention of duty subunits in the order caused a particular stir among populists. But his reaction is at best a result of a lack of information. Such subunits have always been detailed in garrisons, as long as we have had a regular army. Indeed, joint patrolling, as well as other forms of cooperation of the Army and militia, has been practiced (successfully, moreover) for a long time. Just last year the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee twice requested that the Ministry of Defense "increase the number of commandant patrols and assist militia employees..." and "give instructions on placing some national economic installations under guard." The joint order of the two ministries and the USSR president's ukase seemingly legalized this system of interrelationships between the Army and the militia which had already evolved. The row that the "democratic leadership of the capital" raised only says that it does not know what is happening in its eparchy, or that it is deliberately hostile to any decision of the center, without even looking into its substance.

This, in my opinion, is typical of the "radicals" in general. When the first results of the patrolling were publicized at a briefing of the Ministry of Defense and it became apparent that the gloomy predictions are simply the usual hysteria, other no less senseless "prophecies" came forth. Here is the most typical kind, from NEZAVISIMIYA GAZETA, where T. Ivanova came up with this: They say that this order was published in connection with the forthcoming referendum. That is, "it is necessary to patrol so that no one will come out on radio and television and try to make the people understand the truth about this referendum. So that no kind of Yuriy Afanasyev will clamber up on any truck, gather a crowd around himself, and begin to shout: Fellow citizens, you are being duped..."

It is necessary to mention that the order was published in fulfillment of the USSR Council of Ministers decree of 11 October 1990 "Concerning Urgent Measures to Strengthen Legality and Law and Order in the Country," and the instructions of the Council of Ministers of 27 October 1990. So that, as we see, this was at the time when the question of a referendum did not even stand.

Of course, if during the conduct of the referendum public order is violated, the joint patrols will not pass by. But this, you see, is the norm for any civilized society!

The use of the Army in the interests of supporting law and order is practiced throughout the world. Thus, according to Article 79 of the constitution of Austria "the federal army, if the legal civil authority requires its assistance, is responsible, in addition to the armed defense of the country, for the protection of constitutional establishments and ensuring conditions for their functioning, and also for the democratic freedoms of citizens and the general support of order and security inside the country." Similar legal provisions also exist in other countries. In Mexico, Article 89 of the constitution and Article 29 of the organic law of the federal public administration of 1976; in Italy, in constitutional law No. 2 of 1948 and No. 670 of 1972; in India, Articles 53 and 352 of the constitution and the law on supporting internal security of 1971; in France, according to Article 16, the president can adopt necessary measures, if this "is dictated by the situation"; in the United States, several legislative acts regulate the use of troops in cases of "illegal obstacles to the functioning of state authority and the execution of constitutional and federal laws." Incidentally, one of the first steps taken by L. Walesa, president of the Republic of Poland, in the resolution of problems of internal security and public order consisted of uniting the efforts of the ministries of national defense and internal affairs, and the establishment of a common front in the fight against crime, including the organization of joint patrolling.

The world has long since accepted this kind of cooperation between the army and law and order forces as a necessity. But our "democratic press" is categorically against it for some reason. Why? Perhaps for the reason that it really stopped listening to the voice of the people

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a long time ago? I will not begin to talk about the thousands of letters in support of the joint patrolling that have arrived lately at the Ministry of Defense, the MVD, and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. I will cite the evidence, as the saying goes, of a neutral source. On the very first day of patrolling Teresa Olbrecht, a Swiss television journalist, took pictures in the military commandant's office of the city of Moscow and at the Yaroslavskiy Railroad Station during the course of several hours. Out of 80 citizens who gave an interview, only two expressed doubt as to the advisability of joint patrolling, and the

remaining fully supported the USSR president's ukase and the measures he is employing for maintaining order in the country.

In conclusion, I acquired alarming statistics in the USSR MVD and from regions where the "democratic leadership" blocked a decision on joint patrolling. In comparison with January and the beginning of February last year, street crime increased in Armenia by 168 percent, in Georgia by 116 percent, in Moldova by 107 percent, in Estonia by 75 percent, and in Lithuania by 52 percent...

Careless Handling of Radioactive Sources, Poor Monitoring Examined

91WN0217A Moscow TRUD in Russian 11 Jan 91 p 4

[Article by V. Davydov, TRUD special correspondent: "Lethal Cargo"]

[Text] Moscow and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy—The "blank spots" on the map of the country's radiation situation are resulting in thousands of people regularly receiving "doses" of radiation that could easily be avoided. The lack of complete information concerning this matter and of individual means of measuring ambient radiation sometimes have tragic consequences.

It was an ordinary work day at the Freza Ship Repair Yard in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. The hull workers were completing repairs on a refuse barge intended for hauling sewage. The barge was standing in the slip of a floating dock, while the shipyard workers were scraping its hull, cleaning off barnacles and rust.

Suddenly one of the workers started feeling sick: He felt dizzy and started vomiting. The doctors, who came promptly in response to a call, suspected radiation sickness. A group of specialists from the oblast radiation-safety center headed by M. Rayzman took measurements on the dock and reached the conclusion that there were sources of serious radiation there. The source turned out to be the refuse barge itself!

The radiation level along the barge's hull was six times the permissible norms. But who was to blame? How did the radioactive contamination get into the port?

The barge captain V. Matviyenko knew nothing about hauling any sort of radioactive waste on his vessel: his sanitation certificate was perfectly in order. Consequently, the shipyard workers were not warned about the elevated radioactivity. No special work order-authorizations for performing work under especially hazardous conditions were issued, and no one saw to it that shifts were shortened and additional pay provided for work under especially hazardous conditions.

It would seem that the news about the accidentally discovered information should have forced the shipyard management to take prompt measures, but despite Rayzman's prescription, work was not halted. The workers were deceived and told that there was no radiation on the barge. The ship was refurbished and launched. The dock was washed off with a disinfectant.

I managed to meet with M. Rayzman, who is no longer working at radiation-safety center. Nonetheless, he still had the document on the barge inspection, which clearly and circumstantially recorded the fact that the vessel was "emitting" microroentgens. The document was signed by A. Ryabenko, the shift dockmaster, and N. Babyak, the dock shop chief. But what is astonishing is that in the local newspaper N. Babyak blamed what had happened on the workers! He explained the deterioration in their health as follows:

"They drink glass cleaner and throw up."

I spoke with the shipyard workers. They were indignant at their boss's fabrication and demanded that he apologize. But they did so in vain: Babyak would not take back his words. Can it be that he really believes that the talk about radiation is pure fabrication? Yet the facts indicate that even in small doses it has potential consequences about which we still know far from everything.

On Kamchatka I learned about a strange coincidence: at the ship repair yards, in hull workers' brigades like the one that was cleaning off the refuse barge at the Freza Shipyard, people who have been employed in that occupation their whole lives do not live to see retirement. Brigade leader Ye. Kabzistov, winner of two Orders of the Labor Red Banner and member of the bureau of the Kamchatka CPSU Obkom, explained to me:

"The substantial pay increments and regional pay coefficients have inured many Kamchatkans to the idea that they live under hazardous conditions, which means that they shouldn't grumble if something unusual happens to them. After all, it's an extreme zone. For the same reason, Kamchatkans try to move to more tranquil realms before they reach retirement age. That's why no one is really surprised that you don't see any pensioners on the streets....And under these conditions, it is hard to keep any accounting of who fails to 'hold out' until their well-deserved rest, and why."

To the brigade leader's words, one might add: some people simply find it disadvantageous to keep any such accounting. Rather than explaining why it is that the hull workers die so early, it is far simpler to write everything off to the hardships of the remote region. It is a screen that can be used to conceal any sort of negligence you like, including radioactive negligence. And that such negligence is a common occurrence on Kamchatka is indicated by the facts:

An expedition of local hydrobiologists disembarked on a nearby island. The scientists went into the lighthouse, whose power generator was capable of supplying electric power to a relatively small settlement for decades. They found it unsupervised: equipment was lying around haphazardly, and there were no control systems. And that was despite the fact that there was a familiar triangular sign hanging above the generator bearing a special symbol and the inscription: "Radioactivity!"

An aerogeography party from Yelizovo Geographic Expedition inspected the region of the oblast center by helicopter and, with the help of instruments, identified about 15 locations with elevated ambient radiation. Four of them were in the very center of the city. One of the hazardous zones was the central square. The statue to the leader that stood in it was emitting about 50 microroentgens an hour—the limit beyond which significant human health disorders begin. The problem was that the base, as inspection showed, had been faced with granite that was interspersed with uranium and thorium.

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In a settlement remote from the Petropavlovsk Bay, a group of scientists under the leadership of G. Snytkin, chief radiologist with the Kamchatka Oblast Environmental Protection Committee, discovered 20 radioactive anomalies containing levels of gamma radiation greater than 4000 microroentgens per hour. The highest radiation level was in the area of a municipal and domestic waste dump. A source of radiation was even found in the settlement school. It turned out to be a sample of magnetic iron ore that had been prepared by the USSR Ministry of Education and was emitting 320 microroentgens an hour.

All this indicates one thing: the oblast leaders' underestimation of the danger of radioactivity. Can one hope that the situation will change for the better in the future?

"Every year in our country the number of instruments and devices emitting radiation increases by an average of five percent," says Oleg Partolin, head of the radiation-safety laboratory of the All-Union Research Center for Labor Protection. "And that means that our radiation protection should be increased by the same magnitude. First of all, we must provide measures to eliminate the useless risk where it is possible to do without things that needlessly expose people to radiation."

Whatever one says, the prospects for the future are clear, and they are not happy ones. Radiological monitoring measures must be enhanced. Explanatory work that is as honest as possible needs to be conducted—among both ordinary citizens and leaders of all ranks. It is important to recognize the sort of danger to which people are subjected in a radioactive zone, and of course, to hold the people who are responsible for conducting such work more accountable.

KGB Staffers Review Need for Nuclear Power Plant Security

91WN0217B Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
4 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by V. Nosko and A. Ostapenko, UkrSSR KGB employees: "Pickets at the Nuclear Power Plant: Or Fuses Made of Political Passions"]

[Text] The remarks offered to the reader have been written by people who are professionally concerned with ensuring the security of nuclear power plants. Fate so disposed that their authors, A. P. Ostapenko and V. F. Nosko, senior officers with the UkrSSR State Security Committee, were at the site of the accident within several hours after the explosion at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. The former was involved in evacuating people from Pripyat, and the latter served on an operational investigative group. Both were subsequently taken out of the zone for medical reasons. Their observations and conclusions have been paid for with their own health. That is all the more reason that we should listen to them.

Today it can already be said that some "specialists" are not opposed to writing the Chernobyl accident off to "the hand of the enemy." It is understandable that in the

face of such statements the security agencies were unable to remain on the sidelines. The hard work of KGB officers made it possible to substantiate the conclusion that there had been no sabotage, and thereby to define other areas of search for causes of the reactor's explosion. The amount of what has been done can be judged from the following data alone. Altogether, KGB agencies have received more than 200 statements by citizens concerning the accident's possible causes, and more than 1,500 other documents pertaining to the elimination of its consequences. The government commission and the procuracy have been informed of the results of follow-ups on and the study of these materials. That is just part of the answer to those who ask the question: What is the reason for the presence of chekists at nuclear power plants?

The Chernobyl tragedy demonstrated to the whole world how vulnerable nuclear power plants are in a technical sense. However, it is not just mistakes in designing, unreliable equipment, or inadequately qualified service personnel at nuclear power plants that can result in accidents with grave consequences. Alas, the unique properties of radioactive materials attract people who by no means always have noble intentions and purposes. Lately, unfortunately, the term "nuclear terrorism" has become common in the world political lexicon. Because of the dangerousness of this phenomenon, it has been designated as one of the extremely urgent problems of national and international significance. Literally the whole world has responded with alarm to reports of various sorts of attacks on U.S. nuclear facilities, including attacks aimed at stealing radioactive materials, reports of an armed incident at a nuclear power plant in South Africa, and reports of attempted sabotage at nuclear power plants in France.

Special trained units have been set up in all foreign countries to combat nuclear terrorism. For example, there is a police administration for nuclear power in Great Britain. It protects nuclear power plants against criminal attempts and unsanctioned penetrations of plant grounds, maintains protection within a 24-kilometer radius, and is also prepared to for combat actions against armed terrorist groups.

In a number of countries legislative acts have been adopted that provide serious sanctions for unlawful actions with regard to nuclear facilities and radioactive materials. Thus, the United States has a law stipulating criminal liability or a fine of \$250,000 for violations of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Authority] convention, which contains principles for the protection of nuclear power complexes that are uniform for all the organization's member-countries.

The ever-growing rise in crimes accompanied by cruelty and violence, the use of weapons stolen in military units and from the militia in interethnic conflicts, the increasingly frequent cases of the seizure and hijacking of airliners, and a number of other factors compel us to think about potential acts of nuclear terrorism within the USSR, as well. It is no accident that in January 1989 the USSR Council of Ministers instituted special security

procedures at all nuclear power plants; oversight over the implementation of these procedures has been entrusted to KGB agencies. And even before that, in March 1988, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the ukase: "On Criminal Liability for the Illegal Use of Nuclear Materials." The final touches are being put on the USSR law on the Utilization of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security.

As for state security officers, their goal is to prevent acts of sabotage at nuclear power plants, and to oversee the reliability of the system for operating and protecting those facilities. Such measures are carried out in close cooperation with the management of nuclear power plants, as well as with agencies and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in full accordance with the IAEA's recommendations and other international requirements.

And today we cannot fail to share the concern of the personnel of existing nuclear power plants, the builders, and the military personnel of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs' special forces that are guarding the Khmelnitskiy and Rovno nuclear power stations in connection with the picketing of those facilities by various public political organizations. Their most active representatives have even made attempts to penetrate into the protected zones, block the work of the nuclear power plants' operating personnel, and carried out other unlawful acts. Thus, the executives of the Khmelnitskiy and former Crimea nuclear power stations have received anonymous letters threatening them with physical violence if the construction and operation of generating units continues. It goes without saying that this sort of "social activeness" by no means contributes to the safe operation of nuclear complexes. Confrontation and an atmosphere of mistrust surrounding our nuclear power plants can have extremely grievous consequences.

Of course, one can also understand the public and the people living in proximity to nuclear power plants, who react with distress to every instance of fire, the development of other emergency situations, and unplanned stoppages of equipment. That is a manifestation of the "post-Chernobyl syndrome." But it can also be cured by providing people with accurate and truthful information. That is possible today since the country is developing a new approach to the understanding of state secrets and departmental secrets, the list of which has been considerably shortened. In nuclear power engineering nearly all information has become open. And now it is all the more inappropriate to ignite fuses made of political passions at such dangerous facilities as nuclear power plants.

Narva Official Criticizes Perceived Environmental Protection Weakness

91WN0216A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 1 Dec 90 p 3

[Article by Yu. Mazanov, chairman of the Narva City Soviet Deputies' Committee on Ecology and the Efficient Utilization of Natural Resources: "Everything

Becomes Known by Comparison"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] A month ago an international exhibition entitled Environmental Protection-90 closed in Tallinn; it was the first of its kind in Estonia. A little before that a group of Finnish specialists on environmental protection had visited Narva. Both the exhibition and the visit by our northern neighbors were accompanied by seminars and extremely interesting reports. The general conclusion which can be drawn from them is quite trivial: environmental protection in the Western countries is at a higher level than in our country, despite the fact that we have more organizations involved in this kind of work than they do. Goskomgidromet (State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control), the Environmental Protection Administration, the public-health and epidemiology centers, the Fishery Protection Agency, the Marine Inspectorate and other services—they are all concerned in one way or another with environmental protection activities. And their effect is minimal.

At the seminars it became clear that one of the most important reasons why we are behind is that the level of their environmental protection legislation is higher than ours; it stimulates the development of progressive new technologies and the production of new equipment which helps to reduce harmful effects on nature.

It is true that we must not overstate the case: some designs produced by our own associations and institutes, whose existence we never suspected before because they were part of the military-industrial complex, "closed drawers" as they were, surprised and impressed many representatives of foreign companies with their quality. If only these designs had received broad industrial application in our own country by now!

The ideas heard at the seminars are forcing us to re-examine in a fundamental way our entrenched views on many problems of environmental protection work.

Take, for example, the treatment of waste water. The usual opinion is that a city's growth inevitably brings with it an expansion of the system of treatment facilities. The emergence of new technologies decisively refutes this traditional view: they even make it possible to decrease the capacity of new systems in comparison with existing ones. The significance of this is enormous. After all, the larger the facility in terms of the amount of water being treated, the larger the quantity of effluent being discharged into a body of water. Although these wastes have been treated, nonetheless, in one way or another they influence the composition of the water: the oxygen content is reduced, bottom deposits are accumulated, the

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biological activity of the body of water is diminished, and the self-cleaning processes are disturbed.

As an example, one can cite the Narva Municipal Treatment Facilities, which were built in the 70's and expanded in the 80's. Designed to handle 70,000 cubic meters per day, today they handle up to 120,000. Their three sludge collectors give off such a stench that they make life in the adjacent neighborhoods completely unbearable. The lack of localized treatment for waste water at enterprises means that when these wastes enter municipal treatment facilities, they contain nearly half of Mendeleev's periodic table of the elements. As they settle in the sludge collector, these elements threaten everything alive in the area and pose gigantic problems for the city.

These problems are intensified as well by the fact that serious mistakes were made during construction of the treatment facilities. As a result, the reinforced concrete is disintegrating in a serious way. According to the conclusion of specialists from the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Hydraulic Engineering imeni Vedeneyev, the facilities are in a disastrous condition, and they have only three-five years of life left.

At present, planning for a new treatment facility with a capacity of 140,000 cubic meters per day is taking place. Is such a giant necessary? It would seem not. It is essential to take the path that the civilized countries have taken: everything that can pollute nature must be removed by the one who produces this "dirt." For this reason, it is my opinion that an impact assessment is required to determine the advisability of building such a large treatment facility in the city.

We continue to display a wasteful, spendthrift attitude toward water resources, a poor practice which was halted a long time ago in the Western countries as a result of the adoption of strict legislative acts and their rigorous enforcement. The experience of these countries suggests to us effective ways to resolve the problems of wasteful water-resource utilization, which is growing worse before our very eyes. Here are the ways: develop strict legislation and efficient norms, raise the fee for water, raise the minimum fee for the treatment of wastes at municipal treatment facilities, and establish a differentiated fee schedule for waste-water treatment that depends on its harmful-substance content.

The adoption of the first two points of this program are the prerogative of the supreme authority of the republic, while the third and fourth come under the jurisdiction of local organs (see the law on local self-government).

Once we have started down this path, we will be able to force enterprises to meet the new requirements when they build and renovate their own local treatment facilities in order to ensure that treated water is used many times for manufacturing needs.

There is no doubt that the necessity to reduce water consumption in daily life must become axiomatic. At present a fee is levied for the taps which are installed in apartments, but not for the water which flows out of them. It is clear that water-consumption meters must be installed in every apartment. At present the average water consumption for every resident of Narva is about 265 liters per day. And the city is building another extension of the water supply line, which will raise this figure to 400 liters! Is that not waste?

After the Finnish group had visited the Baltic GRES [state regional electric power station], its leader, Orli Oyala, noted in passing at the seminar that he had never before seen an energy enterprise with such primitive technology. He illustrated his idea with data on the large sulfur dioxide emissions from the plant's smokestacks, emissions from which Finland suffers. And sulfur dioxide is, above all, acid rain. It is true that it does not threaten us thanks to the abundant emissions of slaty ash from the GRES smokestacks. At one of the meetings I. Epiik, academician of the Estonian Republic's Academy of Sciences, said: "It is possible that acid rain falls far away due to the slow course of the reaction. According to some data, Estonia gets 17 percent of the pollutants, Finland gets two percent, and the Leningrad and Novgorod oblasts receive 61 percent." To a specific question on how to work together to reduce the amount of Soviet sulfur dioxide coming into Finland, Mr. O. Oyala answered briefly: "Install equipment to trap the sulfur."

As we see, the opinion of an official from Finland's Environmental Protection Ministry is in line with the basic provisions of the republic's draft energy program, which has already been the subject of discussion several times—in Narva, in Kokhtla-Yarva and in Tallinn.

In general this program, with the exception of certain successful parts, leaves an impression of something indefinite and nonspecific; this was noted more than once in the course of the discussions about it. For such a serious piece of work involving a large group of scientists arguments of the "if it succeeds, it it does not" type are hardly acceptable. After all, these proposals concern the developmental prospects for the one of the main branches of the republic's economy in the next 25-30 years.

Here are examples. The program calls for the production of electrical power to be concentrated at the Estonian GRES, taking note of estimates that the existing equipment will last until 2005-2010. After that time, attempts can be made to update it if by then the republic has learned how "to produce the equipment and materials (boilers, fittings, regulating and measuring devices) locally." And if it has not learned how?

Undoubtedly the best option for the city of Narva is to renovate the Baltic GRES, which would include converting it to gas, mainly to meet central the need for central heating. But during the discussion of this issue

Academician A. Ots, department head at the TTU [Tallinn Technical Institute] said: "If they give it to us" (the gas, that is). Who will give it? I hope that in the coming years Estonia will shift to a market economy and will not be forced to obtain gas with funds distributed by Gosplan. That is, gas can be bought on the free market, there would be funds. By the way, from the program it is not at all clear whether anybody has calculated which is more beneficial, to put a gas stove in a kitchen or to replace it with an electrical one and make the kitchen ecologically clean, while burning gas at the electric power station and making the station safe for the environment.

And what is the situation in our republic with regard to heat pumps, which provide alternatives for obtaining heat? One can ask: "what is the situation?" many times while studying the draft of the energy plan.

One can only welcome the decision by the republic's leadership, which rejected what is in our view a completely unacceptable proposal by 88 specialists to build an atomic power plant in Estonia. At a time when the Swiss—under the influence of the Chernobyl catastrophe—have rejected atomic power in a referendum, when its prestige in the world is falling dramatically, it is in all probability pointless to talk about building an atomic power plant in our small republic. And the government's decision has convincingly confirmed this.

For many people the following question is almost shocking: in general, do we need to increase the production of electrical energy? In one of his works N. Shmelev cites the following data: "The energy intensiveness of our national income is nearly 1.5-fold greater than in a majority of Western countries, while the introduction of advanced energy-conserving technology would yield the same effect—but at a cost which is three-four-fold cheaper—as drilling oil wells." After all, through the application of new energy-saving technologies Japan managed to reduce the energy-intensiveness of its production by 78 percent, the United States achieved a 33-percent reduction and Sweden a 20-percent reduction.

There it is, the most effective way to develop power engineering, the way which would make it possible to remove a colossal burden from nature and which would lead to significant improvement in the environment of our habitation.

Estonian Environment Minister Comments on Republic Concerns

91WN0216B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 2 Dec 90 p 3

[Interview by G. Golub with Toomas Frei, environment minister of the Estonian Republic: "In Order To Protect Nature You have To Pay for It"]

[Text] [Golubov] I do not think that it is necessary to begin our conversation by stating that the condition of the republic's environment is, to put it mildly, serious.

This has been discussed and written about quite a lot, while the residents of certain regions know from their own experience the cost of air and water pollution.

Now, aside from this problem, there had been talk about the possibility of selling Estonia's natural resources, which you are supposedly quite willing to do in order to obtain hard currency.

[Frei] That is what it is—talk. And above all about phosphorites. The situation is this. Recently the Economic Council of the republic's government discussed the situation with regard to mineral fertilizers. We have enough phosphorus and nitrogen fertilizers for our own needs; it is only potassium that we lack. But intensive land cultivation with today's "Yuko" spreaders, which are already being made in Valga, definitely requires comprehensive granulated fertilizers. They are applied to the earth in a localized way, which significantly reduces the amount consumed as well as the harmful consequences. Even now, after all, most of the fertilizers which are applied end up being washed away, poisoning the water. The production and application of tricalcic phosphate which, as is well known, did not dissolve, but only contaminated the soil, has been rejected altogether.

[Golub] And what about the phosphorites being worked in Toolsa?

[Frei] On this subject the Supreme Soviet expressed itself unequivocally in one of its first decisions: do not touch it. And the decision remains in force. The government simply does not have the right to raise the question of mining.

[Golub] And what is the situation with shale?

[Frei] It is largely determined by the energy situation. The program for this very important sector has not been determined once and for all. But I consider the main point to be that so far we have said no to atomic power. At least for the next 15-20 years.

But the extraction of shale—a primary form of power-generating fuel will also be reduced (from 23 million tons in 1989 to 15 million tons in 1995). According to international agreements we must reduce our sulfur emissions by 30 percent, and this means we must reduce by the same percentage the amount of shale which we burn.

[Golub] Does this mean that there will not be any new mines? And we do not need to worry about the area surrounding Kuremyae, where they were planning on building another mine?

[Frei] I hope so. But I am not certain. We have a serious opponent—the Estonians Association. For now we have agreed that the planning of a new mine (in exactly which spot we do not know) will not stop, especially since it is not being done at our expense. The formulation of the plan will take five years. And then we will see.

At the present time it was more important to halt the construction of the atomic power plant, which we have done.

[Golub] Since we are already on the subject of the shale basin, tell me, how satisfied can we be by the level of recultivation for worked lands?

[Frei] Of course, it is difficult to be satisfied with the overall picture. You probably have seen the lunar landscapes of our Northeast. Estonslanets is carrying out recultivation work. It would be naive to expect that in a year it will correct what has taken decades to accumulate. But we require new quarries to return worked hectares in a form suitable for recultivation. And the rest is up to the foresters.

Nine thousand hectares have been damaged; 7,000 have been recultivated, and on a majority of them biological recultivation has been carried out, that is, trees are growing. The quality of the work being carried out is good—at the level of Eastern Europe, one could say. But of course, landscape architects are needed. At present the Ida-Virumaaskiy District is dealing with these issues.

[Golub] Estonia has another resource—wood. And it has now become much more expensive—at the initiative of your ministry.

[Frei] We have refused the 35-million ruble subsidy which forestry received from the state. (Incidentally, this money will go to buy mixed feed). It is absurd to pay a subsidy for what should bring a profit, as it does everywhere else in the world. Add it up yourself; does it make sense for a cubic meter of timber to cost 3 rubles and 50 kopecks? After all, think what it costs just to plant and grow it! And what is 3.50 today? Even the new price of 24 rubles per cubic meter does not bring it up to normal prices on the world market; they are seven-fold higher.

[Golub] Does that mean that building materials and furniture will become more expensive?

[Frei] This should not have a strong impact on furniture because only one percent of timber goes for that purpose. The cost of furniture depends largely on costs for labor as well as varnish, stain, and other materials. But building materials will become more expensive, there is no getting around it. On the black market a cubic meter of wood already costs nearly R500.

[Golub] Does the republic have enough wood of its own? And is the cutting of it not leading to the destruction of the forests?

[Frei] I will cite two figures for comparison: every year we cut 3.5 million cubic meters, and we bring in 200,000 cubic meters, especially hard woods for ski factories. The cutting does not harm the forest stand because the amount depends strictly on growth. Our forestry plan contains an exact picture of what grows where throughout the republic. In fact, we cut 100-year growth; moreover, this does not effect protected areas. After all, we distinguish three types of forests: income forest;

defensive forest, which grows along river banks, highways and the sea; and protected forest (nature reserves, wildlife sanctuaries, national parks, etc.).

[Golub] We probably should not conclude our conversation without saying a word about environmental pollution.

[Frei] In general, the ecological situation has not changed for the worse in a year, if one does not count the disasters in the Tapa region. Nor is there yet any noticeable improvement. In Tallinn, for example, the treatment facilities are operating at 10-times their capacity; at any minute we might have to pay in hard currency for the untreated wastes going into the sea.

I do not think there will be any general improvement until we force the guilty parties to pay for environmental pollution. Starting in January a special tax on harmful discharges will be introduced. The pulp and paper combine, for example, will have to pay R7 million rubles per year. And we must not fear that some enterprises will not be able to tolerate such a heavy tax burden. It is necessary to be consistent in our decisions. Nature cannot be saved if we do not pay for it, if we leave everything as it was—owned in common, that is, with no owner.

Odessa Holds Referendum on Closure of Port Chemical Works

Referendum Results

91WN0215A Moscow *TRUD* in Russian 20 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by D. Romanov: "Odessa Referendum"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] Yesterday the results of the referendum held in Odessa were summed up. The city's residents had to determine their attitude toward two problems: the creation of a free economic zone and the port plant which produces ammonia.

There were some doubts about how inclined to participate the Odessa residents would be: people were pretty tired of the endless elections and by-elections. But this time about 60 percent of the eligible citizens turned up at the polling stations. Ninety-three percent of those who participated in the referendum voted in favor of creating the free economic zone. And that is not surprising: the memory of the "free city" that Odessa once was has been passed from generation to generation. And every schoolchild knows the term "porto-franco." It can even be said that a step, however small and tentative, toward reviving its ancient status has been made. Komsomol Street, which rings the old city and served in ancient times as the boundary of porto-franco, has been given back its old name—Staroportofrankovskaya Street.

Eighty-three percent of the citizens voted in favor of closing the port plant.

Political Aspects Examined

91WN0215B Kiev RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian
22 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by V. Kreshchuk, RABOCHAYA GAZETA correspondent, Odessa: "Running in Place: Reflections on the Referendum Held in Odessa"]

[Text] A long time ago, during the stagnant period, Vladimir Vysotskiy, satirized those who loved to run on the spot. However, the number of people who wish to imitate motion has not declined during the years of perestroika. A referendum was held in Odessa on 16 December. The idea to hold it was accepted at a session of the city soviet. Originally it was proposed as a way to clarify the attitude of Odessites to the dangerous production units at the port plant (OPZ). However, when they learned that satisfying their curiosity would cost the city nearly 1.5 million rubles, they decided to add on another question—about the opening of a free economic zone in Odessa.

It should be noted that the preparatory work for the referendum was carried out in an obviously unsatisfactory way. In many of the mass media the state of affairs at this modern production unit of the port plant, which meets world standards in terms of technology and safety, was covered in a one-sided manner.

"You understand, I get the impression that the referendum was thought up in order to distract people from more serious problems," noted one of the scientists from the university.

"All you hear is talk about the danger arising from the port plant. But very few people actually understand the extent of the danger. Incidentally, there is a more serious problem, and that involves drinking water. It is still not known how matters will stand with regard to the port plant. But we consume the water from the Dnestr every day, and it is obviously not of good quality. The accident which took place seven years ago at the Stebnikskiy Potassium Plant made a "worthy contribution" to this. Moreover, other industrial and agricultural enterprises and organizations regularly poison the water with their discharges. On 30 November of the current year I. Lyakh, the main state inspector for environmental protection of the UkrSSR State Committee signed an order in accordance with which the Stebnikskiy Plant began a measured discharge of brine into the Dnestr from its overfull storage tanks. That is what our attention should be focused on. But how many enterprises in the region ignore the positive experience of the OPZ and discharge untreated wastes into the sea and poison the air? The resolution of these problems should be given top priority.

On the day of the referendum it came out in conversations with citizens at polling places that some of them

have only an extremely vague notion of what the free-city status will mean to Odessa, and others thought that the preparation for opening a free economic zone was obviously insufficient.

"I am for closing the dangerous production units of the port plant and against the free economic zone," said Lyudmilla Shapovalova, a member of the Green Party, employed by the Transflot Black-Sea Steamship Line. I do not think it is necessary to explain why am I against harmful production units, but neither am I pleased by the Odessites' transition to a market economy in the form of a free economic zone. After all, the introduction of favorable conditions for free enterprise and the conversion of state enterprises to a joint-stock or cooperative basis requires special measures for the social protection of workers, the unemployed, pensioners, large families and invalids. Toward this end good protection—with a legal basis—must be worked out.

"And when you vote, Aleksandr Grigoryevich, it is unlikely that you will have any doubts about your attitude toward the port plant?", I asked chairman of the OPZ labor collective soviet, A.G. Dronov.

"Such questions are not decided by a referendum," said A. Dronov. Strange that the fate of an enterprise depends on people who do not know it at all. We have held meetings and rallies in the shops. The workers voted not to take part in the referendum.

And so the referendum took place. As expected, a majority of the Odessites voted for closing the dangerous production units at the OPZ and for the establishment of a free economic zone in the city. It is true that the OPZ workers who monitored the voting uncovered a large number of various violations. Frequently one Odessite voted for two, three or more people. After all, we have not yet eliminated "collectivism" among us. At present the OPZ representatives are attempting to present their claims on referendum irregularities to the city soviet. But it seems they can hardly get a hearing.

At a meeting with deputies of the city soviet, Mackie Skinner, an American expert, was asked whether he knew of any instances in which chemical production units had been closed down on the basis of a referendum.

"I cannot remember any," answered M. Skinner. However, when enterprises are being built, much depends on the decision of the local residents and authorities. And at existing ones, if claims are made, the case is usually limited to measures to improve the ecological state of the enterprise and to improve the reliability and security of its operations.

And what is to be done now with the opinion of the participants in the Odessa referendum?

"You understand that our referendum has no legislative basis," said L.A. Chernega, deputy chairman of the city soviet. It is advisory in nature. When the republic's Council of Ministers comes to decide the question of

opening a free economic zone in Odessa, no one will be able to make the accusation that only a small group of people is fighting for free status. The referendum decision will also help in the future struggle against the State Agrochemical Association.

"A definite distortion has taken place among us here with regard to the port plant," noted V.A. Ilin, deputy chairman of the city soviet. For a long time the press stressed the fears about a possible accident. And only in the last days before the referendum was there brief mention of the plant's benefit to the city. As an engineer I think that in terms of its technology and operational safety the OPZ is actually quite good. Especially since measures have already been set out to speed up the introduction of an automated system for monitoring and controlling the manufacturing processes.

On the eve of the referendum the president of the country issued two ukases dictated by the difficult economic and political situation. The first of these is devoted to the special conditions for the expenditure of hard currency in 1991 and, in accordance with it, the city and oblast will receive extremely small hard-currency payments from the OPZ. The second ukase repeals all

restrictions on the use of foreign currency by the population. The president's ukase on the hard-currency payments from the OPZ is a clear violation of the law. The city soviet has the right to demand that the president's ukase be rescinded. The president's ukase on the use of foreign currency is a violation of the law. The city soviet has the right to demand that the president's ukase be rescinded.

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decisions by the local organs of power which violate economic relations for 1991. However, even under these conditions, the plant is trying to do everything in its power to resolve the city's problems.

After the referendum I had occasion to meet representatives of foreign companies at the OPZ. They had come to work on issues related to constructing a transportation bypass in the Kotovskiy neighborhood, building an emergency hospital and large hotel complex, as well as increasing the capacities for treating and preparing the drinking water supplied to the city. The port plant will use fertilizer to pay for all this work.

But the city soviet is fighting. And it is not clear why: possibly to create the appearance of furious work? At the moment the most preferable position seems to be that of one of the republic's people's deputies, who decided to ask the country's government to establish for the OPZ—while taking into account the difficult ecological situation in the region—a beneficial, more substantial system of payments to the local budget. One would hope that in Moscow they will pay attention to the voice of the people's deputy.

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RSFSR Official on Action To Increase Birthrate, Decrease Deathrate

91US0290A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 8 Feb 91 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Inga Ivanovna Grebesheva, chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Family Affairs and Demographic Policy, by N. Barabash: "In the Name of the Unborn"; date and place not specified; first three paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[Text] In our unstable society of today there are simply threatening indicators. One of them is the record low level of the birthrate which they attained in 1989. Scholars can compare it only with the demographic situation of the year 1917 and the 1920's, and perhaps also during the Great Patriotic War.

In the Russian Federation the deathrate today outstrips the birthrate so much that, according to the prognoses of sociologists, if things continue to go this way in the future, in 25 years the republic's population may decrease to half of what it is now. The reason lies in the disregard of the interests of the family.

"The cell of society" was perceived only as a structural subdivision, responsible for the reproduction of manpower, and nothing more. The conversation did not even turn to the fact that society should be concerned with the family, and not the other way around. Our main task—to put precisely the interests of the family at the head of state policy—this is how the purpose of the RSFSR State Committee for Family Affairs and Demographic Policy at the RSFSR Ministry of Finance was defined by its chairman, Inga Ivanovna Grebesheva. She tells the editors about the tasks of this committee.

[Barabash] Inga Ivanovna, can any committee you like really stop the dying out of the nation, to direct a demographic policy? Will there, as a result, not simply be a mountain of new instructions and papers?

[Grebesheva] Of course, we understand that in a single moment you will not change the situation. But, you know, something must be done. . . . In all the developed countries, the interests of the family are taken into account in the adoption of all important decisions, many state programs are aimed at its strengthening; special municipal services exist for assisting the family, I am not even talking about the enormous army of social workers.

And we, having lagged behind the West in technology by 30 years or so, in the social sphere of family protection we are in general forced to start from scratch. We do not have any services which are concerned with the problems of the family in a comprehensive manner. Even today, in the calculation of incomes in the conditions of the transition to the market, the authors of various programs are as before oriented to "every worker." But how will the child feel in the new conditions, what will become of the family—there are no such calculations. Meanwhile,

according to our estimates, during the transition to the market, the income for every family member must be no less than 200 rubles, and for the children—even more; you see, they have to purchase products in the market which are not available in the stores. And the three million infants who will be born in 1991 cannot wait until milk will appear in the country.

[Barabash] But what concrete assistance can your committee propose in the present-day conditions? It is not in a position to lower prices, to flood the country with goods, and to solve the housing problem. But, you know, these are the main problems.

[Grebesheva] The committee has the right of legislative initiative. We will certainly insist on the creation of a social protection reserve fund for the period of the transition to the market from the state budget, and to coordinate the actions of public and charitable organizations for assistance to families.

There are problems for whose solution already now large funds are required. For example, there are about 100,000 orphaned children or children left without the guardianship of parents in the children's homes of Russia, but meanwhile 85 percent of these kids could be adopted if we had a well-developed practice of that sort. Today there are four-five times fewer adopted children. What is the reason? The artificial difficulties that have been created in the way of the people who are ready to accept someone else's child into their home. In the children's homes, people have been waiting in line for adoption for five years, at the time the kids are growing up without parents.

We need to free ourselves of unnecessary formalities. In Karelia, for example, the first adoption center in the country was established, which has helped those who want to take someone else's child for upbringing. And in a year three times more children found themselves parents than during the preceding year. Other forms can also be utilized. The state pays up to 3,000-4,000 rubles a year for the support of one child in a children's home. If it would be possible to pay this sum to those who would agree to assume guardianship over children, I think, many more orphans would be raised in families.

This year our state ratified a convention on the rights of children. But we are violating it as before. Let us take the commissions for the affairs of minors. In essence, these are unlawful formations, since, not being judicial organs, they can send a child into a special institution, to separate him or her from the parents. Nowhere in the world is the life of adolescents turned over to the complete control of people who are working on a voluntary basis.

Or another example. In our country, parents may be perfectly calmly refused the right to be in the hospital with a sick child, to limit their meetings with the child. And although there is a special letter of the USSR Ministry of Health to the effect that physicians are obliged to let parents see their sick children, in actual

fact this rule is not adhered to anywhere. A law is needed here which here, too, would defend the rights of the family.

Today cases of divorce, violation of the law by adolescents, and deprivation of parental rights are regarded in the courts on a level with cases of murder and robbery. They are handled by the same judges and lawyers. But, you know, it is clear that a special knowledge, tact, environment, and consultation of specialists are needed here, too. Family courts are needed.

In Ivanovo Oblast two such courts are functioning at present. They specialize only in divorce trials. And people receive here the skilled assistance of lawyers and psychologists, so that the case by no means always ends in a divorce. . . . Services for family assistance should also be created.

[Barabash] And nevertheless, for the time being it turns out that the matter is a purely voluntary one for every oblast. Somewhere they wanted to—and they turned their face to the problems of the family, but somewhere [else] they do not regard this as a necessary concern. Given precisely the present-day regional independence, will your committee have levers of influence on the local authorities?

[Grebeshova] We will submit a draft for the organization of family services for examination by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. We are beginning to develop the idea of social patronage, which exists in all Western countries. And for this we are creating a system for the training of social workers, ready to help the people who turned to them, and not to refuse them. In England there exist 125 educational centers that train such specialists, but in our country we do not have a single one up to now.

Funds are needed for all of our programs. We will turn to enterprises, utilize local funds, and attain the redistribution of the state budget for the benefit of family assistance.

Reform in Maternity Care System Urged

91US0294A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Feb 91
Second Edition p 4

[Article by G. Bilyaltdinova: "Such Is the State of Affairs"]

[Text] With this material we begin publication of the series "A Woman's Lot," having in mind the quota of problems unsolved by society that have fallen particularly hard on women's shoulders. We select the fears ourselves and await more from our readers.

"My wife was expecting a baby; she was under the care of the doctors in a Kaliningrad city hospital, Moscow Oblast. The birth took place early on the morning of 10 December, under general anesthesia. That day we were informed that the child had been stillborn. My wife was

not shown the child. A day later, they wouldn't show me the child in the morgue, but the doctors gave their consent for burial.

"On 15 December I came in for the autopsy report and my son's body. A criminal investigations staffer met me and informed me that the child had disappeared from the morgue on the night of 11-12 December. The morgue director stated to me that she had not admitted the child to the morgue, and thus she would not answer for his disappearance.

"I think it possible that the child is alive, since he was shown to neither the father nor mother. Medical indications were that the fetus had been developing normally."

What a letter, the apotheosis of a topic that had already been sounding ever more terrifyingly in the readers' mail.

A human being has been born. Yet today, such news is hardly an eternal joy. It is all the more alarm and danger for the family.

"I've been delivering babies for 30 years," says A. Vutsanova, chief obstetrician of Moscow Maternity Hospital No 23. "But there has never been anything like what we have today."

A natural female matter, the birth of a child, has suddenly grown into a very serious problem. Here are the first aspects of that problem.

During the perestroika years, over 14,000 women have died in maternity hospitals; 200,000 newborns die annually. Today, 50-70 percent of pregnant women experience pathological changes. Premature labor and delivery are increasing. Over half of all newborns have various defects in the state of their health.

Where are all these terrible indicators coming from? We will attempt to break the situation down into its components. And we will do this with statistics, which are eloquent in that they often need no commentary.

We will begin from far off, from long before the moment when a woman prepares herself to become a mother. Over 3 million of our women work under harmful conditions; over 500,000 are employed in heavy physical labor, and 4 million work night shifts. And how are women who go down in mine shafts every day supposed to give birth? Can they expect normal, healthy children? What sort of progeny will be produced by, for example, a fire brick worker at a brick making plant, who lifts up to 40 tons per shift? Upon investigation, the picture is hardly more optimistic for women textile workers, machine operators, or greenhouse workers.

What the production line has left undone, the ecology will finish off. In the area of the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine, the pregnancy interruption rate has grown 3-fold; the miscarriage rate by 22.5 percent, and infant mortality has grown 78 percent. Organic chloride and phosphorous compounds, poisonous to children, to

put it simply, have been detected in the breast milk of 46 percent of the women tobacco workers in the Osh Oblast of Kirghizia.

It should be added that even in less ecologically nightmarish places the future mother, like all of us, washes with acid rain, is cooled by harmful winds, and uses more than permissible levels of nitrates in her food. Incidentally, pregnant women have problems with food today, like everyone else.

And nevertheless, nature claims its own. A woman wants to become a mother. Or more precisely, she makes an attempt, she takes a risk in the eternal hope that she will be the lucky one. What can she plan on?

Obstetric wards are found in far from all oblast hospitals. This deprives women, particularly rural women, of qualified medical assistance. An almost unbelievable figure came to light: About 40 percent of pregnant women had not previously undergone gynecological examinations.

And what about those who had seen a doctor? Where had they been seen and treated? In regular clinics, where there is a gynecologist, of course (the question is, how qualified a doctor), yet the majority of the attending therapists are not familiar with the particulars of the course of pregnancy and birth during illnesses. The diagnosis, a heart defect, was determined while living only in 25 percent of the cases of illness in the RSFSR, even though all the cases had been examined by therapists, yet not one of the women who died had had a complete cardiac work-up.

And what is the state of the maternity hospitals? The supply of obstetric beds is below norms, particularly in Central Asia. Not infrequently, there are beds, but they are in rooms that were built ages ago. Today, 76 percent of the maternity hospitals in Kirghizia and 85 percent in Turkmenia do not have a central water supply. It is impossible to imagine, but there is no sewerage in almost every other maternity hospital in Moldavia. And what is there in the auls, kishlaks, or small cities? Out of 38 maternity wards in Moscow, only nine correspond to modern requirements; the remainder are either located in modified premises or are in need of major repair.

It would seem that there should be no problem in the best maternity hospitals. Yet they are not cut off from life; the dangerous winds of the times waft into them, too.

"Our poverty has now moved into the foreground," says USSR People's Deputy V.N. Zubkov, chief physician of the Rostov-na-Donu maternity hospital. "The lack of quality treatment and diagnostic equipment, the acute shortage of medications and disinfectants, the sudden price increase for linen and furniture. For 1991, we will be supplied with only 20-22 percent of the medications compared with last year's level. The problem of single-use syringes has not been solved, and I foresee new HIV infections via needle in medical facilities, including maternity hospitals. This is the country's disgrace..."

AIDS, which infects its victims in maternity hospitals faster than anywhere else, is a such a piercingly unnatural tragedy that just to speak of it is to need to say nothing more. But we must speak about it, laying the problems bare, both the global ones and the smaller ones. And they are innumerable.

"We can declare the health system to be a priority trend, which has been done from all tribunes, but what sense does it make if we are like everybody else?" grieves O. Dronova, chief physician of Moscow Maternity Hospital No 23. "The maternity hospital administration has been cornered: We don't have the right to give incentives for good work, but the salary of a first-rate obstetrician is a pittance. Young people are not coming to us. Personnel is one of the maternity hospital problems subject to immediate solution..."

That is the state of affairs; you can't understand where and how it begins, nor what is coming out of it. And is there a way out of the situation that has been created? There is, I was told at the USSR Ministry of Health, and I was handed a pamphlet: "Concepts of the Basic Trends in Maternal and Child Health Care." Yet another concept from the interminable reserve of concepts being born today.... And even the style does not strongly differentiate it from everything that has been said and declared one more than one occasion: All that same roster of measures, to create, to improve, to organize...

Or what was it that the authors were counting on in creating their concept, in which each of the enumerated measures spills over into millions, and sometimes billions of rubles? Is it possible to realize a program if health care is financed through "residual funds"? "If only the Government would allocated the funding, then..." I was told more than once at the ministry. But even then, to my extreme regret, we would not get far. After all, the millions of rubles earned by people of good conscience during all-union subbotniki have not yet been used.

The circle has closed, or is just about to. Immersing oneself in this material, one almost physically admits: We are on the threshold of a childless society.

"The best best way out in the given case is to forbid women to have children for the duration of the period of the transition to stable market relations," grimly joked my aforementioned interlocutor, the Supreme Soviet deputy.

Well, even that is possible. But then who is going to inherit our debts?

RSFSR CP Department Head on Women's Movement

91US02834 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
25 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with M.N. Lazutova, head of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Problems of the Women's Movement Department, by N. Shevchenko; place and date not given: "Women's Lot"]

[Text] [Shevchenko] Mariya Nikolayevna, preparing for the discussion with you, I tried to write down the names of the various councils, committees, and commissions whose job it is to concern themselves with a better lot for women, and do you know what I discovered? The campaigners are without number! Almost a full type-written page of the list of names, from the women's councils, which we have everywhere, through, say, the RSFSR Council of Ministers Committee for Family and Demographic Policy, which is little known to the reader.

[Lazutova] And in this table of ranks, you wish to say, there is additionally our department, of recent formation, what is more....

[Shevchenko] And, furthermore, with not all that comprehensible a name—problems of the women's movement. What is the situation with us, do we have such movements in the country? But.... I somehow do not recall that in the earlier party structures a "separate paragraph" distinguished that which dealt directly with women's problems. What has suddenly happened now?

[Lazutova] I would not say suddenly. As you know, a Commission for Women and the Family has been created in the CPSU Central Committee, and in the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee, for Problems of the Women's Movement. And this, in my view, is proof that the priorities in party policy are changing. This is the first thing.

Second, judge for yourself: Women constitute approximately 30 percent of the Communist Party of the RSFSR, and this means more than 3 million persons. Given such representation, it would surely be a sin for women not to have their own structure. Finally, I suspect another hidden meaning to the question also: Such events are occurring in the country, such storms are raging, and you are intent on lapsing into some women's questions....

Yes, storms really are occurring and raging. Only let us lend an ear: Is there in the calamities being experienced by the country not an echo of purely women's problems, more precisely, the misunderstanding and unresolved nature of them?

Take only crime, about the growth of which criminologists are now saying: At a time of restructuring for society this is a natural and inevitable process. One can hardly argue with this. But I would like to add: Natural also in the sense that, having kept our women occupied to the maximum extent in social production—the highest level of employment in the world!—we have left her with absolutely no time and strength for the home, the family and education proper. How to spend more time with our children? Torn between the job and housework, forever harassed in an everyday life in disarray—forever in a rush as far as our children are concerned, everything in rough-and-ready fashion. We

love them in haste, we raise them in haste, and we develop them in haste. And this lack of sufficient care cannot help but avenge itself, resulting subsequently in the columns of militia reports, accident statistics, investigation records....

And just analyze women's work conditions on the collective and state farms! One out of 10 is more or less in luck when it comes to so-called mechanization. The remaining nine fight "one-on-one" for harvests and weight gains: At times bent double in the field, at times on their bellies, as the women themselves say, dragging fodder to the livestock. And receiving pennies for this, what is more....

I feel sorry for our women, affronted and upset. And it should certainly not come as a surprise—one can only wonder how the party did not see these problems earlier and did not assign them a separate paragraph.

As far, however, as the women's movements directly are concerned, such movements not only exist in our country but are making their presence known with ever increasing assurance with the appearance of various foundations, associations, and leagues. They include committees of soldiers' mothers and councils of large families, professional women's clubs and associations of an environmental nature. The number of charitable foundations is growing, the Russian Women's League has emerged, currents on a religious basis are springing up, there is the women's peace movement, and there is a movement for social renewal and even: "Women for a Socialist Future for Our Children." And combining and consolidating these efforts would seem important for the Communist Party of the RSFSR not only in order not to lose our powers "in isolation" in the solution of purely women's problems but also in order via this consolidation to arrive, perhaps, at more general civil harmony in society.

[Shevchenko] But this is what is odd: It is against the background of this growing assertiveness that women for some reason or other in our country are making their way through to the principal roles increasingly rarely. What is wrong here, in your view?

[Lazutova] A kind of natural pattern. Earlier this representative percentage was observed volitionally, so to speak: A woman was moved "up" per the official schedule of allocations and placed on the presidium—and everyone was comfortable with this. But when a struggle for a deputy's seat developed and when arguments for the defense of platforms came to be conducted on a par with men, our women hereupon found themselves discriminated against: They carried a larger load and stereotypes were reflected on the part of the electorate (politics is not women's business), and there was simply an inability to present oneself in the election struggle. The result? Women now constitute merely 5.6 percent of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, for example, and among executives in the republic, little more than 7 percent.

[Shevchenko] But, perhaps, Mariya Nikolayevna, the people are sometimes right, for all that, and politics is indeed not entirely women's business, given our present ordeals all the more: buying, acquiring, standing in line, clothing the family? And, in general, should the weaker sex lead?

[Lazutova] I am convinced that there needs to be a fundamental change in the present situation, in which connection I believe that the Russian Communist Party should have a program to prepare women for political activity and executive work. And we are not talking about a race for figures or purely female ambitions here. But about the fact that it is not right when laws concerning women are thought up by men.

[Shevchenko] But even this, most likely, is not the sole explanation of why the life of us women is at times, oh, so bitter, Nekrasovian almost. Remember? "What a fate, the Russian woman's lot...." I mention this because an illness is treated effectively only when it is correctly diagnosed. Where, in your view, is, for all that, the first cause and painful nerve of our, I would like to say at times simply barbaric, attitude toward women? Alas! It is said that among barbarous tribes the woman was esteemed....

[Lazutova] The cause is on the one hand the absence of a consistent, integral, and, what is most important, humane official policy in respect to the woman. And, on the other, the one-dimensional vision of her role and place in society. "Long live woman the toiler!"—this is as yet the predominant slogan of official requirements of her, with the emphasis on the "toiler," what is more, by no means on her health.

Just trace the path: Beginning with industrialization, we have not separated women's labor into a special category—this was not considered or factored in during the construction of facilities and the development of agricultural machinery and technology. Or in the 1970's: Having come down with giant-mania and having hit on the idea of large-scale animal husbandry complexes, we completely forgot about the medium- and small-sized units and the work and everyday conditions there. Yet the bulk of our female manpower is still employed at them in the countryside!

And take the quite recent example involving the adoption of the document on the limitation of heavy work. How rural women mock this! They say: If we took it into our heads to live in accordance with this document, agriculture in our country, having gone on strike, would simply "get off."

That is, I wish to say that in making decisions we sometimes contrive not to confer with women themselves at all. And, on the other hand, why are the former at times divorced from realities! But the main thing, if we really want a healthy, civilized society, is that we must urgently and fundamentally alter our view of the woman's role and place in society, I would say even our philosophy and ideology of relations with her.

A most eloquent detail: Ask the secretary of a party committee or collective farm chairman what the life of the women working there is like. And you will immediately be told about discipline, milk yields, the plan. About any other existence—whether there is a hospital or consumer outlet nearby, whether her children go to a good school or not—not a word, as a rule. Just as long as woman the toiler thrives! And woman the mother? Housewife, wife, custodian of the domestic hearth, warmth, and kindness? Is she somehow and somewhere disappearing from our life? And are not all of us, society as a whole, suffering today from the fact that she is not performing these roles in life?

[Shevchenko] I suppose that only a wealthy state and society are in a position to permit women such roles....

[Lazutova] On the contrary! A society is rich and prosperous precisely because it considers such women's roles by no means secondary for itself. But we place them on the outskirts of official policy and its main interests.

Take a look: In terms of provision with preschool institutions in the countryside the Russian Federation is in 10th place among the republics, in terms of health care establishments, in 11th place, sales outlets, 12th. The size of the family in the countryside has declined to crisis point—it now has only 3.3 persons on average. The number of people living by themselves in the villages is growing, and this is a most complex social problem in the countryside, and even folk wisdom says in this connection: A house is warm when two pairs of hands throw wood on the fire. And do you know how much time the female inhabitant of villages and hamlets can devote to raising children? Only... three hours a week (!) in winter and 2.5 in summer.

These are the realities and life lines on a woman's hand. And we, looking at them, tell fortunes concerning a limitation of heavy work: You may carry so much yourself, but this much, by vehicle. Or remember how it was before? We would place a poor milkmaid on the presidium and feel gratified that the countryside was held in reverence with us and that the women's question was being solved!

[Shevchenko] Now is probably the right time to ask: How is the party of Russian Communists planning to solve the women's question?

[Lazutova] It is my firm belief that there must be a specially formulated program pertaining to the rural woman and her work and everyday conditions and pertaining to the rural family. The Russian village will not be raised up without attention to these matters.

Further, we will strive to ensure that the government devises and adopts measures pertaining to the protection of woman and child in market relations. Incidentally, women's commissions, providing their expert evaluations on a number of laws that are being enacted, have been formed even now under the auspices of certain committees. Finally, the RSFSR Communist Party will

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join in the elaboration and realization of an official program pertaining to the family and the protection of mother and child. And also in fulfillment of the decree: "Urgent Measures for Improvement of the Position of Women and Protection of the Family and Mother and Child in the Countryside," which was recently adopted by the Russian Supreme Soviet.

[Shevchenko] And the funds? From what sources do you expect the planned programs to be financed?

[Lazutova] The program to train political leaders and female executives that I have already mentioned could most likely be financed by the party itself—it would not require that enormous an amount of money. But in terms of the social areas: everyday life, work conditions, and so forth—we need to find coauthors—they cannot be handled in isolation.

However, we ourselves should be somewhat more active, more womanly efficient, perhaps. There is in pedagogics the golden rule that education of the student begins with education of the teacher. So also with we women, let us for a start personally try to turn official heads in our direction. The famous Russian philosopher Vl. Solovyev predicted in this connection, incidentally: "Solution of the women's question will come to us from Lesbos, probably."

[Shevchenko] Mariya Nikolayevna, you speak about programs and structures, but I hear women readers sighing: We have had these, we know about them! How might you persuade them that the Russian Communist Party's intention to help women is serious and long-term, not another short-lived campaign doomed to drown in paper and resolutions?

[Lazutova] As yet only by the nature of our intentions: Not by attempting to be a benefactor "for all mankind and immediately" but by constantly taking if only a small, but real step forward. We hope, for instance, together with designers and developers of agricultural equipment to see how we can alleviate women's work in cropping. We will not be able to do this universally for everyone, but we will try to see what we can do in a number of regions that have resources and funds within the framework of conversion. Or meeting with the leaders of women's movements, we would like to take a closer look at additional pay for the professional growth of women in production. Why not employ it? After all, today's wages for women are far lower than for men, and also there are more of us laid off. Under market conditions this trend will most likely grow. How to protect ourselves against it? We must think and decide.

[Shevchenko] But to dream a little? Even give up for a minute the problems and joyless figures and trends—could we dream of some ideal of women's fate? And to what kind of fate might we wish to aspire? Finally, will the programs planned by the Russian Communist Party bring us closer to this future? What do you think?

[Lazutova] I would refrain from any optimistic forecasts—too much has been destroyed in the peasant structure and way of life. Essentially, it no longer exists, only fragments of it remain. But even by hanging onto these our women have, for all that, been able to preserve in themselves goodness, patience, and natural wisdom. Precisely what in today's explosive life it would be most appalling not to preserve.

As regards the ideal.... You know, there is a saying that goes: The ideal husband is he who believes that he has the ideal wife. So with women's happiness also—it takes its own form for everyone. Some like to shine more at work; others, at home, in housework, in the family. And for there to be children in descending order of size and nearby, under the same roof, the old ones also and a decent, warm parental old age.

We will not conjure up a fate for others, squeezing it into ideals. Let us rather think about our women a little more often and do a little more for them. And sometimes testing against the touchstone the judiciousness of what has been done, ask them all: "Are you happy?"

[Shevchenko] And you? Excuse the feminine curiosity.... I have been wanting to ask the whole time: Are your knowledge and ideas of women's lot in the countryside more of the armchair and hearsay variety?

[Lazutova] Not at all. I myself was born in the remote countryside, in a large (11 children) and, of which I am particularly proud, close peasant family. Whenever I have to fill out a personal record sheet for the personnel department, I ask for extra sheets—I cannot list my village relatives without them. Such kinship is nowadays no longer in fashion, it is true, roots are increasingly being sought in the nobility.

But mine are in the soil. It is largely for this reason that, learning of the opening of the special "Veteran" account, I considered it my moral duty to make a personal cash contribution. Although, of course, the debt to our countryside and our long-suffering Russian land cannot be fully repaid. And I confess that much would be added to my personal happiness in the home were it possible to help somewhat more quickly the woman working on this land. Otherwise what use are we?

At M.N. Lazutova's request the fee for this interview will be transferred to account No. 700305 of the "Veteran" all-Union charitable foundation.

Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet Decree on Improving Social Conditions for Women, Children
91US0228A Kishenev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 14 Dec 90 p 4

[Decree of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on Urgent Measures for Improving the Conditions of Women, Protecting Mothers and Infants at Birth, and Strengthening the Family; issued in Kishenev on 5 December 1990]

[Text] Attaching major importance to a swift resolution of the most critical problems pertaining to the family, mothers at birth and infants, and increasing social protection for the least provided-for families with children, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova **resolves**:

I. For the purpose of improving the material conditions of families with children:

1. To establish for working mothers with less than a year on the job and for non-working mothers an allowance for domestic child care until the age of one and a half, amounting to 50 percent of the minimum wage.

2. To increase the amount of the state child-care allowance until the age of one and a half (and to pay for each child in the event of bearing two or more children) up to the level of the minimum wage:

For working women with not less than a year on the job;

For working women less than 18 years of age regardless of length of on-the-job service;

For a child under foster care (guardianship);

For children of mothers serving a tour of duty in the military;

For the care and maintenance of the children of single mothers, widows, widowers, and for children previously raised in orphanages or boarding schools.

3. To extend to widowers with children who are not receiving a pension resulting from the loss of a supporting spouse the right to receive the same state allowance that is paid to a widow in accordance with existing law.

4. To extend to all orphan children and children left without the care of parents who are being raised and schooled in boarding institutions, regardless of classification or departmental subordination, allowances established in accordance with existing law for each category of children living in orphanages and boarding schools.

5. To transfer the funds obtained from parents for the maintenance of children in state institutions for children, together with any pensions or allowances accruing to them, to personal accounts in the name of the children at the Savings Bank.

6. To grant to rayon, city, settlement, and rural soviets of people's deputies the authority to establish within the limits of their resources supplementary payments, in addition to those provided for under existing legislation, to families with children; to introduce supplementary benefits and allowances to more fully satisfy the needs of families with children, particularly families with many children, families with one parent (without a father or mother), and young families, as well as those raising children with disabilities or children left without parents.

7. It is the responsibility of the government of the Moldovan SSR:

To develop a single system of state benefits for families with children, making due allowance for the composition of the family, its income, and standard of living;

To determine a system of benefits for pregnant women unable to work so as to provide care for young children (under three years) and for children with disabilities in the event of the illness of their mother for the time that she cannot provide for them.

II. For the purpose of protecting and strengthening the health of women and children:

1. To require the managers of associations, enterprises, and organizations, in coordination with union committees and departments of hygiene, and with the participation of social organizations for women, to determine suitable places and types of work, which conform to medical requirements, and to which pregnant women may be transferred, or work that they may perform at home; and to create special shops (sections) for adapting their work or for performing it in cooperation with others.

2. The Moldovan SSR Ministry of Finance and the Ministry for the National Economy are instructed to provide for the allocation in 1991-1992 of supplementary funds for the construction and equipping of new types of medical facilities for obstetrical and pediatric care; for the purchase of importing technology to increase production of products for feeding infants; as well as for the purchase of products, including medicinal and pharmaceutical drugs, for pediatric treatment; and single-application douche syringes and birth-control devices. These products are to be in sufficient supply to meet the needs of the population with due allowance made for domestic production output.

3. The Government of the Moldovan SSR is instructed to provide concessions for the creation of joint enterprises with foreign firms and organizations for the production of tools and laboratory equipment used for diagnostic and treatment purposes in institutions offering obstetrical and pediatric care; and to provide rehabilitation facilities and prosthetic appliances for disabled children.

4. The Moldovan SSR Ministry of Agriculture and Food Production and the Ministry of Health are instructed to provide for the planning and introduction of a technology for the cultivation, harvesting, and basic processing of tobacco, geared to the conditions of work and forms of organization in this branch, that will not be injurious, so as to protect healthy women from the harmful effects of tobacco.

5. The Moldovan SSR Ministry of Agriculture and Food Production is instructed to work out by 1 January 1991 a system for strengthening the economic incentives of

agricultural enterprises to cultivate and process ecologically pure agricultural products, particularly for pregnant mothers and young children.

III. For the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of the clinical treatment of pregnant women, protecting their health and the health of their offspring, and to create conditions conducive to the proper care of children newly born and in their early infancy, provision is made for the following:

Leave for reasons of pregnancy and birth consisting of a total 17 calendar days prior to the birth and 56 calendar days following the birth (70 days after birth in the case of complications or the birth of two or more children) is granted to each woman in full, regardless of the number of days actually used prior to birth.

Leave to care for a child under three years of age is granted in full or in part to the mother of the child or to the father, grandmother, grandfather, or other relative for family supervision that, in fact, constitutes child care.

Annual leave shall be granted to working men whose wives are on leave for reasons of pregnancy and birth upon request during the period of the wife's leave.

IV. For the purpose of improving the conditions and schedule of work by permitting parents to combine child care with the work they perform in social production, provision is made:

1. To establish partial work days or partial work weeks at the request of women with children under the age of 14 (including those for whom they are providing foster care), or with a child who has a disability under the age of 16, while in the performance of work during the period or periods indicated.

2. To maintain for women an uninterrupted work record for the purpose of calculating benefits for being incapacitated by reason of pregnancy in the event of suspension of a labor contract in connection with the care of a child under the age of 14 (including any children for whom they are providing foster care) or a child who has a disability under the age of 16, in the event of reporting to work prior to the period or periods indicated.

3. To provide for a single parent (foster caretaker or guardian) raising a child with a disability:

A certificate of incapacity by reason of pregnancy and birth for the entire period of treatment at a sanatorium (including travel time) for the child with a disability who is under the age of 16 upon certification by a physician that individual care is required.

One additional day off a month with the daily wage to be paid for by social insurance.

4. To extend privileges granted to women in maternity cases (by limiting work at night, overtime, or on holidays, restricting business trips, granting additional leave,

easing work schedules, or making other concessions as provided by law) to fathers raising children without their mothers (by reason of death, deprivation of parental rights, a prolonged stay at a medical institution, or other reason for an absence of maternal care); and also to foster caretakers (guardians) of children below the proper age.

5. To create genuine conditions for making proper use of the labor of women, and also of persons under the age of 18, on a preferential basis at work suited to their physiological and psychological characteristics as well as to their ages, while improving their professional skills, their advancement at work, and their active participation in all areas of social activity.

V. The government of the Moldovan SSR, in joint cooperation with the Soviet Federation of Independent Unions of Moldova, is instructed to carry out the following actions in 1990 and 1991:

To develop measures to increase the incentives of enterprises, institutions, and organizations to expedite the efficient use of the labor of women, including those who are pregnant, those who are under the age of 18, and those who are partially incapacitated. Until a determination is made how to employ a pregnant woman in accordance with medical certification, the woman is entitled to be released from work while retaining the average wage for all working days missed as a result of this leave, which is to be paid for from the funds of the enterprise, institution, or organization regardless of departmental affiliation or form of ownership.

To develop new, scientifically established standards for the maximum allowable work periods for women and persons under age who are required to lift and move heavy objects manually.

To prepare and authenticate lists of industries, professions, and kinds of work with arduous or injurious conditions of labor for which the employment of women and persons under age is to be prohibited.

To identify branches of the national economy, industries, and kinds of occupations in which work at night by women is not for any reason required, and to establish specific periods and procedures designed to free women from working night shifts, assigning a priority in this respect to women having children under the age of 14 or children with disabilities under the age of 16.

To establish criteria for the classification of work positions with due regard for psychological, physiological, and age characteristics, among others, and to compile a general list of positions and professions to be assigned to women and persons who are partially incapacitated on a preferential basis.

To introduce statistical labor-reporting forms with separate space provided to indicate in the cases of women

and persons under the age of 18 the following information: type of occupation; worker category; kind of organization; working conditions; illness or injury, and reasons thereof.

VI. Oversight responsibility for compliance with the provisions of this decree is entrusted to the standing commission of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet dealing with problems of women, the protection of families, the care of mothers and infants at birth, public health, and social security, together with the Moldovan SSR Ministry of Public Health and the Moldovan SSR Ministry of Labor and Social Protection.

VII. This decree shall enter into force as of the day it is adopted.

A. Moshanu, chairman, Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR

Turkmen SSR Officials on Women's, Children's Welfare in Republic

91US0285A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 10 Jan 91 p 3

[Article by Kh. Gochmuradov and N. Charukhcheva, members of the State Supervisory Commission of the TuSSR Council of Ministers: "Tomorrow's Menu for Children: A Report of a Joint Session of the Committee on Women's Affairs and the Protection of Mothers, Infants, and the Family of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet and the State Supervisory Commission (Goskontrol) of the TuSSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] In August 1990 the TuSSR Supreme Soviet adopted a decree: "On Urgent Measures for Improving the Situation of Women, Protecting the Health of Mothers and Infants, and Strengthening the Family." Discussing his prospective program at the summer session of the Supreme Soviet, TuSSR President S. A. Niyazov stressed the need for exploiting every means to discover and tap the full potential for the practical implementation of the particularly urgent measures specified in the decree. Among them he cited the organization of free food service in the starting classes of secondary schools.

Could the local soviets find the means? Did they do everything that could be done to provide republic children with free food by 1 January of this year? How is the provision of food for children of early and pre-school age now being organized? Seeking answers to these questions, a working group of deputies set off to inspect the services of Chardzhou Oblast.

The results of their inspection tour, to put it mildly, were not reassuring. It is clear that even today this section of the decree has not been complied with. January is already here, and there is not so much as a whiff, as they say, of bread and butter provided free of charge in the schools. That is why the deputies decided to introduce

this question of free food for immediate discussion by the two committees—that of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet and TuSSR Goskontrol.

Incidentally, Chardzhou Oblast is by no means the worst in the republic in this regard, and after visiting literally every corner of it, the deputies became convinced that quite a lot had been done to strengthen the material base of school cafeterias and lunch counters and to supply them with food. It is a heartening fact that for the past two or three years the parents of children in the elementary classes of the schools in rural locations have not had to pay so much as a kopeck. In Deynauskiy, Sakarskiy, Sayatskiy, and Chardzhouskiy rayons they have found it possible to feed the children not only free of charge but to serve hot meals as well. Most of the kolkhozes contribute meat, milk products, fruits, and vegetables to meet the needs of the schools on a regular basis. School-sponsored agricultural teaching programs in the form of hotbeds, or small-scale farms where they raise swine, poultry, and agricultural products, have been of great help in providing a varied school menu: for example, in schools No. 1 and No. 12 of Bolshevik Kolkhoz in Sakarskiy Rayon, and in No. 22 of Bolshevik Kolkhoz and No. 28 of Kommunizm Kolkhoz in Deynauskiy Rayon.

Nevertheless, a heated discussion of problems ensued. There was talk of school sections designated for assistance but otherwise neglected and left to twist slowly in the wind. Mention was also made of the fact that not all the managers of kolkhozes and sovkhozes were thinking about the menus of their own kindergartens and schools. It was emphasized that in the oblast agro-industrial and trading organizations, and the Union of Consumer Trade Cooperatives, as well as in the departments of public health and education, there was lack of clear-cut coordination, resulting in a number of errors.

A. A. Snezhko, chairman of the Committee on Women's Affairs and the Protection of Mothers, Infants, and the Family, noted that 35 schools out of a total of 345 in the oblast have neither cafeterias nor lunch counters, and that only 47 percent of the schools provide the children with hot meals. Moreover, the quality and variety of meals served in most of the schools leave much to be desired, especially in the city schools; this, she said, was to be explained by the fact that the funds set aside each year for food were not fully utilized. In 1989, for example, Dargan-Atinskiy, Farabskiy, and Sayatskiy rayons spent less than half of the money allotted on food. When the provision of food is examined in terms of percentages, the picture is altogether disheartening. Children in rural schools receive 23.1 percent of the meat required; 6.9 percent of milk products required; and 22.9 percent of the required amounts of vegetables. There is, of course, a written order in effect from the TuSSR Council of Ministers for the allotment of necessary supplies of meat and milk to be derived from the accumulation of domestic agricultural resources by overfulfilling the procurement plan. As it happens, however, not all the farm managers in Sayatskiy, Chardzhouskiy,

and Khodzhambasskiy rayons seem to be aware of the existence of this order. Who knows but that they are using the order to cover their own shortages in meeting the state quotas by saying: "We gave the meat to the schools." And that is the whole story, except for one thing. The schools are short of meat, too.

The menu in school cafeterias could be varied to some extent with the help of semifinished products and products packaged in small units. But food-processing plants in Chardzhou Oblast do not produce goods in this fashion. Also, hopes for a school food-catering combine in this plan have not been justified. Since June of last year the combine has been closed for repairs—which, incidentally, are yet to begin. The city executive committee has yet to allocate the funds.

It is, of course, precisely food-catering services, if only they were available, that could in many respects resolve our problems. In the West for a long time schools have not been built with kitchens, only with cafeterias. The food is prepared at a central location and brought in special containers, fresh and hot. It is easier, more practical, and less dangerous for the health of children.

Still another outstanding problem is the shortage in the school cafeterias of plates, dishes, and technical equipment, as well as plumbing and sewage facilities, which are either nonexistent or inoperative. Understandably, as a result, it is quite impossible to prepare meals for children that meet all the requirements in terms of calories and proper sanitation. And not in all cases is this shortage attributable to a lack of equipment from the Central Union of Consumers' Cooperatives. There is little concern for the schools being shown by their own directors. They do not plan on making repairs, and they do not use the equipment they have in a proprietary manner. Moreover, the innovation being shown in the construction of facilities for children is progressing sideways, as they say; so we engender problems. Buildings continue to be erected according to obsolete designs without cafeterias, lunch counters, or kitchens, and without gymnasiums. It is absolutely impossible to find the equipment to build facilities outside the plan. The State Committee for Material and Technical Supply will not allocate it; there is no place to order it from, nor is there any way for a kolkhoz to pay for it by contracting for it directly.

The meeting brought to light several examples of adults showing little concern about the menu of our youngest citizens. Our republic was the first in the country to decide to provide free meals for children under the age of two. An enormous investment was made to accomplish this. It became apparent, however, that a large part of it went up in smoke; or, more accurately, was wasted on stale, long-unused formula foods for children that were purchased abroad. This is the picture that emerged. The oblast voted to provide 57 percent of the children with milk products, and in Chardzhouskiy Rayon, for example, only 22.5 percent of the children had them free of charge.

It is not an uncommon occurrence for stores to sell, in place of these foods, products that are not even remotely related to food for children.

The situation in the oblast (and in the republic as a whole) is not alleviated by milk kitchens. They are unable to provide the necessary assortment of food products for the young ones since they are poorly equipped and lack the raw materials. Incidentally, in all the civilized countries milk kitchens are long since a thing of the past. The production of food for children has long been industrialized, assuring a much higher standard of quality. Meanwhile, we cannot do without them; for bad as they are, they fulfill a function. We do have our own dairy products plant, but our high hopes for it have not been justified. It is still not being utilized at full operating capacity. We also lack processing plants for canning meat and vegetable products for children.

"But there are plans to build them," said TuSSR Goskontrol Chairman S. Motayev. "One of the top-priority programs approved in the republic includes a provision for such facilities." They should begin to operate between 1991 and 1995. It is essential for deputies locally to place these projects under the strictest supervision; for the nutrition of our children—and this means their health, of course—is going to depend largely on them.

In discussing problems of organizing food for children in the oblast, an attempt was made by the meeting's participants to avoid blunt criticism and view the situation from a constructive standpoint. Literally breaking in on the speakers, A. A. Snezhko and S. Motayev admonished them: "Give us your proposals, please!" Alas, their appeals went for the most part unheard.

Some valuable suggestions with regard to opportunities and untapped resources were made by M. Razhapov, chairman of the TuSSR State Planning Committee; A. Atayeva, TuSSR minister of public health; and TuSSR people's deputies P. Tanrykuliyev and T. Oradova, among others.

In sum, the steps that must be followed, so that the promises made to the children by their elders do not remain merely on paper, are these: Work out within one month a system to ensure a balanced supply of food and material supplies to milk kitchens, schools, and preschool institutions. Establish continuous monitoring of both the quality and distribution of food products for children in cooperation with work supervisors. It is, of course, no secret that a share of the proceeds of food that has been paid for is being pilfered by dishonest workers employed in the cafeterias and kitchens, and perhaps some of the food served free of charge is also "disappearing." To continue: Take appropriate action to complete calculations of budget appropriations and resources required to provide food free of charge. Within a two-month period, complete a thorough inventory of technical equipment on hand; repair it; and redistribute it, as required, to schools and kindergartens. Establish a

system for the accounting, distribution, and efficient utilization of food products. These are the main avenues of approach. Many others were projected. Deadlines were set, and persons responsible for specific actions were designated. The resolution that was adopted applies to Chardzhou Oblast, but the situation is even worse in other oblasts. It is of the utmost importance for the local soviets also to exert their leadership in assuring that action is taken immediately. It must be realized that the implementation of this resolution in support of the children, which is of such vital importance for the republic, may be disrupted by the onset of free-market conditions.

It remains to be said that the work of the Chardzhou Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies was recognized as being insufficient. Nevertheless, the committees singled out no one for punishment.

"That is not our purpose," said Alla Annadurdyevna Snezhko. "It was more important to get to the root of the problems that have been preventing us from carrying out our program—to find the ways and means, the resources and capabilities. We all realize, of course, that problems of nutrition are linked to another problem that is especially painful for the republic—the high rate of illness and death in infancy and childhood. We simply do not have the right to put off a decision today about what will appear on the menu tomorrow for newly born infants and school-going children. We, the elders, must answer for the health of our children. In June we intend to return once again to this issue. It is incumbent upon managers and leaders of oblast organizations, who have been heretofore unconcerned, to come up with a comprehensive response.

The current session has been reviewing a number of vital matters in which the provision of food for children is included. Funds are allocated for this purpose in the budget.

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